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Settler colonies arose out of a form of European colonialism 
where a white collectivity was installed permanently on 
territory formerly occupied by non-European 'indigenous' 
peoples. In British colonies where white settlers formed 
the majority population - the United States, Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand - the political, economic and 
cultural infrastructure has historically privileged whites 
over 'indigenous' groups. -In recent years territorial 
appropriations, which formed the basis of national wealth in 
these places, have been the focus of struggles for self- 
determination by 'first peoples'. 
This thesis focuses on the colonisation of New Zealand to 
show that although there were commonalities between white 
settler colonies, generally the historic specificity of 
nation building in each place, together with the way in 
which racial hierarchies were interpreted by colonialists, 
meant that national formations developed differently. 
New Zealand was the last of the 'dominions' to be settled 
and it became a commonplace that this was the most 
successful British colony in terms of racial harmony, 
largely because of a treaty made with the Maori. However 
recent reinterpretations of the nation's history have shown 
that while this treaty has functioned as a symbol of 
nationhood, notions of 'civility' which were brought to bear 
on the Maori people meant the terms of the treaty were never 
honoured. 
The thesis examines, through analyses of a variety of 
cultural artefacts, - from nineteenth century travel writing 
to contemporary cultural forms - films, television and 
museums -, the way Icivilising discourses' underpinned a 
matrix of ethnic, gendered and class-based differences which 
legitimated the privilege of the settler majority. 
In recent years reinterpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
and the severing of ties with Britain, have led to new forms 
of nationhood constructed around the lindigenisation' of the 
'treaty partners' - Maori and Pakeha. Drawing on Cultural 
Studies approaches to representation and ethnicity, the 
thesis addresses issues which arise specifically from the 
way in which these shifts have challenged the hegemony of 
'whiteness' in the colonial context. 
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Chapter 1 
A key contention of this thesis is that the 
colonisation of New Zealand was a racialised 
process. It argues that in order to facilitate the 
conditions necessary for capitalist modes of 
production and exchange the territory was, during 
the latter half of the nineteenth century, brought 
under the governance of a colonial state formation 
which privileged the economic, political and 
cultural interests of white European settlers over 
the indigenous people. Maori were systematically 
stripped of their land and largely disenfranchised 
from the apparatus of government as the colony 
emerged as a structured totality -a legal, 
administrative, educative and moral force - which 
developed what can be broadly characterised as a 
'system of rules' in order to meet the needs of the 
burgeoning capitalist system. 
The thesis is centrally concerned with analysing 
'whiteness' as a racial identity which has 
historically been invisible, centred and unmarked in 
the monologic, hierarchical and authoritative 
discourses of nation. By explicating the way the 
hegemony of whiteness has been maintained through 
structural and signifying dimensions, the following 
chapters examine the crisis of nation in terms of 
the social, political and cultural processes which 
have legitimated the colonisation of the territory. 
The thesis argues that the recent attempts to arrive 
at a 'settlement' with Maori have been important to 
the realignment of the national political and 
economic order brought about by globalisation and 
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deregulation. Forced to break with the colonial 
relationship binding the place to Britain, the New 
Zealand economy has, in recent years, been 
repositioned within the orbit of the Asia/Pacific 
Rim. The institutional and cultural 'settlement' 
with Maori (based around the rhetoric of 
biculturalism and marked by financial and 
territorial reparations) has ensured that the nation 
is perceived by international markets to have the 
capacity to cede sovereignty to the interests of 
global capital through its amelioration of the 
threat to political and social instability posed by 
the 'minority' challenge. 
The analysis of whiteness in the following chapters 
examines the relationship between structural and 
signifying dimensions of hegemony to show how ideas 
of race have pervaded the social and cultural 
formation and have been the focus of complex 
struggles over shifting political meanings 
articulated and rearticulated through identity 
claims, particularly in relation to the issue of 
sovereignty. 
New Zealand comprises three islands - the North 
Island, the South Island and Stewart Island - which 
lie in the South Pacific, 1200 miles south-east of 
Australia, the country's nearest neighbour. The 
current population is just over three million with 
the total land mass of the three islands roughly 
equalling that of the United Kingdom. In other 
words, for a territory which is almost completely 
habitable (aside from a spine of mountains running 
along the edge of the South Island), it is relatively 
sparsely populated. 
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Despite being sold as a destination offering visitors 
an unspoilt nature paradise (there are extensive 
reaches of undeveloped coastline and areas of 
relatively pristine native forest), the landscape, 
first surveyed by European explorers two centuries 
ago, has been rapi dly transformed. Deforestation 
during the nineteenth century created millions of 
acres of agricultural pasture which, in the twentieth 
century, has given way to sprawling conurbations 
where most of the population now live. 
The exploitation of limited natural resources (such 
as gold, fisheries and native timbers) has been part 
of the imposition of modernity (the handmaiden of a 
voracious capitalism) on a territory previously 
managed by the indigenous people whose distinct 
tribal identities were homogenised into the singular 
race category 'Maori' by the colonisers in the mid- 
ninteenth century (Kelsey, 1995: 184). 
Since the earliest days of colonisation, land has 
been central to wealth generation and as a result, it 
has also been the focus of the long political 
struggle by tribal groups against what they perceive 
to be the betrayals of the colonisers. The legal 
foundation for Maori demands for self-determination 
have been based on the Treaty of Waitangi tribal 
leaders signed with the British Crown in 1840 which 
the tribes were led to understand at the time, 
guaranteed their on-going entitlements to land and 
resources in exchange for ceding overall sovereignty 
of the territory to the colonisers. Despite the 
treaty, the wealth of the colony has always accrued 
disproportionately to white settlers and their 
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descendants while Maori have been excluded, firstly 
from their tribal lands and then from the surplus 
generated by the burgeoning capitalist economyl. 
Maori people have long featured in Government 
statistics, as one of the most disadvantaged grouping 
in relation to access to housing, education, jobs, 
health care, transport whilst being 
disproportionately over-represented in the prison 
population 2. This economic, political and cultural 
marginalisation provides material evidence of the 
extent to which the imposition of modernity was a 
racialised process. 
Foucault's notion of 'governmentalityl has been used 
in the thesis to describe the way colonisation 
imposed a totalising grid of institutional structures 
- political, cultural, economic and legal - on the 
territory during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries in order to produce a national 
formation which was part of the emerging world system 
of 'the West' (Foucault, 1991). Within the global 
configuration of 'the West', whiteness has functioned 
as a universalised identity, a performative ideal, 
aligned with the individualised subject of modernity. 
Until recently whiteness remained unmarked and 
largely invisible in discourses of nation (white New 
Zealanders were the New Zealanders), but counter- 
hegemonic challenges to the power and privilege of 
this dominant group during the past thirty years have 
brought about a crisis precisely because, as a 
collectivity, white New Zealanders have lost their 
transparency, their apparent Iracelessness'. 
1 Ten percent of the population now identify themselves in 
ethnicity census as 'Maori' (New Zealand official Yearbook, 
1997). 
2 ibid. 
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The thesis examines the shift from the unifying 
discourses of nation based on the myth, 'We are one 
people', to the more recent biculturalist version 
based on the notion that 'We are all settlers'. 
These shifts are testimony to the plasticity of 
identity in the national context. As Balibar puts: 
No nation posseses an ethnic base naturally, but 
as social formations are nationalised the 
populations included within them are ethnicised; 
represented in the past, or in the future, as if 
they formed a natural community possessing an 
identity or origins, culture and interests which 
transcends individuals and social conditions 
(Balibar, 1991a: 96). 
As the shift to biculturalism, has produced new and 
different institutional and signifying practices 
purporting to accommodate Maori lifeways across all 
spheres of economic, political, social and cultural 
life, new versions of white identity have also 
emerged. 
Using Gramscils concept of hegemony (broadly defined 
as a form of rule which operates by structuring its 
subjects and incorporating contestation), the thesis 
analyses whiteness by examining the relationship 
between economic and cultural life (Gramsci, 1971). 
It analyses the ways in which political processes, 
policy making and social movements are bound up with 
struggles over meaning and identity (represented in 
cultural form) and shows how racial signifiers 
pervade social and political institutions to produce 
forms of subjectivity through which individuals are 
socialised into forms of national belonging (Hall, 
1986). 
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Focusing on specific texts, the thesis shows how 
cultural artefacts put into circulation particular 
meanings which have material determinants at certain 
historical moments. It emphasises that while 
discourse is of vital importance in understanding the 
way hegemonic formations define a 'common sense' at 
any one time, so are the forces which shape and 
change these discourses over time. 
The thesis draws on the critical perspectives and 
methodologies of British Cultural Studies which has, 
since the 1960s, developed a variety of approaches 
for the analysis, interpretation and criticism of 
culture. Breaking with established academic 
divisions of labour, which have tended to abstract 
cultural texts from their socio-political and 
economic contexts, Cultural Studies posits 'culture' 
as constitutive of social relations, institutions and 
knowledges. It is centrally concerned with 
representation as the site of power and regulation; 
of the relationship between texts (intertextuality) 
and between cultural institutions and texts 
(contexts). 
Methodologically, the inter-disciplinarity of 
Cultural Studies draws on a range of approaches. 
Textual analysis is combined with sociological and 
historical investigation of cultural production in 
institutional and spatial contexts, to examine the 
interplay between representation and meaning in 
relation to class, gender, race, ethnicity and 
sexuality at different levels of the social formation 
from global to national to local and across public 
and private spheres. 
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John Kraniauskas has described Cultural Studies as: 
an almost unmappable field of critical inquiry 
endowed with both a set of languages and local 
histories. At its most institutionally 
radical it is an anti-disciplinary discipline 
with a multitude of practitioners working, on 
the one hand, at the boundaries between 
disciplines and, on the other, in response to 
social movements and even political parties, 
with an eye to illuminating the ways relations 
of power are experienced in everyday life 
(Kraniauskas, 1998: 9) 
Broadly speaking, the approaches to the texts and 
textuality of culture used across the field of 
Cultural Studies, exist in what could be described as 
a productive tension between analyses of cultural 
production, focused on the political economy of the 
culture industries (and the extent to which this 
'determines' content), to text-centred approaches 
(where textual analysis undertaken by 'expert 
readers' who make qualitative judgements through the 
interpretation of texts) to 'cultural populism', 
which is concerned with the actual consumption of 
texts and valorises the meaning-making processes of 
%ordinary' audiences/consumers. 
Stuart Hall gives an account of these tensions when 
he describes cultural texts both as a source of 
meaning, and as that which escapes or postpones 
meaning: 
There's always something decentred about the 
medium of culture, about language, textuality 
and signification which always escapes and 
evades the attempt to link it, directly and 
immediately, with other structures. At the same 
time the shadow, the imprint, the trace of those 
formations, of the intertextuality of texts in 
their institutional positions, of texts as 
sources of power, of textuality, as the site of 
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representation and resistance ..... (means) it has 
always been impossible ... to get anything like 
an adequate account of culture's relations and 
its effects (Hall, 1992: 284). 
And of course this 'impossibility' is exacerbated 
when 'culture' is considered at the level of global 
production, circulation and consumption. How is 
meaning produced, circulated, translated and 
transformed across and between different spatio- 
temporal zones and identity groups? 
Such issues have been central to the choice, and the 
analysis of texts in the thesis. Chapter Five 
considers the representation of race, ethnicity, 
class and nation across a range of texts which 
exemplify the complex inter-relationship between 
culture as a mediation of technology, spatial 
relations, history and audiences. For example, the 
development of exhibits at Te Papa Tongarewa, the 
national museum which opened in Wellington in 1998, 
was based on the collaboration of a range of 
governmental and Maori groups. This makes the museum 
an appropriate 'text' for analysing the way new 
accounts of race, ethnicity and nation are being 
produced in New Zealand as the terrain of 
'biculturalism' continues to be fought over., 
The representation of these issues is highly charged 
politically and therefore an institutional account of 
the planning and development stage of the museum 
would be necessary to reveal the complex issues 
discussed 'behind the scenes' and translated into the 
content of the exhibits. A Cultural Studies analysis 
of the museum's exhibits would require an engagement 
with a complex range of 'domains' - from planning and 
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architecture to art historical discourses and would 
ideally include an ethnographic aspect because so 
much of the institutional material was not made 
public. Clearly, this 'totalising' approach to the 
museum as text is beyond the scope of the thesis as 
it is structured. Nevertheless, the account offered 
in Chapter Five attempts to tease out some of the 
complexities and tensions operating at the 
institutional level, and move beyond the one- 
dimensional plane of the exhibits as text. 
Chapter Five also includes an analysis of a segment 
of Itelevisual flow' - the live coverage of a 
football match. Given the ubiquity of television in 
everyday life, together with the centrality of sport 
(particularly rugby) in producing national 
identifications, television is a crucial medium for 
any analysis of representation and identity in New 
Zealand. The codes and conventions of television 
genres tend to be standarised and universalised, with 
technologies and formats sold globally and translated 
at the level of the local/national. This 'local 
content' needs to be analysed in terms of context 
and intertextuality, (particularly because of the 
commercial imperative to generate advertising revenue 
organised around schedules appealing to targeted 
audience segments), if the complex mediations of this 
'flow' are to be understood. The examples discussed 
in this section analyse the generic codes of 'live' 
broadcasts to show how viewers are 'sutured' into 
event and potentially interpellated as 'national' 
subjects. 
In Chapter Four a contemporary collection of essays - 
Pakeha: The Quest for Identity in New Zealand, edited 
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by Michael King - is drawn on to explore textual 
reformulations of 'whiteness' in the context of 
Ibiculturalism' which, in this book, sees the 
reiteration of a range of 'indigenising' tropes - 
myths of origin, relationships to land and nature - 
also apparent in contemporary representations of 
Maoriness. The collection is of particular interest 
here because it is an example of a genre of populist, 
'%middle-brow' publications addressing the 
contemporary 'crisis' of pakeha identity. The other 
texts examined in this section comprise a range of 
late nineteenth century travellers accounts and 
settler guides selected from the relatively small 
corpus of material written about New Zealand during 
the early days of colonisation. 
As an expatriate white New Zealand woman who has 
lived in London for the past twenty years, the 
writing of this thesis - the 'making strange' of my 
relationship to New Zealand and its racialised 
history - has involved a process of self-reflexivity 
which has made the work something of an 
autobiographical journey. 
Leaving New Zealand in 1979,1 experienced my 
whiteness for the first time in the 'aliens' queues 
at Heathrow where, without a stamp of patriality in 
my passport, I was required to account for my arrival 
in the country. My inability to establish recent- 
enough patrilineal blood-line connections with 
Britain provided me with my first glimpse of the 
racialised boundaries of my subjectivity. 
I arrived in London the month the white New Zealand 
school teacher Blair Peach was killed by police at an 
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anti-racist march in Southall; it was also the month 
Margaret Thatcher entered Downing Street. I 
immediately found myself caught up in a milieu which 
I am now in a position to characterise as a 
politicisation of everyday life. 
Despite the Thatcherite attack on the public sector, 
London boasted a network of publicly funded amenities 
- museums, theatres, libraries, parks, bathhouses, 
pools and laundries, voluntary organisations, housing 
co-operatives and so on - unlike anything available 
in New Zealand. I came to understand that the 
commitment to this public sphere contributed to a 
general level of politicisation around class issues 
which was inconceivable in New Zealand, where a 
relatively weak public sphere emerged in order to 
facilitate capitalist modes of production and 
consumption rather than to ameliorate the historic 
demands of the working class as it was industrialised 
and urbanised (as was the case in Britain). At the 
same time, the legacy of Empire, which had to a large 
extent generated the wealth underpinning the public 
sphere, was represented in a way which failed to link 
the presence of black people in Britain with the 
nation's colonial past. 
Making connections between the presence of black 
people in Britain, my colonial origins and the 
naturalisation of my 'whiteness' became possible when 
I encountered debates about race and identity at 
university. This provided me with a theoretical 
framework through which I could begin to examine 
'whiteness' and to reassess my relationship with New 
Zealand. 
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Growing up in a sprawling all-white suburb of New 
Zealand's largest city, Auckland, I had experienced 
from an early age the oppressive proscriptions of 
ascribed gender roles but, in relation to race and 
ethnicity, I can now see that 'whiteness' was 
completely naturalised. 
My family were unexceptional in their genealogical 
connection to Europe; both my parents' families had 
left Europe in the mid-nineteenth century for New 
Zealand. My father's family were strict Methodists 
who had left Yorkshire in the 1850s to join a farming 
community in the Waikato while my mother, a 
Fredrickson, was a direct descendant of Norwegians 
who had settled on the North Island coast in a place 
they called Norswood. 
In the 1960s, my parents, who had both left school at 
14 unqualified and unskilled, were nevertheless 
economically secure enough to take on a 25-year 
mortgage in order to purchase a quarter-acre plot of 
land in a suburb on the edge of Auckland. The house 
they had built on this land was, for some years, 
surrounded by ungrazed farmland which had been 
surveyed and marked out for residential development. 
I now know that the land on which the house was built 
had been part of an extensive tract of tribal 
territory bordering the banks of the Tamaki estuary, 
a stretch of nearby water which, for my parents and 
their neighbours, constituted nothing more than that 
most prized real estate aspect -a 'sea view'. In 
the 1980s the land on which the suburb was built 
became the focus of a substantial claim for 
reparations in the Land Court. 
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Over a period of ten years the open space around our 
house was transformed into a maze of cul-de-sacs 
offering dead-end access to new-build three bedroomed 
weatherboard houses with double garages, mortgaged to 
young white couples with children who at that time 
would have considered themselves to be struggling to 
gain a foothold on the ladder to prosperity. 
Everyday suburban life in New Zealand hummed with 
low-level racism directed primarily against Maori 
people who seemed to choose the most run-down places 
to live, to drive the most beaten-up cars and to wear 
the scruffiest clothes. In a place where appearance 
was everything - suburban life involved an energetic 
regime of status-enhancing domestic and corporeal 
labour - the invective directed against Maori as 
dirty, lazy 'good for nothings' seemed to be borne 
out by their refusal to adopt a suitable ('white') 
lifestyle. 
Race issues in New Zealand have, in recent times, 
obscured pressing political and social issues related 
to the multinational takeover of one of the most 
deregulated economic zones in the globalised economy. 
Aside from those who continue to benefit directly 
from the spoils of laissez-faire capitalism, most New 
Zealanders - no matter what their racial or ethnic 
identification - have experienced the erosion of 
what was always a relatively weak public sphere, an 
end to formerly taken-for-granted civil rights and 
the on-going destruction of the environment in the 
service of economic development. Just as the 
discourses of race legitimated the colonisation of 
the place, so the mirage of race (as a Maori 
'problem') continues to disguise rampant exploitation 
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in a place where , as Kelsey puts it ' the mass of 
the population remains fragmented, unorganised, 
insecure and apathetic' (Kelsey, 1995 : 191). Despite 
the 'bicultural settlement', which has 
institutionalised Maori and Pakeha as 'partners', 
the discourses of nation continue to be racialised in 
ways which naturalise links between colonisation, the 
so-called democratic process and the reinvigoration 
of global capitalism brought about by neo-liberal 
approaches to 'globalityl. It is my contention that 
an analysis of whiteness as a racialised category is 
an important step in addressing the continuing 
disavowal of the links between race, nation and 
capitalism. 
Any re-assessment of the New Zealand's colonial past 
cannot be isolated from a much broader context in 
which the legacy of European imperialism has been 
played out globally. Every place subjected to 
colonialist intervention has been involved in some 
form of territorial or ethnic struggle 3. 
In Britain, post-war immigration from former colonies 
in Africa, the Caribbean and the Indian sub-continent 
have racialised issues around national identity and 
ethnicity. The significant presence of black and 
Asian people in the United Kingdom has given rise to 
a politics which challenges the exclusions and 
unequal access of groups (characterised in dominant 
discourses as 'immigrants' and 'ethnic minorities') 
to all areas of national life whilst at the same time 
3 Imperialism means the practice, the theory and the attitudes 
of a dominating metropolitan centre ruling a distant territory; 
colonialism, which is almost always a consequence of 
imperialism is the implanting of settlements on distant 
territory (Said, 1993: 8). 
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continuing to disavow explicit historical and 
economic connections with the Commonwealth. 
During the post-war period race and ethnicity have 
emerged as key terms in political and social 
contestation, creating powerful alliances between 
geographically dispersed groups whilst disrupting 
hegemonic forms of national identification. 
As a result of these shifts, British Cultural Studies 
has moved beyond its Marxist origins (and a 
preoccupation with the historic agency of class) to 
refocus on the relationship between discourses of 
race, gender and nation in the construction of 
hegemonic versions of 'Englishness'. Such 
constructions have privileged hierarchies of social 
organisation and cultural distinction which have 
maintained the dominance of an English ethnicity, 
increasingly seen as the exemplar of 'whiteness' 
(Young, 1990; Rattansi, 1994). 
Debates about race, ethnicity and national identity 
in Britain have connected more widely with critiques 
of Western ethnocentrism showing that imperialism and 
colonialism were not marginal activities on the edges 
of 'European civilisation' but were fundamental to 
'Western' cultural self-representation - in other 
words racialised discourses underpinned the project 
of Modernity (Goldberg, 1993). 
The rather broad field of investigation (known in the 
Anglo-American academy as 'post-colonial studies') 
has analysed how discursive formations such as 
10rientalism' have positioned 'Europe' as superior to 
non-European Others. Foucault's work on the 
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articulation of particular power/knowledge relations 
through the production of discursive formations, 
provided a theoretical basis for what has effectively 
become the founding text for contemporary 
'postcolonial theory', Edward Said's Orientalism 
(Said, 1978). 
Said's work established a general theoretical 
paradigm through which the cultural forms of colonial 
and imperial ideologies could be analysed. By 
shifting the study of colonialism away from the 
positivist focus on economic and political structures 
towards a consideration of the complex fields through 
which discourse operates, Said demonstrated that a 
range of representational practices in literary 
texts, travel writings, memoirs and across academic 
disciplines, were implicated in the complex 
power/knowledge relations underpinning colonialism. 
His work has been important in opening up areas of 
study dealing with the centrality of issues relating 
to imperial and colonial histories in fields where 
they were traditionally overlooked (literary and 
legal studies for example), and has encouraged the 
development of a critical and theoretical vocabulary 
which can deal with such phenomena 4. The application 
of Said's approach to different contexts has 
demonstrated the way 'colonialist' texts function as 
more than mere documentation or 'evidence'. As Hulme 
argues: 
4 It is important to note that Orientalism has subsequently been 
the object of wide-ranging critiques which have focused on the 
way Said ended up replicating the totalising discourses he set 
out to dismantle by constructing his own version of an 
essentialised 'Orient'; which James Clifford describes as a 'hermeneutic short-circuit'(Clifford, 1988; Mills, 1991; 
Ahmad, 1992). 
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Underlying the idea of colonial discourses 
the presumption that during the colonial 
period large parts of the non-European world 
were produced for Europe through a discourse 
that imbricated sets of questions and 
assumptions, methods of procedure and 
analysis, and kinds of writing .... normally 
separated out into discrete areas of military 
strategy, political order, imaginative 
literature and personal memoir (Hulme, 1986: 
2). 
While such an approach provides an important and 
different framework for analysing the political, 
economic and administrative aspects of colonial power 
(by emphasising that the language used to enact, 
enforce, describe or analyse colonialism was never 
transparent, innocent, ahistorical or simply 
instrumental), it tends to focus on colonisers' 
accounts of Others rather than examining how European 
identities themselves were constituted differently in 
different colonial contexts. 
So-called 'postcoloniall encounters in the West (such 
as the post-war migrations mentioned earlier), have 
given rise to an identity politics focused on notions 
of cultural hybridity, diaspora and difference which 
together articulate a particular kind of contemporary 
'metropolitan experience'. Theories of 
postcoloniality have tended to universalise these 
encounters as representative of an emerging global 
condition: a move which replicates the imperial 
hierarchies of 'the West and the rest' 
(Hall, 1992: 275). 
Thus it can be argued that the term 'post-colonial', 
in describing both a 'global condition' and a 
theoretical approach which critiques Eurocentrism, 
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attempts to designate 'too many things, all at once' 
(Dirlik, 1994). As a temporal marker 'post- 
colonialityl suggests a binary - colonial/post- 
colonial - representing history as a series of stages 
in a teleological narrative from the 'pre-colonial' 
to the 'colonial' and on to the 'post-colonial'. Used 
in this way, the term is monolithic and glosses not 
only geo-political distinctions in relation to 
specific regional histories and differing forms of 
colonisation/decolonisation but more importantly, 
fails to account for complex forms of Ineo- 
colonialism' which are re-aligning global economic 
relations. 
The phrase 'colonial discourse' belongs to the 
critical vocabulary of 1postcoloniality', a concept 
which as Terry Eagleton wryly points out, it has 
become almost de rigeur to problematise: 
There must be a secret handbook for post- 
colonial critics which reads 'Begin by 
rejecting the whole notion of post- 
colonialism' 5. 
This uneasiness is linked, in part, with the fact 
that so-called post-colonial theorists find 
themselves not only speaking on behalf of 'colonial 
subjects' but invariably from a position inside the 
Euro-American academy. To this end Aijaz Ahmad argues 
that the terms of the debate which he defines as 'the 
condition of post-colonialityl, have been determined 
from an Anglo-American Icentrel, often by those 
Idiasporic intellectuals' who have left the periphery 
5 Eagleton's comment appears in his review 'In the Gaudy 
Supermarket', London Review of Books, 13 May, 1999. 
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to take up privileged positions within this academy. 
He argues that: 
the figure of the migrant, especially the 
migrant (postcolonial) intellectual residing 
in the metropolis, comes to signify a 
universal condition of hybridity and is said 
to be the subject of Truth (Ahmad, 1995: 13). 
He suggests that the drive to carve out an academic 
'niche' has meant that colonial encounters in the 
'contact zones' of the peripheries have tended to 
receive less attention not least because circuits of 
academic production and consumption are dominated by 
the Euro-American academy and related cultural 
industries, in particular publishing. 
Certainly, in post-colonial studies the 'whiteness' 
of settler colonies such as Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada has been largely taken for granted or 
simply ignored. Even in the United States (which 
despite its status as a modern imperialist nation was 
also a white settler colony), the linked discourses 
of multiculturalism and post-colonial theory have 
marginalised issues around indigeneity in relation to 
Native American Indians. As Nicholas Thomas argues: 
Debates about race, minority identities, 
representations of ethnicity ... are almost 
always about Afro-Americans, Hispanics and 
other immigrant people of colour... there is 
no widely read theoretical text that speaks 
from the indigenous perspective in the way 
that the works of Gates, bell hooks, Cornel 
West speak from the Afro-American experience 
or as Said's Orientalism and Spivak's work 
presents the positions of diasporic 
intellectuals from the Middle East and South 
Asia respectively.... there seems scope for 
the marginal societies of Australia, New 
Zealand and Canada for which indigenous 
assertions and identities are powerfully 
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present to write back into the debates 
(Thomas, 1994: 172). 
The invisibility of whiteness as a dominant ethnicity 
in places such as New Zealand, Canada and Australia, 
and the way in which the current political struggles 
of indigenous peoples has been overlooked, has 
occurred partly because these places tend to be 
peripheral in terms of global flows of culture, 
information and knowledge production. Across all 
forms of cultural production (from academic and 
literary publishing to television and the news media, 
advertising, cinema and popular music), cross-border 
circulation of texts tends to flow unevenly, and 
although the pan-global circulation of capital and 
culture makes it increasingly problematic to speak of 
a binary Icentre/peripheryl axis, cultural production 
and distribution takes place 'elsewhere' (Tomlinson, 
1991: 14). This apparent marginality further 
complicates the field of the 1postcoloniall, 
suggesting that issues to do with globalisation and 
cultural imperialism, the circuits and flows of 
cultural production and consumption at a global 
level, are inextricably bound up with colonial 
histories; to this end the Taiwanese-based academic 
Kuan-Hsing Chen has called for an international 
cultural studies which 'provincialises the dominant 
Anglo-American cultural studies' (Chen, 1996: 37 )6. 
6 For Chen, the 'post-colonial' is an Anglo-American invention 
which now claims universality and legitimacy to 'frame' other 
parts of the world, arguing that: 
Beyond the therapeutic function, so that previous colonisers 
feel better, postcolonial discourse in effect obscures the 
faces of a neo-colonial structure in the process of 
reconstructing global capitalism and potentially becomes the 
leading theory of the hegemonic re-ordering (Chen, 1996: 
51). 
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Colonial encounters in the West's peripheries 
prefigured, by centuries, the dislocations which the 
paradigms of 'post-modernity' now universalise 7 As 
Anthony King argues: 
The first multi-racial, multi-cultural 
societies on any substantial scale were in 
the periphery not the core and they were 
constructed under the very specific economic, 
political, social and cultural conditions of 
colonialism (King, 1993: 8). 
In settler colonies, where majority white European 
populations were installed on territory appropriated 
from indigenous groups, 'multiracial, multicultural' 
encounters took place in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. These encounters resulted in 
long struggles by the 'First Peoples' of colonised 
territories focused politically on land-rights and 
culturally on claims to an 'authentic' indigeneity. 
Such struggles, in apparently 'peripheral' places 
where the colonisers never left, not only complicate 
the notion of 'post-colonialityl but also 
problematise theories of diaspora and hybridity which 
articulate a specifically metropolitan experience 
based on an anti-essentialist critique of racialised 
identities. 
The analysis presented in the following chapters 
examines struggles over indigeneity and 'belonging' 
in a specific geo-political context. It shows how the 
reassessment of colonialism in New Zealand can write 
key issues back into 'postcoloniall debates which 
7 Hannerz suggests that the First World has been present in the 
consciousness of many Third World peoples a great deal longer 
than the Third World has been on the minds of the first 
(Hannerz, 1991: 110). 
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have been largely framed within a metropolitan 
context. 
New Zealand was the last of the settler colonies to 
be established in the British Empire. Historically, 
there was a straightforward link between settler 
appropriations of land, the economic power and 
privilege of the white majority and the dispossession 
of the Maori. Land taken from Maori tribal groups 
provided the basis for a pastoral economy structured 
around a political, economic and legal relationship 
with Britain which guaranteed relative prosperity for 
white immigrant settlers and their descendants. 
Until recently it was a commonplace (in dominant 
accounts at least), that New Zealand was Britain's 
most successful colony in terms of racial harmony, 
largely because of the 1840 treaty made with the 
Maori. In colonial territories the installation of a 
political, economic and social structure which could 
facilitate a capitalist social formation was 
underpinned by legal apparatus (based on liberal 
notions of formal universal equality) protecting the 
concept of private property and systems of contract. 
As Chapter Three discusses, recent reinterpretations 
of the nation's history have shown that while the 
Treaty of Waitangi (1840) has functioned as a 
powerful symbol of nationhood and racial 
assimilation, notions of 'civility' which were 
brought to bear on the Maori people meant that the 
terms of the treaty were never honoured - it was used 
primarily as a means to legitimate and expedite the 
imposition of colonial power. 
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More broadly the project of modernity was based on a 
commitment to progress: to material, moral, physical 
and political improvement, the mastery of Nature and 
the promotion and development of civilisation. Thus 
the structural inequalities and exclusions built into 
the process of colonial nation-building in New 
Zealand were shored up by moral (and racialised) 
discourses, based on universalised doctrine of self 
and society, which legitimated the dispossession of 
the indigenous people, but also positioned the 
nation's citizens unequally in relation to the 
supposed entitlements of modernity (as enshrined in 
the ideals of democratic governmentality). As 
Goldberg puts it: 
As modernity commits itself progressively to 
idealised principles of liberty equality and 
fraternity, as it increasingly insists on the 
moral irrelevance of race, there is a 
multiplication of racial identities and the 
sets of exclusions they prompt and 
rationalise... race is irrelevant but all is 
race (Goldberg, 1993: 6). 
While it is possible to argue that race has been the 
dominant organising category for the imperialist 
expansions of modernity it continues to function as 
an impossibly slippery and contradictory concept. 
Broadly, discourses of race signify socio-political 
conflicts and interests by differentiating between, 
and ranking, different types of human bodies 
(Winant, 1994: 270). Although race appeals to 
biologically-based human attributes (for example the 
epidermal schema i. e. skin colour), the selection of 
particular human features used to signify race is 
always a social and historical process (and is 
therefore necessarily imprecise and arbitrary). 
Importantly, while there is no biological basis for 
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distinguishing human groups along the lines of 
racialised attributes - in other words 'race' is a 
not a natural attribute - it has real material 
effects. 
As Foucault has shown, the newly emerging natural 
sciences produced 'knowledge' through practices which 
ordered and classified according to perceived 
differences (Foucault, 1986). Historically, the 
imperialist application of a racialised grid, based 
on putative biological differences, was global in its 
reach but delineated in terms of spatial hierarchies: 
Africa was the 'dark continent', Oceania the space of 
the 'noble savage', while the Orient represented 
amongst other things, the 'exotic' (Said: 1979). 
Spatial distinctions were made through theories of 
climate and ecology (for example the tropics were 
seen as places of 'indolence') with different levels 
of development defined in relation to the Western 
notion of 'progress'. Within this spatialised schema 
Europeans were also hierarchically classified on a 
scale which moved upwards from 'dark-skinned and 
passionate' southern Europeans to 'fair-skinned and 
rational northerners' (Goldberg, 1993: 29)8. 
In colonial contexts such as New Zealand, 'whiteness' 
was represented as the repository of racial purity, 
sexual virtue and forms of 'civility', while colonial 
'Others' in these places were marginalised and 
excluded in different ways through classifications 
which defined groups as variously exotic, primitive, 
savage, childlike and inferior. 
8 Thus the term 'European' tends to refer to 'northern Europe', 
specifically to England, Germany and France, 
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However, within the metropolitan social formation 
discourses of 'civility' and 'purity' were also 
deployed in order to maintain the boundaries of 
bourgeois whiteness against a range of 'others' 
including the poor, the insane, and the criminal 
(Stoler, 1992: 321). As Foucault's 'archeaologies' of 
the human sciences have shown, regulation through 
institutional 'technoloqies' involved the 
surveillance of individuals and their bodies across 
the fields of education, the economy, mental health, 
criminal justice. This has meant that the West's 
internal Others (those pathologised as weak, sick, 
insane, poor or criminal) were, like racially Othered 
peoples in the colonies, classified and excluded 
(Foucault: 1973,1979,1986). 
Thus Europe's internal others, from the subaltern 
classes to oppressed ethnic and national groupings 
such as the Irish and the Jews, were excluded from 
the polity at different historical conjunctures. The 
invisibility of 'whiteness' in this context (it was 
class-based rather than 'racial') became explicit 
when deployed in the colonial context. As Kiernan 
puts it: 
In innumerable ways the European gentleman's 
attitude to his own 'lower orders' was 
identical with that of Europe to the 'lesser 
breeds'. Discontented native in the 
colonies, labour agitator in the mills, were 
the same serpent in alternate disguise. Much 
of the talk about the barbarism or darkness 
of the outer world, which it was Europe's 
mission to rout, was a transmuted fear of the 
masses at home (Kiernan, 1986: 316). 
Hierarchies which delineated difference in the 
metropolitan context were translated and transformed 
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in European colonies. Therefore this 'topology of 
difference' - defining what it meant to be white and 
European - cannot be defined exclusively in terms of 
race. It has extended at particular conjunctures 
throughout the social formation of 'the West' 
delineating gender, class, national and regional 
differences with bourgeois 'whiteness' defined in 
terms of what was marked out as 'low' (Elias, 1994). 
While race, constructed in terms of degrees 
'blackness', had been defined within a hierarchy of 
visible differences, 'whiteness' has also been 
naturalised within hierarchies based on notions of 
culture and Icivilisation'. In order to link the 
discourses of race with the discourses of class it is 
important to examine plasticity of 'whiteness' as it 
is symbolised through a matrix of distinctions: the 
'high' defined in terms of its difference from the 
'low' across a range of topographies from the human 
body to the colonial landscape and cultural forms and 
practices. 
The following chapters, summarised below, develop the 
theoretical arguments of this thesis showing how 
contestation in relation to cultural identities and 
forms of belonging, have been rearticulated and 
reformulated at different historic moments. 
Wallerstein argues that the production of ethnicity 
- the constituting of peoples into 'fictive' ethnic 
unities - is the crucial underpinning of forms of 
national identity which are inevitably racially 
hierarchised. He poses the question: 
Why should the establishment of any particular 
sovereign state within the interstate system 
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create a corresponding 'nation' or 'people'? 
(Wallerstein, 1991: 81) 
Historically the stability of this world system of 
nations has relied on identifications with 
nationhood (and Empire) through the interpellatiion 
of the inhabitants of a particular territory as a 
collectively imagined 'people'. Wallerstein 
describes this experience of 'peoplehood' as the 
'complex clay-like historical product of the 
capitalist world economy' with the rules of what 
constitutes 'culture' (in relation to the dominant 
versions of ethnicity in specific national contexts) 
being transmitted through the institutions of the 
state in particular the family, the language and the 
education system (Wallerstein, 1991: 83). 
Within legal studies a new focus on the historic role 
of the Law in furthering imperial objectives has 
extended positivist approaches to the discipline 
which have traditionally 'sealed off' the law as an 
autonomous, specialised practice 'removed from the 
everyday commitments and discourses of social and 
political conflict' (Goodrich, 1987: 5). Such critical 
perspective have analysed the Law within a field of 
practices which have distilled and articulated 
Enlightenment principles through a reified discourse 
which draws its power from 'hierarchical, 
authoritarian, monologic language' (Goodrich, 
1987 : 7) .9 
In settler colonies, the exploitation and 
displacement of indigenous peoples involved the 
9 This work, when applied to the colonial context, usefally makes a link between the approaches 
which have privileged the economic and political aspects of imperialism andpost-colonial 
theory' which tends to privilege cultural forms. 
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appropriation of land for white settlement. 
Throughout the British Empire this was achieved 
through treaties made between colonial administrators 
and native peoples. As Chapter Two argues, the 
European legal apparatus, underpinned by the 
civilising discourses which provided ideological 
legitimation, was a central feature of the colonial 
process, not just to secure land for white settlers, 
but also to guarantee favourable terms of trade for 
the colonisers. Chapter Two shows how the Treaty of 
Waitangi has been used historically to mediate 
shifting relations of power within the colonial 
formation whilst 'on the ground' Maori tribal groups 
have fought against treaty injustices since the 
1840s. 
Chapter Three begins by outlining the Treaty's 
history, drawing on contemporary reinterpretations to 
offer context, and focusing on the proceedings of a 
specially-convened land court in New Zealand which 
has been assessing tribal claims. These claims have 
been based on re-interpretations of translations of 
the treaty. With reference to specific tribal 
claims, this section shows how Maori legal challenges 
to the Treaty of Waitangi have drawn their power from 
the recognition of particular attributes of 
'Maoriness' (in particular spiritual and communal 
relationships with the land) which have been set 
against the perceived avarice and duplicity of 
colonial interventions. 
The final section examines the way in which 
'primitive idealisations' have been the basis of a 
Maori cultural renaissance in New Zealand. While the 
treaty has provided the constitutional basis for a 
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state-brokered 'bicultural' settlement between Maori 
and Pakeha, demands for self-government from tribal 
groupings continue as the assimilationist impulse 
underpinning the settlement is resisted. 
Within theoretical elaborations of the problematic of 
race, it has been recognised that the invisibility of 
'whiteness' as an ethnicity has been due to the 
hegemony of 'white' as a normative, naturalised 
category (Dyer, 1988). 'Post-colonial theory' has 
tended to privilege the analysis of racialised 
notions of the Other over forms of exclusion 
producing an homogenising of both the notion of 
'coloniserl as European and 'colonised' as 'native'. 
In New Zealand 'whiteness' has always been a 
contested form of identity, not only because of the 
nation's on-going relationship with the imperial 
centre, but also because the colonisers were divided 
by conflicting economic interests and different 
visions of the Icivilising mission'. 'Whiteness' was 
constructed in relation to a complex range of 
racialised, gendered and class-based distinctions 
which historically defined what it meant to be a 'New 
Zealander'. 
The transculturation process in which European values 
and lifeways were reproduced in the colonial context 
was an important factor in delineating settler 
differences from the Maori, particularly in relation 
to the colonial version of 'civilised' domesticity. 
Settlers were, in a sense recruited to the mission 
through their enactment of a performative 'whiteness' 
-a transculturated 'Europeaness' - based around a 
repertoire of practices which 'repressed nature' 
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through the repetition of normalised codes 
delineating domestic and corporeal rituals of 
'civility'. These norms were set against the tribal 
lifeways of the Maori, perceived by Europeans to be 
based on a transgression of Icivilised' boundaries, 
particularly in terms of the domestic arrangement of 
space and lack of control in relation to sexuality, 
eating rituals and gendered divisions of labour. 
Moral discourses about the body included regulation 
of sexuality, with white women represented as 
custodians of morality. 'Civilised' sexual behaviour 
was codified within the normative values of 
heterosexuality and the family where Icivilised' 
behaviour was reproduced. The domestic space, the 
sphere of social and biological reproduction, became 
the site where the 'inherent' qualities of whiteness 
(purity, order and cleanliness) were naturalised 
through the invisible domestic labour of white women 
(as either wives, mothers or servants). 
In recent times, versions of whiteness in New Zealand 
have shifted from an identity based on a notion of 
'Europeaness' to an emergent Pakeha identity which 
makes claims to indigeneity. This transformation is 
explored through an analysis of early travellers' 
accounts and publicity material for would-be 
settlers. These accounts are compared to a series of 
recent essays on 'being Pakehal which show how an 
indigenised 'Pakehal identity has been refashioned in 
the face of Maori challenges to white privilege to 
effect a decentring. 
Although race has been the primary organiser of 
difference in discourses of nation, Chapter Four 
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shows that class and gender were also important in 
defining local taxonomies based on 'cultural 
competencies' which separated the colonial 
bourgeoisie from white 'others'. However, this 
situation was further complicated by an ambivalent 
relationship with the imperial centre, where the 
Icreolised' culture of the white settler colony was 
regarded as producing inferior versions of 
'Europeaness'. 
Chapter Five examines the way white hegemony has 
historically been maintained through the local 
cultural formation and a complex interplay between 
the centre and the periphery, and the local and the 
global. It suggests that the one-way flow of cultural 
products from other places, together with historical 
links with Empire, has ensured that the 'imagined 
community' of nation in New Zealand has been 
fragmented and discontinuous with cultural production 
in the 'national' context, tending to reproduce 
globalalised forms with specifically 'local' 
content. To this extent, the global hegemony of 
whiteness is maintained in cultural form through 
local versions of difference which draw on more 
widely intelligible representational practices. For 
example, components which make up the 'national 
culture' were provided by forms and practices 
translated from the imperial metropole, not least 
because English was installed as the national 
language. 
Such translations have given rise to cultural forms 
which combine the canonical (in terms of dominant 
tastes and values translated to the colonial context) 
with a limited repertoire of indigenised elements. A 
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national 'imaginary' has been constructed through 
visual symbols such as flags, maps, statuary, 
ceremonies and public spectacles which, in given 
historical periods, served to unify the majority 
population (despite the rhetoric of 'one people'), 
through a valorisation of 'whiteness' as the shared 
characteristic of nation. At the same time an 
appropriation of the cultural resources of the Maori 
has been crucial in delineating the boundaries 
between the 'new' and the 'old' ethnic 
collectivities, as selected indigenised 
appropriations have been used to furnish 'local' 
(unique) versions of nation. 
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Chapter 2 
This chapter examines the relationship between 
race, ethnicity and nation in a place where the 
institutional mechanisms of the state historically 
guaranteed the majority white population 
disproportionate access to the wealth generated by 
colonisation. This unequal access to power and 
privilege has been the focus of a long struggle by 
Maori. 
As a result of the challenge posed by Maori 
demands for reparations, the discourses of the 
modernist colonial formation, which previously 
sought to assimilate Maori to the national 
project through the unifying myth 'We are one 
people', have, in recent times, been reformulated 
to a 'biculturalist' version: 'Two peoples of one 
nation'. Thus. the on-going crisis of nationhood 
continues to be contested on the terrain of 
'indigeneityl. Its most recent manifestation - 
biculturalism - indigenises the treaty partners, 
Maori and Pakeha, in the process denying any pre- 
eminent status to the Maori as tangata whenua 
(people of the land) and excluding other ethnic 
groupings, including the significant population 
of Pacific Islanders, from the dominant 
discourses of nation. 
The first section of this chapter examines the 
way in which disparate tribal identities were 
collectivised under the designation 'Maori' and 
then subjected to the rule of imperial Law which 
drew on the civilising discourses to legitimate 
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the large-scale appropriation of tribal land. As 
Kelsey puts it, tribal identities: 
posed an intolerable barrier to the colonial 
enterprise. For economic, political and 
ideological reasons, tribal members and 
their resources had to be individualised, 
atomised and abstracted from their pre- 
colonial location within their 'beastly 
communism (Kelsey, 1995: 184). 
Gathered under the sign Maori, the tribal groups 
were classified as a 'knowable' entity in terms 
of the racialised hierarchy which underpinned the 
colonial Icivilising mission'. 
The second section examines the way in which 
the construction of 'peoplehood' in the colony 
required the Inationalisation, of the white 
settler majority. 
Kelsey has described the settler colony of New 
Zealand as an 'exemplary modernist creation' 
which, by mimicking metropolitan institutions and 
complying with imperial constitutional doctrines, 
gained admittance to the 'high table' Of the world 
system as a 'western' nation (Kelsey, 1995: 178) 
I The nation-building process in'the colony was 
based on a template replicated globally, in terms 
of forms of constitutional democracy, with nations 
being incorporated into an international community 
bound by 'standards of civilisation' and regulated 
through the legal and administrative structures of 
a European-centred 'international system' 
(Robertson, 1992: 115). 
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Settler colonies were legally cognizable in 
international law. They enjoyed the 'comity of 
nations' and gained admittance to the 
collectivity designated as 'the West' because 
they were exemplars of the universal Icivilising' 
standard of modernity. As Fitzpatrick argues: 
The civilisation characteristic of nation 
has been derived from opposition to the 
uncivilised. It is this identity in 
negation that enables nation to exist as an 
abstracted, even transcendent entity. 
Nation is dynamically homogenising and 
universal in being set against,... specific 
forms of life that are fixedly particular 
and heterogeneous (Fitzpatrick, 1995: 12). 
National identity is produced out of the 
universalisation of 'fictive ethnicities' which 
take the form of myths about national character, 
national histories and narratives of origins. 
These are continually redefined and set against 
the particularisms of other groups positioned on 
or beyond the nation's margins. Thus identity is 
formed in relation to excluded others, as such it 
has no positive content, rather, it is formed in 
terms of 'what it is not': 
Identity and its limits are generated from 
within, by constituting the nation as 
universal in opposition to what is 
exceptional to its universality ...... The 
nation must exclude the other - and so be 
non-universal - in order to be universal 
(Fitzpatrick, 1995: 10). 
Laclau argues that modernity found 'its own body' 
in the form of a certain particularity - European 
culture - which became the expression of 
'universal human essence'. European universalism 
constructed its identity 'through the 
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universalisation of its own particularism' 
(Laclau, 1996: 24). Imperialist expansion was 
presented in terms of a universal civilising 
process with whiteness the 'master signifierl of 
this racialised project: 
The resistances of other cultures 
were ... presented not as struggles between 
particular identities and cultures but as 
part of an all-embracing and epochal 
struggle between universality and 
particularisms; the notion of peoples 
without history expressing precisely their 
incapacity to represent the universal 
(ibid). 
In order to participate in world trade, emergent 
nations were required to adhere to the rules of 
international law. The formation of an 
'international community' in the nineteenth 
century was regulated by the legal apparatus and 
discourses of international law (ibid: 122). As 
Roland Robertson argues 
Civility became a regulative principle in 
inter-state relations ... the civilising 
process operated as an external politico- 
cultural constraint on nation states 
(Robertson, 1992: 121). 
The application of these laws was based on the 
humanist notion that 'humankind' shared essential 
qualities which could be measured against certain 
'standards'. These principles were conceived of as 
universal system which could be applied to all 
peoples equally: 
The definition of 'positive law' is 
inherently circular in that 'law' could 
only exist by the will of a supreme 
sovereign. A community could not be 
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categorised as a body politic unless a 
supreme sovereign could be 
identified ..... Communities which lacked the 
necessary criteria to constitute a body 
politic could not be regarded as sovereign 
entiiies, nor did they have legal root of 
title to the territory they occupied. In 
other words, such-communities were legally 
non-existent because they lacked the 
contractual capacity to enter into 
international agreements (Hackshaw, 
1989: 100). 
In the colonial context the Law legitimated 
European notions of 'property rights' by refuting 
'native title' and custom through the deployment 
of notions of 'civility' which were enshrined in 
the legal apparatus: 
When shipped to the colonies Law stood at a 
point from which it could legitimately 
dominate lesser orders .... it could join 
the Icivilising mission' .... it could 
fulfil the imperatives of Enlightenment 
and relate to an essential humanity, yet 
treat parts of that humanity in radically 
different ways because of their radically 
different position in the scale of 
civilisation or in evolutionary development 
(Fitzpatrick, 1990: 99). 
Thus the true meaning of 'terra nullius' (a term 
used to enforce Britain's 'right of discovery' 
claims to Australia and the southern islands of 
New Zealand) was based, not on the notion that the 
land was empty of people (it manifestly was not), 
but that the inhabitants were not organised in 
some form of government or regular system of 
authority and were therefore not able to make 
binding contracts about property or participate in 
international relations (Ward, 1997: 2) 
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Dirks has described colonialism as the 'theatre 
for the Enlightenment project': 
Before places could be colonised, they had to 
be marked as 'foreign', as 'other', as 
colonisable. If geography and identity seem 
always to have been closely related, the age 
of discovery charted new possibilities for 
this relationship (Dirks, 1992: 6). 
So for example, Captain James Cook's 
explorations played an important role in 
representing and classifying newly 'discovered' 
territories. The Endeavour's voyage to the 
Pacific heralded a new phase of colonial 
expansion and was inseparably linked to the rise 
of science in the eighteenth century, 
inaugurating an era of maritime travel which 
involved the mapping, naming and cataloguing of 
distant spaces. 
In its most general terms, the voyage of the 
Endeavour was described as a scientific 
expedition. It was sponsored by the Royal Society. 
Cook was commissioned to observe the transit of 
Venus in Tahiti in April, 1769 and then to travel 
south to find the great southern continent, terra 
australia incognita. The curved surface of the 
planet had been projected onto a geometrical grid 
which squared off empty seas and unexplored 
regions in measured boxes; Cook's mission was, in 
part, to 'fill in the blanks' (Fabian, 1983: 8). 
The invention of the chronometer in 1761 had made 
possible the precise calculation of longitudes and 
prefigured the totalising classification of the 
earth's. surface, eventually represented in the 
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Eurocentric interpretations of the Mercatorian 
map. 
The Endeavour was 'a floating laboratory'. The 
crew included Sir Joseph Banks, who was appointed 
director of Kew Gardens after the voyage to the 
Pacific. Banks was accompanied by Solander, a 
botanist, together with Sydney Parkinson, an 
artist skilled in drawing plants (Obeyeskere, 
1992: 5). 
Solander and Banks used the system developed by 
the Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus to classify 
plants according to the characteristics of their 
reproductive parts; classification of flora was 
designed to reveal the 'rationality' of nature 
through a universalised taxonomy. Just as the 
geographies of newly discovered places were being 
mapped and re-named, so were the life-forms and 
peoples of these places drawn into European 
taxonomies which constructed a 'Great Chain of 
Being'. As Mary Louise Pratt argues: 
The eighteenth century classificatory 
system located every species on the planet 
within a grid, extracting them from the 
arbitrary surroundings (the chaos) and 
placing them within a system (the order) - 
book, collection or garden - with a new 
written, secular European name. One by one 
the planet's life forms were to be drawn 
out of the tangled threads of their life 
surroundings and rewoven in European-based 
patterns of global unity and order 
(Pratt, 19 9 2: 3 1) . 
The 'global classificatory project' is the subject 
of Foucault's historical and philosophical 
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analysis in The Order of Things. He argues that 
natural history reduced 
the whole area of the visible to a system 
of variables all of whose values can be 
designated, if not by quantity, at'least by 
perfectly clear and always finite 
description. It is possible to establish 
the system of identities and the order of 
differences existing between natural 
entities (Foucault, 1986: 136). 
The classificatory systems of natural science were 
also applied to indigenous peoples encountered on 
these voyages. They too, as David Theo Goldberg 
observes, were inserted into a hierarchical grid 
of visible typologies defined by the 'racial' 
classifications of the period 
A hierarchy was thought to be revealed 
through physical, natural correlates: skin 
colour, head shape, body size, smell and 
hair texture.... thus ordering human groups 
on the basis of putatively natural 
differences. Classification could then 
claim to provide an objective 
ordering.... enabling their subjection to 
the cold scientific stare and economic 
exploitation of Europeans and their 
I descendants (Goldberg, 1993: 50) 
Racial hierarchies formed the basis for different 
forms of European colonisation which emerged in 
the Pacific. While the Aborigines were seen as 
'bestial' and 'uncivilised in the extreme', the 
people living in New Zealand were 'noble savages', 
with the result that they were treated very 
And as Chapter 4 shows, in nineteenth century travel 
accounts of New Zealand there was continue slippage between 
the description of flora and fauna and the way in which the 
Maori were described. 
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differently by the colonisers 
(Beaglehole, 1961: 390). 
A policy on indigenous rights had been set out in 
a Royal Proclamation of 1763. When Cook embarked 
on his Pacific voyage six years later he was 
instructed to obtain the consent of native 
inhabitants before taking possession of territory. 
There is no evidence that he did so 
(Sorrenson, 1989: 21). When he arrived on the east 
coast of Australia, despite the fact that there 
were signs of human settlement, Cook took 
possession of the territory by right of discovery 
because the Aborigines were deemed to be living in 
a 'state of nature' and he was therefore able to 
decree the place 'terra nullius' ýland belonging 
to no-one). 
Drawing on eighteenth century notions of 
'civility', the Europeans judged that the 
Aborigines had attained only the 'first stage' of 
civilisation, described in Cooks' journal as, the 
stage of: 
a small society whose members live by 
hunting and fishing, and know only how to 
make rather crude weapons and household 
utensils and to build or dig for themselves 
a place in which to live, who possess a 
language with which to communicate their 
needs and a small number of moral ideas 
which serve as common laws of conduct, and 
who live in families, and conform to 
general customs which take the place of 
laws (Beaglehole, 1961: 397). 
In Cook's words, accordingly the place was 
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in the pure state of Nature, the Industry 
of Man having had nothing to do with any 
part of it (ibid: 397). 
In not having reached recognisable states of 
Icivilisation' (e. g. domesticating animals, 
maintaining agriculture or establishing a 
political entity capable of negotiating on behalf 
of the whole society), the Aborigine had not,. in 
the eyes of the Europeans, subdued and cultivated 
the Earth so as to obtain 'dominion' over it. 
As the Endeavour sailed up the Australian coast 
Cook and his crew came across small settlements of 
Aborigines; Cook wrote that the Aborigines 
wandered 
like the Arabs from place to place set them 
up wherever they meet with one where the 
sufficient supplys (sic) of food are to be 
met with, and as soon as these are 
exhausted remove to another leaving the 
houses behind, which are framed with less 
art or rather less industry than any 
habitations of human beings probably that 
the world can shew (ibid: 399). 
It was observations of this kind which provided 
the basis for subsequent colonisation of the 
territories. Seventeen years after Cook's visit 
the First Fleet, eleven 
600 'convicts', arrived 
place designated 'terra 
legal requirement to ne, 
and the colonisation of 
the destination for the 
vessels carrying more than 
in Botany Bay. With the 
nullius' there was no 
gotiate with the aborigines 
Australia,. which became 
forced exile of 160,000 
members of the British 'criminal class', was 
undertaken without any negotiation between the 
British and, -the Aborigines. 
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Cook's encounter with the tribal people of New 
Zealand was very different. Despite their 
cannibalism they were ranked as 'noble savages' 
within the racial hierarchy Cook constructed of 
Pacific peoples. Cook's journals describe them as 
a brave, open, warlike people and voide of 
treachery, certainly in a state of 
civilisation. They are very frequently 
decorated with a skilfully carved head, the 
face of which expresses rage. For in this 
uncivilised state one seldom sees emblems 
which are pleasant. They almost always 
represent cruel, deadly passions. While 
the bodies of their enemies are still 
palpitating, they are cut into pieces, 
roasted and devoured with particular 
pleasure(Beaglehole, 1961: 514). 
Cook continues admiringly: 
I venture to say that for cannibals they 
display a very. good character and are aware 
of benefaction and humanity. 2 (ibid: 516) 
He goes on to suggest that they would benefit from 
some form of government: 
Living dispersed in small parties, knowing 
no head but the chief of the family or 
tribe whose authority may be very little, 
subjects them to many inconveniences a well 
regulated society united under one head are 
not subject to (Beaglehole, 1961: 518). 
2 Beaglehole notes that when Cook returned to New Zealand 
the second time, in 1772, his ship was a 'Noahs Ark' loaded 
with 'two young bulls, two heifers, two young stone horses, 
two mares, two rams, several ewes, rabbits and poultry'. 
Many of the animals died en route: 'With now only the bull 
and the bull calf left , hopes of changing the cannibal diet 
of the New Zealanders was fading'(Beaglehole, 1961 Vol 
2: 101). 
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The subsequent European colonisation of New 
Zealand was based on recognition of the Maori as 
the indigenous people of the territory. The Treaty 
-of Waitangi, signed in 1840, is legal evidence of 
this status. It has been argued that legal 
recognition of the Maori meant that (compared to 
the Australian Aborigines) they were always able 
to take on the colonisers militarily and 
politically although, new interpretations of the 
colony's history suggest that the ability to 
challenge colonial power had as much to do with 
the ways in which tribal life has been organised 
as it had to do with the trans-historical legacy 
of Enlightenment Law (Belich, 1997) 
Treaty historians have noted that the Treaty of 
Waitangi was the first official document where the 
term Imaoril was used to designate the indigenous 
people as a collectivity (Orange, 1987; 
Kawharu, 1989). Before the arrival of Europeans, 
Maori people had no single term for themselves: 
they were distinguished from one another by tribal 
whakapapa (genealogies) and tended to identify 
with tribal affiliations and the natural 
environment in specific locales (Durie, 1998: 53). 
The word Imaoril meant 'normal', 'usual' or 
'ordinary' but after the treaty designation it was 
capitalised to refer to the collectivity of New 
Zealand tribes while the term 'pakehal, which 
meant 'imaginary beings re sembling men with fair 
skins', changed from designpting 'strangers' to 
referring specifically to the European settlers 3 
3 As discussed in Chapter 4, 'Pakehal is currently a highly 
contested term in New Zealand. There has been much debate 
about whether the word 'pakehal should it be capitalised to 
indicate a stable identity (Sharp, 1990: 13). 
44 
Defining the Maori as a unified ethnic grouping 
was an important part of the Treatyls role in the 
producing the nation; all inhabitants of the 
territory were drawn within the jurisdiction of 
the Anglo-settler state and classified in terms of 
their 'race'. As Balibar puts it: 
As social formations are nationalised the 
populations included within them are 
ethnicised (Balibar, 1991: 96) 
The contemporary reinterpretations of meanings 
embedded in the different versions of the Treaty, 
(explicated in the lengthy recommendations of the 
Waitangi Tribunal), have explicitly shown how the 
rule of law was deployed in the new colony to 
underpin the 'civilising mission'. Nineteenth 
century notions of 'civilisation', which were 
brought to bear on land use, were not only 
instrumental in ensuring a steady supply of land 
was available for settlement, but also need to be 
considered within a broader context, namely the 
imposition of a monolithic system of political and 
legal control over the territory. According to 
Adams: 
Europeans theorised that land only acquired 
value as labour and capital were expended 
on it and that individual property rights 
arose from this expenditure of labour and 
capital, thus they were only prepared to 
recognise aboriginal rights to land which 
they tamed and cultivated (Adams, 1977: 189). 
Various colonial administrators spoke of 
Icivilisation' being the gift the British gave to 
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the Maori people. In other words Maori paid for 
their engagement with modernity through the loss 
of land and resources. 
Thus in the colonial context, the Law was deployed 
as a form of 'scientific administration' which 
universalised the legitimating frameworks required 
to impose colonial rule. The Law was identified 
with civilisation and the absence of Law with 
untamed nature. The unassimilated 'savage' was 
thus excluded from the polity as 'irrational' and 
'unproductive'. In this way the Law was used to 
police the boundaries of the nature/culture divide 
which underpinned the Icivilising mission': 
Liberal legality creates the rational civil 
subject and rejects others as rebellious: 
what is excluded is characterised as 
savage ... The excluded is very difficult to define in terms of legal rationality, quite 
simply because it is the 'other'. The 
strongest example is the colonial regime 
where the 'native' is legally understood in 
terms of brute custom (Carty, 1990: 22). 
In New Zealand, following the signing of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, the implementation of European 
law provides numerous examples of the way in which 
Enlightenment principles were used strategically 
to delegitimate collective ownership (based on 
shifting boundaries of tribal territory) and use 
of land for what were deemed 'unproductive 
purposes'. Ward argues, Maori: 
had consistently thought in terms of 
scattered property rights in, land, bird 
trees, eel weirs, fernroot patches, pipi 
beds and garden lands ... they were now being 
asked to think of discrete areas of land 
encompassed by continuous boundaries ... but 
46 
until boundaries were clearly marked on the 
ground this would have had little real 
meaning to Maori (Ward, 1997: 37). 
Within months of the treaty-Signing in 1840, a 
Royal Charter from London had ordered the colonial 
government to survey the territory and 
redistribute 'waste land'. This has been 
interpreted by contemporary Treaty historians as 
evidence that the legal agreement was seen by the 
colonisers as the easiest way of expediting land 
appropriations whilst appeasing humanitarian 
concerns in Britain (Kawharu, 1989). 
As the tide of settlers increased, the New Zealand 
Company (in an attempt to make more land available 
for settlement) claimed that Maori land titles 
could not legally extend beyond tribal sites of 
habitation and surrounding cultivations. The 
Company called for all other land to be made 
available for settlement and this view was 
subsequently accepted by the Crown's House of 
Commons' Select Committee in 1844. The Crown then 
issued further Royal Instructions which were more 
draconian than those of 1840 (when the initial 
survey of the territory was carried out), 
decreeing that no claim by 'aboriginal 
inhabitants' to land should be considered by the 
colonial government unless: 
... they have been accustomed to use and 
enjoy the same either as places of abode or 
for tillage or for the growth of crops or 
otherwise for the convenience and 
sustenance of life by means of labour 
expended thereon (quoted in Oliver, 
1994: 173). 
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Recent rulings of the Waitangi Tribunal have 
reassessed land appropriations demonstrating that 
the monoculturalism of European distinctions 
between 'cultivated' and 'waste' land failed to 
take account of the spiritual values the Maori 
attached to land. The contemporary rulings 
acknowledge that for the tribes, land was a source 
of identity that went far beyond the limited 
relationship enshrined in European law, 
recognising Maori rights only in relation to 
'cultivated' land. 
Initial colonial policies directed at the peaceful 
and voluntary incorporation of the Maori people 
(enshrined in the Treaty of Waitangi), eventually 
gave way to physical coercion as Maori tribal 
groups were forced to become subjects of 
individualised property law. A series of acts of 
parliament in the 1860s opened up the country to 
agriculture. The 1865 Native Lands Act, for 
example, imposed European conceptions of land 
ownership and inheritance on the Maori by 
legislating for the transfer of communally-held 
tribal lands into individual ownership, a move 
which created enormous intra-tribal conflict. It 
is worth noting that the 1865 Lands Act was one 
amongst hundreds of pieces of legislation relating 
to Maori land. Ward argues the authorities used 
the confusion arising from the complex mass of 
legislation to their best advantage by avoiding 
consultation and negotiation with Maori (Ward, 
1997: 309) 
By this time the principles of the Treaty had been 
largely been abandoned, with colonial 
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administrators claiming the Icivilising mission' 
had failed (Belich, 1986: 328). This view, 
articulated in an Auckland newspaper. The Southern 
Cross, suggests the extent to which public opinion 
(the 'we' addressed by the editorial) was 
constructed from the colonisers perspective: 
We have dealt with the natives of this 
country upon a principle radically wrong. 
We have conceded them rights and 
privileges which nature has refused to 
ratify .... The Maori is now known to us as 
what he is .... a man ignorant and savage, loving darkness and anarchy, hating light 
and order, a man of fierce and ungoverned 
passions, bloodthirsty, cruel, ungrateful 
and treacherous (quoted in Oliver, 
1994: 329). 
In 1877, after tribal groups had unsuccessfully 
turned to the Native Land Court to address 
grievances over confiscations, the Treaty of 
Waitangi was declared a nullity by Judge 
C. J. Prendergast who ruled that the Maori were 
luncivilised' and as a result had no claim on the 
land. Here, according to McHugh, Prendergast 
retrospectively applied the doctrine of 'terra 
nulliusl: 
Prendergast conceded that some forms of 
recognised title could be given effect in 
the colonial courts of the Crown but these 
were only those of 'civilised' societies. 
Being luncivilised' Maori society lacked 
.... rights to land cognisable in the 
colonial courts (McHugh, 1991: 115). 
Settlers were, by this time, numerically dominant 
- in 1874 the white settler population totalled 
250,000 and was increasing annually while the 
Maori numbered only 50,000 - and as a result there 
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was even less reason to adhere to the treaty 
principles (Orange, 1987: 185). 
Colonial laws increasingly impinged on tribal 
life; initial colonialist strategies to assimilate 
Maori into European ways gave way to the coercive 
strategies of 'white governmentality'. The 
introduction of rating systems and taxes - local. 
body rates, road rates, dog registration taxe S4 
together with the compulsory acquisition of land 
for public works projects (such as the 
construction of the main trunk railway from 
Auckland to Wellington), restricted the autonomy 
of the Maori tribes I 
Thus, in order to further the economic interests 
of the colonisers, the 'monologic' discourses of 
law were used alongside the technologies of 
government to represent the state as an 'engine of 
progress'. Census material and Government Year 
Books 5 from the early colonial period provide 
evidence of the way in which Igovernmentalityl 
relied on standardised and centralised systems of 
classification for the presentation of 'neutral' 
information. Data was presented in extensive 
tables detailing the political economy of state 
affairs, naturalising the ideology of 'progress' 
which underpinned expansion in the colony through 
the representation of statistics as objective, 
4 According to Orange, Maori response to the dog registration 
tax introduced in 1880 to reduce packs of Maori owned dogs 
that threatened flocks of sheep was 'magnified out of all 
proportion because it was construed as one more government 
measure to oppress Maori peoplel(Orange, 1987: 198). 
5 The first New Zealand Official Year Book was published in 
1891. 
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empirical and neutral (Thomas, 1994: 46, Ludden, 
1992: 262). . 
3 
By the turn of the century the information 
apparatus of the state generated data relating to 
aspects of economic life - population, production 
figures (wages, prices and so on), soil types, 
property values, rateable land, tax liability, 
mortality, morbidity, livestock, prisoners, bank 
assets - were all available in statistical form. 
Underpinning the presentation of this data was the 
textual construction of 'national progress', based 
in particular on the 'improvement' and 
'cultivation' of land. 
In the 1901 Official New Zealand Yearbook for 
example, a section entitled 'Land for Settlements' 
details in table form all land acquired throughout 
the colony (with no reference to the actual 
purchase). Each'provincialýdistrict is listed 
giving figures for 'Value of land, and 
improvements', 'Total Land in Cultivation' and 
'Livestock - Cattle, Horses, Sheep'. Also 
detailed are special loan schemes and subsidies 
which were made available to property owners who 
achieved annual improvements on property, while 
tables show the heavy rates applied to 'unimproved 
land'. Extending the totalising representations 
of colonial land surveys, which categorised the 
territory in terms of a grid of productive and 
unproductive land, these statistics collapsed 
localities into identically analysable units of 
production and erased Maori entitlement in the 
process. 
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But however totalising the records of colonial 
administration appeared (creating an 'aura' of 
government based on dominance and order), it is 
evident that on the ground the colonisers had 
achieved neither practical control nor a 
transformation of 'indigenous' life. 
Maori developed effective means (at least in the 
short term) to counter institutional power. By the 
1850s, a pan-tribal movement focused on 'anti-land 
selling' had emerged and in some areas tribal 
groups had developed systems of locally organised 
government to deal with colonial power (Belich, 
1997: 232). During this period war broke out 
between Maori tribal groups and Pakeha. 
Historically the wars of 1845-72 were known as the 
Maori Wars (suggesýing the conflicts over 
possession of the land were the fault of the Maori 
people); in 1982 the Waitangi Tribunal argued that 
the wars should in future be called Land Wars: 
The New Zealand Wars were a series of 
conflicts involving the British and the 
Maori tribes of the North Island. They 
were not, as received versions 
suggest ... storms in a teacup but bitter and bloody struggles ... (Belich, 1986: 15) - 
These wars were more than a mere contest for land; 
as Sorrenson notes, they were 'a contest for 
authority, for mana and the question of whose law 
was to prevail' (Sorrenson, 1989: 10 1 
It is clear that after Cook's landfall tribal 
groups welcomed the opportunity to trade for 
European goods. Ward describes their engagement 
with 'modernity' as 'outstanding': 
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The adoption into the local economy of the 
European pig and white potato meant within 
a few years the Maori were trading a 
surplus of these to ships from New South 
Wales. This showed both a desire and a 
formidable ability to master and manage the 
forces of modernity to their own enrichment 
(Ward, 1997: 12). 
However, as systematic colonisation replaced the 
early trading relationship between Maori and 
Europeans, the colonisers introduced laws to 
facilitate the large-scale appropriation of Maori 
lands. The Treaty of Waitangi, which transferred 
sovereignty to the Crown, was at the time simply a 
means to facilitate the appropriation of land for 
white settlement and the extraction of resources. 
Acquisition of cheap land paved the way for the 
transition from the 'scavenger' economy based on 
whaling, sealing and forestry to pastoralism, as 
permanent white settlements were established on 
territory acquired through the massive transfer of 
land from tribal 'ownership'. 
From this point onwards the privileging of settler 
interests (largely coterminous with capitalist , 
interests) over those of Maori was enshrined in a 
panoply of laws and statutes. It is clear that 
early contact between the Maori and 
representatives of the British Crown fostered an 
image of Britain as a benevolent protector of 
Maori interests, a neutral force whose concern was 
largely to govern, control and regulate the 
behaviour of those Europeans who settled in New 
Zealand. At first the Crown, adopted a 
conciliatory stance, mediating between settler and 
Maori interests for a variety of reasons including 
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the need to protect trade, the recognition that 
the Maori were numerically dominant, and in order 
to appease humanitarian concerns for native 
peoples which were emerging as a key political 
issue in Britain 
From a Maori perspective, therefore, relations 
with the colonialists were initially beneficial. 
The northern tribes had experienced sustained 
contact with white people from Europe, and had 
appeared to have much to gain from the formalising 
of relations between the two groups. They were the 
first to sign the Treaty at Waitangi and were 
subsequently held responsible by tribal groups 
from other regions for the failure of the Treaty 
to protect Maori Imanal (authority, prestige) 
(Orange, 1984). 
Initially legislation which directly involved the 
Maori people was based on an assumption that they 
could be assimilated into white society. The 
Treaty of Waitangi acknowledged the presence and- 
rights of the tribes but at the same time the 
colonial authorities sought the voluntary 
acceptance by Maori of British institutions, 
believing the Maori could be evangelised, educated 
and made subject to European law. 
While the British justified their intervention in 
the colony on moral grounds to prevent the 
perceived slide into anarchy the involvement 
also had a wider context, namely the 'creation of 
a single global economy'. 
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As waves of immigration swelled the settler 
population during, the mid-nineteenth century, the 
'scavenger' industries of whaling, sealing and 
gold prospecting gave way to a more centrally 
organised economy based on the supply of cheap 
agricultural products to the British market. 
This shift in the New Zealand economy was a direct 
response to the industrialisation and urbanisation 
taking place in the European metropole. The 
dramatic increase in urban populations there meant 
that consumption of foodstuffs, in particular meat 
and dairy produce, had outstripped rural 
production (Denoon, 1983: 46). 
Demand for commodities to fuel these rapidly 
industrialising economies resulted in colonial 
territories being created as zones of specialist 
commodity production (Hobsbawm, 1987: 64). 
The economies of the Empire developed in what 
Hobsbawm characterises as a 'distorted fashion', 
with the white populations of the settler colonies 
enjoying 'western' standards of living, despite 
their failure to industrialise, because of their 
'special relationship' with the metropolitan 
centre(ibid). 
In the temperate zones of European settlement, - 
North and South America, Australia - grain and 
meat were being produced cheaply. A market had 
also developed for 'colonial goods': tea, coffee, 
sugar and cocoa and other raw materials which 
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I 
tended to come from the 'colonies of 
6 
exploitation' . According to Hobsbawm: 
these developments did not change the shape 
and character of the industrialised or 
industrialising countries, though they 
created new branches of big business whose 
fortunes were closely tied to specific 
parts of the globe, such as the oil 
companies. But they transformed the rest 
of the world, inasmuch as it turned into a 
complex of colonial and semi-colonial 
territories which increasingly evolved into 
specialised producers of one or two primary 
products for export to the world market, on 
whose vagaries they were entirely 
dependent. Malaya meant rubber and tin, 
Brazil coffee, Uruguay meat, Cuba sugar 
and cigars (Hobsbawm, 1983: 64). 
It is interesting to note Hobsbawmls use of the 
word 'meant' here - 'Malaya meant rubber'. This 
is suggestive of the way in which colonial 
territories were constructed in the 'imperial 
imagination'. in terms of the commodities they 
produced for the home market. (For example, even 
now, in everyday British discourses 'sheep' 
7 
continues to be the referent of 'New Zealand') 
6 Settler societies can be defined as those where Europeans 
settled permanently and where their descendants have 
remained politically dominant over indigenous peoples. 
Colonies of exploitation were those zones where 
appropriation of land, resources and labour entailed 
indirect control by colonial powers through a 'thin white 
line' of administrators, merchants, soldiers (Stasiulis, 
1995). 
7 As Stuart Hall writes: 'People like me who came to England 
in the 1950s have been here for centuries; 
symbolically ..... I am the sugar at the bottom of the English 
tea cup... there are thousands of others beside me that are, 
you know, the cup of tea itself (Hall, 1993: 49). 
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As a result colonial economies developed in a 
distorted fashion compared to other emerging 
'western' capitalist economies. White settler 
colonies, in particular, failed to industrialise 
because of the ', special relationship' with the 
metropolitan centre. They were caught in 'a cage 
of economic specialisation', designed to 
complement metropolitan economies rather than 
compete with them (Hobsbawm, 1983: 65). 
In New Zealand the shift from 'entrepreneurial' 
colonialism, led by private investors, to a public 
works programme financed by the colonial state 
ensured the gradual consolidation of colonial rule 
through the installation of an autonomous 
political and economic infrastructure whiqh 
serviced the needs of British capital and 
attracted considerable inward 
8 investment(Ward, 1997: 312) 
The Treaty of Waitangi had given the Crown 
authority to 'obtain dominion' over the territory; 
and in the year the treaty was signed a Royal 
Charter was issued in London authorising the 
colonial government to survey the entire country, 
dividing it up into districts, counties, towns and 
parishes. Reserves were to be set aside for 
roads, town sites, churches and schools and areas 
of 'waste land' identified. The'survey 
'classified' every acre of land in the colony as 
either public space or 'rateable' property. 
8 Denoon shows that British capital investment in the 
colonies of white settlement was considerably higher than in 
any other colony territories. As he puts it 'trade and 
investment were related to the skin pigmentation of the 
overseas trading partners' (Denoon, 1983: 49). 
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But to reiterate the question posed by 
Wallerstein, why should the establishment of any 
particular state create a corresponding 'nation' 
or 'a people") In order to understand the 
construction of national identity we need to move 
beyond analyses of population movements and 
demographics to look at the way in which the 
production of 'peoplehood' is tied up with an 
imaginary relationship with the territory. In 
particular, the way ideas about race and ethnicity 
are reproduced by a network of cultural and social 
practices through which individual existence is 
projected into the weft of a collective narrative 
aligned with the idea of nation. Crucially these 
projections of identity are multi-layered, 
overlapping, endlessly negotiated and contested 
but nevertheless always bounded by a delimited 
territory. 
Producing 'the People' 
Before the publication of James Belich's Making 
Peoples, New Zealand historiography had been 
dominated by political and social accounts which 
developed, in different forms, a teleological 
narrative beginning with European 'discovery' and 
the birth of the colony, and moving on to document 
the gradual unfolding of nationhood. 
Belich's book delivers a new historiography which 
comes out of the seismic transformations brought 
about by the ending of the nation's colonial 
relationship with Britain and the challenges to 
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sovereignty posed by Maori treaty claims. J. A. 
Pocock has described Making Peoples as: 
the first Treaty-based history, dealing with 
a world of vastly increased contingency and 
insecurity by recognising that there are two 
peoples and offering to narrate how they came 
to be. 9 
Balibar argues that the myth of origins is an 
effective ideological form in which the singular 
narrative of nation is constructed by moving back 
from the present into the past (Balibar, 1991: 87). 
Belich, writing the history of New Zealand as that 
of the 'two peoples' - Maori and Pakeha, has 
produced a biculturalist revision of national 
origins which represents both Maori and Pakeha as 
'settlers'. He employs the metaphor of the Ipakeha 
Great Fleet' to describe the settler exodus from 
Europe to the colony (Belich, 1997: 313). The use of 
this motif (a replication of the Great Fleet from 
Polynesia) not only delegitimates claims by Maori 
to pre-eminence as 'tangata whenua'; it also 
lindigenises' the white majority by creating an 
homologous relationship between the arrivals of 
both groups, albeit at very different historical 
conjunctures. While this literary device might 
appear to create an equality between New Zealand's 
bicultural partners by narrating the mantra of 
biculturalism, 'We are all settlers', it 
effectively depoliticises and dehistoricises the 
nineteenth century colonisation of New Zealand as 
a 'local' instance of the global expansion of 
capitalism by collapsing two radically distinct 
forms of settlement. Belich writes: 
9 'Removal from the Wings', J. A. Pocock, London Review of 
Books, Volume 19, No. 6, March, 1997. 
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Both Maori and Pakeha colonisations were 
driven and structured by myths of settlement, 
by dynamics and imperatives that were 
cultural as well as economic. Both replaced 
mobile and extractive systems with more 
sedentary and sustainable ones (ibid: 447). 
Belich's central theme is that white settlement 
was based on a utopian ideal of constructing a 
"neo-Britain'- in the colony. He argues that in 
order to persuade people to emigrate the marketing 
of the colony in Britain relied on three motifs - 
'progress', Nparadisel and 'Britishness' 
(ibid: 287): 
The Victorians naturally believed they were 
best at progress; that they had the best 
chance of building Jerusalem in their green 
and pleasant land and this boosted collective 
pride. At the same time... actual and 
symbolic encounters with non-European 'Thems' 
were in the increase, reinforcing conceptions 
of "Us' (ibid: 295) 
The New Zealand Company advertised its new 
experiment in colonisation as the 'Wakefield 
Plan'. It would establish concentrated 
agricultural settlements based on 'the best 
English corn counties' (Oliver, 1984: 60). 
Wakefield's treatise The British Colonisation of 
New Zealand, published in 1835, outlined the 
objectives for this form of colonisation which 
were underpinned by the vision of white settlement 
as a 'civilising mission': 
The object is to transplant English society 
with its various gradations in due 
proportions, carrying out our laws, 
customs, associations, habits manners, 
feelings - everything of England in short 
but the soil (Wakefield, 1829,: 158). 
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The settlers would be 
reclaiming and cultivating a moral 
wilderness and civilising a barbarous 
people who can scarcely cultivate the earth 
(ibid). 
The New Zealand Company, set up by Edward Gibbon 
Wakefield, purchased land from Maori tribes for 
next to nothing and then sold on to settlers for a 
profit. The New Zealand Company argued that the 
real price of the land for the Maori was 
Icivilisation'; it was of little value unless 
settled. The company's prospectus claimed that 
the land 
is worth nothing to its native owners, or 
worth nothing more than the trifle they can 
obtain for it. We are not therefore to 
take much account of the inadequacy of the 
purchase money according to English notions 
of the value of land. The land is really 
of no value, and can become valuable only 
by means of a great outlay of capital on 
emigration and settlement (Quoted in 
C. Hall, 1992: 146). 
So on the one hand the land was deemed 'worthless. ' 
(in the hands of the Maori) but at the same time 
it had to be sold at an 'artificial' price in 
order to ensure that capitalist accumulation could 
be guaranteed. Wakefield was convinced that a 
proper balance could be achieved between land, 
capital and labour in the colony through the 
mechanism of 'sufficient price'. Land purchases 
were initially restricted to capitalists by 
setting a relatively high uniform figure; the 
proceeds of these sales were used to bring 
labourers to the colony under assisted passage 
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schemes thus ensuring that there was a constant 
supply of (white) labour. 
Karl Marx devotes a chapter to Wakefield's scheme 
in Capital, describing the concept of 'sufficient 
price' as a euphemism for 'the ransom which the 
labourer pays to the capitalist for leave to 
retire from the wage-labour market to the land' 
(Marx, 1977: 723). 
In other words, the only way in which the 
accumulation of capital could be guaranteed in the 
colony was by ensuring that there was a surplus of 
wage labourers who were given sufficient material 
incentives to emigrate. On this theme Marx writes 
Let the Government put upon the virgin soil 
an artificial price, independent of the law 
of supply and demand, a price that compels 
the immigrant to work a long time before he 
can earn enough money to buy land and turn 
himself into an independent peasant. The 
fund resulting from the sale of land at a' 
price relatively prohibitory for the wage- 
workers, this fund of money extorted from 
the wages of labour is used ...... to import have-nothings into the colony and thus keep 
the wage-market full for the capitalists 
(ibid). 
The New Zealand Company's policy purported to 
select potential immigrant groups on the basis of 
their 'moral character'. Publicity material 
calling for emigrants claimed that only those 
'with character' should apply. As Charles 
Hursthouse observes: 
Wakefield's system of colonisation ... drew to New Zealand a much higher class of 
emigrant than has ever left the Mother 
Country ... selecting its free-passage 
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working men so carefully that almost every 
mechanic and labourer carried to New 
Zealand has been a picked man 
(Hursthouse, 1857: 642). 
It was a widely held belief that industrialisation 
and urbanisation in the metropole were leading to 
a deterioration of the Anglo-Saxon 'race'; the 
salubrious climate and physicality of life in the 
new colony was seen as offering the possibility of 
racial regeneration in a place described as 'the 
perfect environment for Anglo-Saxons'(Belich, 
1997: 299). The decline of the 'race' was 
represented in gendered terms with the population 
remaining in Britain described by the 
propagandists of emigration as 'effeminate' and 
'degenerate'. Thus, white settlers in the colony 
were not only positioned in a racial hierarchy 
'above' the Maori, they were also able to imagine 
themselves as a superior collectivity of 'Anglo- 
Saxons'. The New Zealand Handbook published in 
1873 suggests that the eugenics of Wakefield's 
plan had improved on the best of British stock: 
No colony was ever so carefully and wisely 
colonised as New Zealand. One who knows 
the back slums of every big town in England 
and Scotland must observe a marked contrast 
in the appearance of the people in our 
colonial towns. There is no accumulation of 
a depraved idle class; squalor and poverty 
are not to be seen (Vogel, 1873: 80). 
From a metropolitan perspective however, 
emigration was seen to produce a mixing of British 
ethnic groupings (Scots, Protestant Irish and 
English), resulting in a hybridised 'race' which 
was distinguished by its 'mediocrity': 
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The new nation shows no sign of beating the 
best British or of producing an equal to 
that best but its average is undoubtedly 
better than the general British average. 
The puny myriads of the manufacturing towns 
have no counterpart in the colony but on 
the whole young New Zealand is better known 
by collective usefulness than by individual 
distinction (Reeves, 1898: 174). 
While Belich discounts the myth of 'better stock', 
it is clear that government policies in the 
colony, such as 'whites only' immigration 
legislation justified the exclusion of other 
'races', in particular the Chinese, on the basis 
of a need to maintain cultural and racial 
homogeneity for the good of the dominant majority. 
A bill restricting the flow of indentured Chinese 
labourers into the colony became law in 1879. The 
New Zealand Governor at the time, George Grey 
argued the 'aliens' had 
exercised a deteriorating effect on New 
Zealand's civilisation by forcing the white 
worker to descend the scale of civilisation 
(quoted in Pearson, 1990: 74). 
In the case of Chinese immigration, exclusions 
were applied in particular to Chinese women in 
order, to prevent 'reproduction' in the colony; in 
1896 the Chinese population of nearly four 
thousand comprised only fourteen Chinese women 
(Belich, 1997: 318). 
The New Zealand Company promoted emigration 
through associations in Britain and in other 
European countries although the company did not 
have a monopoly on emigration; private 
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entrepreneurs organised many of the settlements. 
Such settlements tended to be formed on the basis 
of shared regional, religious and class 
affiliations. (There were numerous associations 
set up to administer the emigration of 
Igentlewomen' for example: the British Women's 
Emigration Society, the Female Middle Class 
Emigration Society). Small communities from Devon, 
Scotland, Norway, Denmark and Germany set up their 
own enclaves in the colony; Scots went to 
Dunedin, Germans to Nelson, Norwegians to Norswood 
and settlers from Devon founded the North Island 
settlement of New Plymouth. 
Publicity material advertising the colony to 
would-be settlers emphasised the similarities 
between Britain and New Zealand and downplayed 
links with Australia which was, in Belich's words, 
'too Irish, too convict, too digger' (Belich, 
1997: 317). Settler expectations about New 
Zealand being 'the Britain of the South' were 
fuelled by immigrants' guides which emphasised the 
similarities between 'Home' and the colony: 
New Zealand is an integral part of Great 
Britain - an immense sea-joined Devonshire. 
An Englishman going thither goes among his 
countrymen he has the same queen, the same 
laws and customs, the same language, the 
same schools ... save that he is in a country 
where trees are evergreen and where there 
is no winter, no opera, no aristocracy, no 
income tax, no pauperism and no 
beggars ... he is virtually in a young 
England (Hursthouse, 1857: 636). 
Although Belich suggests that 'strength of 
community' is difficult to measure, it is clear 
that the relatively atomistic communities 
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established in the colony meant that any sense of 
belonging to a 'nation' amongst the settler groups 
did not emerge until near the end of the 
nineteenth century (Belich, 1997: 412). Instead, 
the ability to maintain links with 'home' (because 
communication networks between New Zealand and 
Britain were more developed than those inside the 
territory) meant that settler communities could 
more easily imagine themselves living parallel 
lives to their compatriots on the other side of 
the globe than sharing a sense of community with 
their fellow 'nationals'. 
The New Zealand writer Alan Mulgan describes 
growing up in an isolated rural settlement, 
Katikati, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century. The settlement consisted almost entirely 
of Protestants from Ulster. Mulgan suggests that 
geographical and cultural isolation meant that 
links with 'home' (as Britain was known) were 
stronger than any connections made 'locally': 
For many years Katikati was isolated. To 
get out was a bit of an adventure. One 
party took twenty hours to go from 
'Athenreel (the Mulgan home) to Tauranga 
thirty five miles. Society was remote and 
self-contained.... Belfast and London were 
closer to the Katikati settler than our 
southern towns. Locals had seen Belfast, 
and if they had not seen London they had a 
pretty clear idea what it was like, whereas 
they had not seen our south island and had 
only a shadowy picture of it. In those days 
London, presented to me in books and 
pictures was much more vivid to me than any 
New Zealand town... and in that little 
community English politics loomed larger 
than New Zealand (Mulgan, 1958: 28). 
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The monthly delivery of 'English post' bringing 
letters, remittances and copies of the London 
Weekly News and Punch was the most regular 
communication with the outside world: 
It would have been absurd for people in 
Katikati to think of themselves as part of 
a nation. Our roots were in the soil, but 
they were not deep. The homesteads had 
their shelter belts of pines, inside which 
were gardens and orchards of English 
flowers and trees. Roses bloomed in the 
gardens, jasmine covered the verandas .... in 
the homes English books and periodicals, 
English pictures, English letters, talk of 
England and Ireland. (Mulgan, 1958: 31) 
However by the turn of the century the white 
majority dominated the territory to the extent 
that they were designated a generic grouping, 
naturalised as 'the population' and 'the New 
Zealanders'. 
In census material generated for the government, 
settlers were homogenised under the category 
'population' i. e. they were unified as 'white', 
homogenised and naturalised'as 'the population' 
while the nation's Others were classified by a 
range of 'ethnic' categories defined by 'blood'. 
For example, the 1901 census of New Zealand 
categorised the population as follows: 
i) Population (exclusive of the aboriginal 
Native race, of mixed European and native blood 
and Chinese) 
ii). Half-caste and persons of mixed race living 
as and among Europeans. 
iii). Chinese 
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iv). Aboriginal natives (including 249 Maori wives 
of Europeans) 
V) Half castes and persons of mixed race living 
as members of Maori tribes 
This classification of 'minorities' into 'ethnic' 
types reproduced discourses of 'race' which 
delineated the population in terms of 'blood'. 
Notions of 'tainted',, 'flawed' and 'pure' blood 
defined difference in terms of degeneration and 
racial purity. The discourse of 'blood' was linked 
to fears of 'miscegenation' which threatened the 
fantasy of a distinct, pure white European 
identity and is evidenced by census categories 
delineating 'half-castes' as a liminal grouping 
separated from 'the population' and split between 
those 'living as Maori' and those 'living as 
European'. 
In The New Zealand Citizen discourses of 'blood' 
are deployed to naturalise these exclusions: 
We do not want people belonging to the 
coloured races ... it would take too long to tell you why we keep out people belonging to 
coloured races, save to say it is a question 
of ways of living and ideals, besides of 
course, the desire to keep the blood of our 
people pure (Mulgan, 1886: 117). 
While 'race' was the primary organiser of 
difference, class and gender were also important 
in defining local taxonomies based on 'cultural 
competencies' which separated the colonial 
bourgeoisie from white 'others'. 
As Thomas argues: 
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It could not be disputed that racial 
classifications have been enormously 
powerful, especially since the 19thC, but 
race is not the only basis for representing 
others and representing them negatively... a 
series of religious, linguistic and societal 
differences may figure in the stigmatisation 
of particular populations which may be 
energised as much by analogies with subaltern 
domestic classes as by their race or by their 
feminisation(Thomas, 1994: 53) 
This is important in relation to the Icivilising 
mission' which was not confined to the colonial 
territories; it was also applied within the lower 
echelons of the metropolitan social formation 
where discourses of 'civility' and 'purity' were 
deployed to regulate the boundaries of bourgeois 
whiteness against Europe's 'internal Others'. 
These distinctions were reproduced in the colony, 
as The New Zealand Citizen makes explicit: 
We want immigrants but we do not want 
everybody. We do not want the destitute, 10 
the 
criminal, the insane .... (Mulgan, 1886: 117) . 
In this way, 
and regional 
context were 
colony where 
proclivities 
whites conti 
categorised. 
hierarchies which delineated class 
differences in the metropolitan 
translated and transformed in the 
the cultural competencies, sexual 
and personal habits of 'subaltern' 
nued to be scrutinised and 
10 The New Zealand Citizen was produced as a textbook for 
courses in civics; 'an uncritical course in political 
socialisation close to indoctrination' (Oliver, 1984: 320). 
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In 1903 the compulsory sterilisation of the 
'unfit' in New Zealand was advocated in Chapple's 
'scientific' study The Fertility of the Unfit : 
The unfit in the state include all those 
mental and moral defectives who are unable or 
unwilling to support themselves according to 
the recognised laws of human society 
(Chapple: 1903,118). 
One of the few books published by a woman during 
the early days of colonisation in New-Zealand, 
Lady Barker's Station Life in New Zealand, 
articulates the Icivilising' role of the bourgeois 
white woman in relation to white colonial 
Isubalternsl: 
A lady's influence out here appears to be 
very great and capable of indefinite 
expansion. She represents refinement and 
culture (in Mr Arnold's sense of the words) 
and her footsteps on a new soil such as this 
should be marked by a trail of light (Barker, 
1870: 104). 
Describing the subalterns as lincapables'. Lady 
Barker draws on typologies reminiscent of racial 
categories: 
The housemaid at the boarding-house where we 
have stayed is a fat, sonsy, good-natured 
girl, perfectly ignorant and stupid. She has 
not been in the colony long and requires to 
be taught how to bake a loaf of bread and 
boil a potato. In her own cottage at home, 
who did all these things for her? (ibid: 43) 
In the colony 'whiteness' was cut across by a 
complex matrix of distinctions. While settler 
groups were defined and united. primarily in terms 
of their difference from racialised Others (in 
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particular the Maori and the Chinese) the 
delineation of dominant groups in terms of gender 
and cultural competencies was equally important in 
legitimating inequalities between white settlers 
groups. Such differences were important in 
discourses of nation which were constructed around 
the myth of settler egalitarianism and equality of 
opportunity and were thus devoid of any explicit 
'class-based' differentiation. 
The rise of the nation state 
The abolition of provincial government in the 
1870s led to a state formation which became 
increasingly pivotal in facilitating the formation 
of a pastoral and commercial bourgeoisie, as well 
as uniting the disparate groups of white settlers. 
This process has been described as 'an exercise in 
state capitalism' and demonstrates the extent to 
which the 'liberal democratic' state functioned in 
the interests of capital, especially in a place 
which had no tradition of class-based allegiances 
(Jesson 1991: 38). 
The state actively intervened to protect settler 
interests, particularly in relation to land use 
(for example, heavy taxes were imposed on 'waste 
land' while incentives were offered for land 
'improvements') and ensured that even the lower 
echelons of the settler collectivity benefited 
from material incentives and privileges 
unavailable to Maori. 
The colonial government introduced compulsory 
schooling in 1876 with standardized textbooks, 
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curricula and examinations initially imported from 
England. Universal suffrage, granted to all 
'rate-payers' in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century (which in dominant histories has been 
highlighted as part of New Zealand's leading role 
as the 'social laboratory of the world') can be 
read as an attempt to integrate and stabilise a 
fragmented settler community by reinscribing men 
and women as 'citizens' united by the common 
destiny of the new nation and of course by their 
'whiteness'. 
In an important respect, New Zealand's social 
formation was built around a paradox - the 
atomised, individualistic identity of settler 
society was heavily reliant on the state for 
economic and social stability. The economy was 
cushioned from vagaries of the international 
market by the embrace of the Commonwealth and 
internally by the state, which operated within a 
highly insulated framework, providing a 'welfare 
net' and strictly controlled exchange mechanisms 
to protect businesses from foreign competition. 
As Jesson puts it: 
A network of restrictions and regulations 
overlaid the economy as a whole. It was a 
prosperous and secure existence for New 
Zealand business, but one which rested on 
an inconsistency. While the political 
ethos of the country was individualistic 
and egalitarian, the freedom on the part of 
business was limited. The business 
community itself was dominated by a small 
number of companies and families with their 
origin in the nineteenth century economy 
which constituted an oligarchy 
(Jesson, 1991: 3). 
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What can be usefully drawn out from Jesson's 
argument here is an implicit. relation between the 
economic sphere and the formation of particular 
types of national consciousness and 
identification. For example, the political 
structures set in place in the colony reinforced 
racial divisions, highlighting the differences 
between the Maori and working class whites, rather 
than their commonalities (particulariy in terms of 
exploitation in the workplace). Historically, 
white settlers have been split between two 
constituencies represented by the main political 
parties, Labour and National, while four 
parliamentary seats were reserved for Maori 
voters. The Labour Party, traditionally the party 
of the welfare state and the regulated economy, 
was supported by the unions, public servants and 
the labouring class, while the more conservative 
National Party represented the interests of 
business and the powerful farming lobby. But it 
was the relative lack of grass-roots political 
organisa 
' 
tion amongst the white working class, as 
well as the given configuration of political 
interests and alignments, which explains the speed 
with which privatisation and deregulation could be 
implemented during the latter part of the 1980s 
(Kelsey, 1993). 
As has been suggested, the colony's agricultural 
economy has always been dependent on Britain. This 
'special relationship' meant that the economic 
prosperity and political power of the white 
settlers was hostage to the fortunes of 'the 
Mother Country'. In the 1970s the significance of 
this dependence became especially apparent when 
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New Zealand's guaranteed market was threatened by 
the shift in Britain's trading ties towards 
Europe. No longer able to maintain its monopoly 
on the supply of dairy produce to the British 
market, New Zealand began to slide into a crisis 
which was not only about economic decline in 
particular but was at the same time perceived more 
broadly as a 'betrayal'. The 'European turn' 
exposed the limits of a taken-for-granted 
relationship. White New Zealanders were forced to 
acknowledge for the first time the extent to which 
colonial ties with Britain had not only provided 
an economic and cultural orientation but also 
historically shored up their power and privilege. 
During this period the complacency of the Anglo- 
settler state was also shattered by the growing 
civil rights movement amongst the Maori (linked 
more broadly to an internationalised process of 
decolonisation and self-determination). As McHugh 
points out, white New Zealanders were finally 
confronted with the legacy of their colonial past. 
The nation's history which had, until that time, 
provided a legitimating account describing the 
transformation of 'the atomised social setting of 
Arcadian frontierism of the nineteenth century 
into the suburbia of the twentieth-century 
centralised state' was about to be rewritten 
(McHugh, 1991). 
When elected to office in 1984 the Labour Party 
immediately abandoned its commitment to the 
welfare state. Instead, the party embraced the 
doctrines of New Right monetarism in an attempt to 
deal with the nation's economic decline, and set 
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in motion what Jesson calls 'a process of economic 
disintegration'. Within six years the economy had 
been deregulated with almost all state activities 
privatised: 
Policies which took years to, develop in 
Britain, such as privatisation, were 
inflicted on New Zealand in a matter of 
months. New Zealand serves as a case study 
of the economic and social damage that can 
be wrought by monetarism (Jesson, 1991: 40). 
While the country's slide into crisis may have 
been triggered by shifts in the global economy, it 
is clear that the changes wrought by the Labour 
Party in'the nineteen eighties also came about as 
a result of disintegration of the consensus around 
which traditional party politics had been 
organised. Student radicalism of the nineteen 
sixties had left behind a layer of white middle- 
class people with a concern for social, moral and 
foreign-policy issues who formed the basis for the 
feminist, anti-racist and peace, movements 
(Kelsey, 1993: 145). However, the individualism 
underpinning these 'identity' movements meant 
there was no social force willing or capable of 
defending the welfare state. 
As a result the Labour Government pursued a 
monetarist-driven economic restructuring while at 
the same time appeasing middle-class liberals with 
social policies which were directed at specific 
interest groups. In 1985, for example, the 
Government broke off relations with South Africa, 
created a Ministry of Women's Affairs and adopted 
a nuclear-free policy which brought th4ý country 
into conflict with the United States and France. 
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By the mid-eighties, consequently, the economic 
and social legacy of the nation's colonial roots 
produced a crisis in the form of an economic 
collapse brought about primarily by the severing 
of the former ties of Empire, and secondly as a 
result of Maori demands for self-determination 
under the defining terms of the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The colonial foundation of the nation 
state in New Zealand had resulted in a dual 
formation: one of consensus in relation to the 
white majority and coercion in relation to. the 
Maori who have been described as a 'third world 
colonised people trapped in a first world 
metropolitan society' (Kelsey, 1993: 361). 
The Treaty of Waitangi had also become one of the 
country's most contentious issues. Maori demands 
for sovereignty had coalesced into a mass 
political movement. Assimilationism continued to 
be used to justify state legislation which secured 
the remaining tracts of land from tribal groups. 
In 1967 for example, an amendment to the Maori 
Affairs Act (1953) gave the government powers to 
purchase 'uneconomic' land from tribal groups. 
This legislation ignited a militancy amongst newly 
urbýnised and better educated Maori youth. While 
tribal elders continued their long-standing and 
rather conservative demands for recognition of 
Treaty guarantees, a political grouping called Nga 
Tamatoa (the Young Warriors) emerged. Led by 
student activitists whose politics were modelled 
on the Black Power movement in the United States, 
the group used forms of direct action to make 
their demands for justice and equality. This was 
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the beginning of a highly politicised period 
involving a series of transformations from which 
emerged new forms of political consciousness 
amongst different sections of Maoridom. 
In 1972 30,000 people took place in the Great Land 
March from Te Hapua in the far north to the 
capital Wellington . The marchers demanded 
recognition as New Zealand's 'tangata whenua' 
(people of the land) and publicly declared that 
'not one more acre of land would be lost' 
(Sharp, 1990: 8). 
The following year, 1973, the Government acceded 
to Maori demands by making Waitangi Day a national 
holiday, and by 1975 it passed the Treaty of 
Waitangi Act which set up a tribunal to 'make 
recommendations on claims relating to the 
practical application of the principles of the 
Treatyl(Orange, 1987: 246). The Governor General's 
speech at Waitangi in 1977 acknowledged the 
tremendous sea change which was beginning to 
emerge: 
in all honesty , it is apparent that the 
early settlers, the government and even the 
missionaries ... used methods of land 
acquisition which could be described as 
contentious (quoted in Sharp, 1990: 9). 
In the 1980s, the Labour Party was forced to 
recognise the legality of the Treaty, not least 
because the government's neo-liberal economic 
strategy relied on stability in order to attract 
global capital. In an attempt to contain Maori 
radicals (and send a signal about national 
stability to international investors), the 
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government gave wide-ranging powers to a newly 
formed body - the Waitangi Tribunal. The Tribunal 
called for Maori tribal groups to lodge claims 
dating back to 1840: 
Maori interests filed claims with the 
Tribunal for half the country's fisheries, 
vast tracts of land, and other assets to 
the horror of the Pakeha population and to 
the embarrassment of the Government 
(Jesson, 1991: 42). 
The success of claims put to the Tribunal resulted 
in tribal groups eventually being awarded 
substantial compensation in the form of cash and 
land. Such claims cut across the Government's 
privatisation programme, not least because land 
being returned to the Maori tribal groups by the 
Waitangi Tribunal was in the process of being sold 
off. Successful land claims-also resulted in the 
Government recognising Maori rights as Itangata 
whenual. Subsequently the tenets of the Treaty of 
Waitangi were incorporated into all new Acts of 
Parliament as 'biculturalism' was 
institutionalised within a state formation forced 
to enter into 'partnership' with the Maori in 
order to maintain national stability. 
For critics, while the bicultural settlement has 
benefited middle class Maori professionals who 
have enjoyed an expansion of employment 
opportunities in the state apparatus, the emphasis 
on identity politics has not addressed more 
fundamental inequalities - in other words the 
counter-hegemonic challenges from Maori have been 
'co-opted' into the dominant culture and the more 
radical demands for Maori sovereignty have been 
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Aemptied' of critical content in the process 
(Poata-Smith, 1997: 178; Kelsey, 1995). 
The shift to Ibiculturalism' came about as a 
result of pressure emanating from inside the 
nation; but it can also be seen as part of a 
strategy to ensure that the stability of the 
country was guaranteed as the economy was 
repositioned within an emerging economic zone 
around the Pacific Rim. 
One consequence of the New Zealand government's 
loosening of the regulatory aspects of the state 
and liberalisation of the market (through an 
intense programme of privatisation and 
deregulation), was that 'domestic' conditions of 
production became increasingly favourable to 
international capital. 
High interest rates closed small businesses, while 
marginal farmers were forced off the land. 
Unemployment rose dramatically. Privatisation led 
to the wholesale closure of workplaces in the 
service industries, with postal, transport and 
banking services cut back in unprofitable regions. 
Labour regimes were weakened primarily by 
implementation of legislation which 'improved' the 
flexibility of the workforce while changes in 
employment legislation, together with cuts in 
welfare provision, eroded wage levels and worsened 
employment conditions (with women in particular 
driven into the low-paid, semi-skilled service 
sector). Amongst the unemployed, the introduction 
of means-tested benefits led to the formation of a 
new underclass. As a result of their historically 
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marginal place in the colonial economy, Maori 
people suffered disproportionately and formed the 
bulk of this emerging underclass (Kelsey, 1993: 10). 
A slightly more detailed consideration of one 
incident within this complex of changes 
illustrates the issues at stake as regards 
cultural identity. In June 1995 a monthly current 
affairs journal in New Zealand, North and South, 
ran a feature article about a Maori protest in the 
tiny North Island settlement of Wanganui. The 
protest was similar to hundreds of others which 
had taken place around the country during the past 
ten years. The local tribal group had occupied the 
municipal rose gardens in the town's centre for 
more than a month. For New Zealanders, Pakeha and 
Maori, the story was familiar one. The background 
to the dispute involved a grievance dating back to 
1839 when local tribes lost the fishing rights to 
the nearby Wanganui River following the 'sale' of 
40,000 acres of land to the New Zealand Company 
for goods, including muskets and umbrellas. Seen 
from the perspective of an analysis of the 
complexities of the current crisis in New Zealand, 
however-the articles closing paragraph presents 
succinctly, a set of contradictions which 
characterise the Maori struggle for self- 
determination as it unfolds within the context of 
a nation-state under the sway of a monetarist- 
driven transformation : 
In Castlecliff, Wanganui's working class, 
barely recovered from the closure of their 
railway workshops and the decimation of the 
meat industry, read in the Chronicle that 
another hundred jobs have just been lost 
with the closure of the local woollen 
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mills. In the same paper they read that 
the Maori down at the Rose Gardens are 
asking for self-determination, control of 
their lives and resources. These are 
tough concepts for Pakeha to grasp... they 
live in houses mortgaged to the hilt to 
Australian and British banking 
institutions, pay interest rates determined 
on Wall Street, see the backbone 
institutions of their community, like 
Telecom, the railways and the post office 
sold off to foreign owners and the shops in 
the main street redeveloped by Taiwanese 
investors. In such a context the suggestion 
from the Maori that it is time for a change 
of landlord in New Zealand comes too late. 
The landlord changed some time ago and we 
are all paying rent". 
This quotation highlights the irony of Maori 
grievances relating to nineteenth century colonial 
injustices being acted on at a time when neo- 
colonial interests from outside the nation were 
taking control of assets which were formerly 
state-controlled. While Maori and Pakeha battle 
over 'race' issues, 'behind their backs' the 
nation state has been transformed in order to 
respond to the demands of global capital. 
Therefore the 'local' response needs to be seen 
within the context of a number of inter-linked 
global transformations which have not only 
undermined the sovereignty of the nation-state but 
also threatened its viability as an economic unit 
or bounded cultural sphere. 
S 
11 North and South, June 1995. Published by Australian 
Consolidated Press (NZ) Limited. 
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Reconfiguring nation in the Asia/Pacific 
This chapter has described how the colonisation of 
New Zealand was part of a global process which 
created an international order of formally 
distinct states with sovereign claims to national 
destiny, albeit within the orbit of Euro-American 
cultural and economic domination. Individual 
states have historically had the power to protect 
national economies through local measures such as 
subsidies for farming sectors, tax concessions for 
domestic industry and controls on foreign 
exchange, as well as measures designed to maintain 
social stability, such as welfare provision. In 
New Zealand, the nation's fragile economic 
'autonomy' (and relative prosperity) was always 
underwritten by the relationship with Britain, in 
particular through the protected market for 
agricultural products. 
From the 1970s, the changing economic and 
political relationship with Britain was part of a 
much wider restructuring of the global economy 
within which the role of nation state was 
increasingly to 'broker" the relationship between 
domestic and foreign capital. The mobility of 
trans-national capital has become the locus of 
economic activity with the state's role primarily 
to reduce barriers to trade. The geo-politics of 
this 'trans-nationalism' has been marked by a 
shift from the fixities of monopoly capitalism, 
with tight interconnections between corporate 
capital, the national economy as regulated by the 
state and in New Zealand's case, with the 
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metropolitan centre, to the flexible accumulation 
and investment strategies of trans-national 
corporations(TNCs). In New Zealand, this 
realignment has given rise to a weakened state in 
relation to capital and a strong state in. relation 
to labour. 
New regimes of capital accumulation have shifted 
power to different 'cores' such as the powerful 
US-Pacific Rim alliance dominated by the economies 
of South East Asia (Miyoshi, 1993; Ahmad, 1996). 
This shift has been linked to the emergence of a 
new international order shaping the global 
economy; regulation has moved from the national to 
the international arena. Organisations, such as 
the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, oversee international capital flows while 
regional economies are increasingly administered 
by supra-national organisations, like the European 
Community (EC), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
and the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation Group 
12 (APEC) . 
Within this geo-political configuration, New 
Zealand is aligned with the industrialising 
economies of South East Asia where it occupies a 
semi-peripheral position within a new 'core'. At 
the same time the CER Agreement (Closer Economic 
Relations) with Australia has created a free trade 
zone between the two places, effectively expanding 
12 APEC, which includes Australia, Brunei, Canada, 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand the US, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and China, currently accounts for 45% of world trade 
(Robertson, 1996: 7). 
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New Zealand's 'domestic' market from three million 
potential consumers to 21 million (Robertson, 
1996). 
Globalisation is characterised by an 
intensification of international trade, fiscal and 
technology transfers, labour migrations and the 
consolidation of global modes of production 
through post-Fordist forms of sub-contracting, all 
in the name of 'free-trade'. Ideologically, it is 
driven by monetarist policies which at the macro- 
level rework the twin nostrums of 'freedom' and 
'equality'. The notion of 'free trade' suggests 
the international economy is a level playing field 
with all former national economies able to compete 
on an equal footing at the level of the global. 
Global flows of people, technology, money and 
information have impacted on locales in different 
ways. New 'core' sectors have emerged, clustered 
around telecommunications industries, tourism and 
leisure . Spatially, many of these services are 
centred on global cities, including London, Hong 
Kong and New York, which have all become key sites 
in highly stratified flows of communications 
through information and financial services 
(Lash, 1994: 25). At the same time, underdeveloped 
and impoverished locales provide cheap sources of 
labour or niche markets for an expanding global 
tourist industry or, alternatively, many are by- 
passed altogether. 
In relation to New Zealand, the"transformation of 
the economy can be analysed specifically in terms 
of the globalisation of agricultural production, 
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and the restructuring of the sector brought about 
by the trans-national agro-food businesses. The 
process which began with Britain's shift towards 
Europe was effectively concluded in 1993 when the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) broke post-war alliances between 
farmers and the state by banning forms of subsidy 
in the name of 'free trade'(Frow, 1996). For 
agricultural producers in a small place like New 
Zealand it became uneconomic to compete with 
economies of scale controlled by large agri- 
business consortiums. 
To describe the complex movement of capital, 
peoples, forms of media, technologies, money and 
ideas characteristic of this new phase of 
globalisation, Appardurai uses the metaphor of 
'flows'. (Appardurai, 1996). He identifies four 
key elements in the reconfiguration of such 
global flows, arguing that they construct new 
global imaginaries or 'scapes' which not only 
challenge the cultural and political hegemony of 
individual nation states but create new zones of 
dominance and peripheralisation. He describes such 
Iscapes' as 
ethnoscapes produced by flows of people, 
tourists, immigrants, exiles ... technoscapes, the machinery and plant flows produced by 
multinational and nation corporations and 
government agencies ... financescapes, 
produced by rapid flows of money in the 
currency markers and stock 
exchanges ... mediascapes, the repertoire of images of information, the flows which are 
produced and distributed by newspapers, 
magazines, television and film (ibid: 7). 
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These 'flows' impact on economic, social and 
cultural structures in very different ways. In New 
Zealand, they result in a Ideterritorialised' 
economic sphere, in as much as while capital flows 
through the territory, there is no financial 
centre. 
Deregulation has resulted in a flood of foreign 
investment which has eroded the autonomy of the 
state and opened New Zealand up as a market for 
telecommunications, financial services and 
tourism. The shift away from primary agricultural 
production has brought diversification in terms of 
crops and production sectors generally, aimed at 
'niche' markets. Dairy products have been replaced 
by kiwi fruit, olives and wine; this 
diversification is linked in with other sectors 
such as tourism. 
Tourism is now the most profitable sector of the 
global economy (Lash,. 1994: 194). As a direct 
result there has been an escalation in the 
Imuseumification' of sites as local economic 
regeneration has focused on developing abandoned 
industrial and agricultural landscapes. This 
process - linked to globalisation - has made the 
construction of 'local' versions of identity 
increasingly important as places 'brand' 
themselves 
In New Zealand, tourism has been seen as the means 
to regenerate isolated areas through the marketing 
of 'wilderness' and 'settler heritaael and 'Maori 
tradition' (Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1994). Tours of 
vineyards and farm 'home-stays' have become part 
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of the 'New Zealand experience', an example of the 
way in which locales increasingly need to forge a 
distinctive identity as'destinations in order to 
attract flows - of capital, of visitors and so on. 
As 'lifestyle' and leisure consumption become the 
dominant economic sectors, globalisation generates 
Ilocalisation' (Harvey, 1989: 294). 
The social geography of New Zealand has been 
transformed by the flows associated with 
globalisation. The uneven distribution of 
technologies and services (brought about in part 
by the shift from public to private provision) has 
exacerbated divisions between rich and poor. 
The privatisation of services across all public 
sectors from forestry, coal and electricity to the 
national airline and telecommunications resulted 
in job losses and led to the demise of isolated 
communities where it has been unprofitable for 
privatised services to continue to operate. 
The growing isolation and impoverishment of rural 
areas, together with a decline in small-hold 
farming, has accelerated the population shift from 
outlying areas to the cities (although there has 
been some traffic the other way as urban Maori 
13 have returned to tribal marae) 
Unlike other regions of the West (Europe, the US, 
Canada and Australia) which have seen a huge 
influx of migrants as a result of post-war 
decolonisation, the bulk of migration into New 
Zealand has continued, until recently, to be 
13 Discussed further in Chapter Three. 
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predominantly British. However, the expanding 
post-war economy has drawn on a pool of unskilled 
labour which was available as a result of New 
Zealand's neo-colonial interests in the Cook 
Islands, Samoa and Vanuatu. Pacific Island guest 
workers initially moved into Auckland's inner-city 
ghetto; by the 1960s the city had the largest 
Polynesian population in the South Pacific 
(Pearson, 1990). As urban regeneration took hold 
in the 1970s, rising property prices associated 
with gentrification forced Pacific Islanders into 
outlying suburbs along with other sectors of the 
urban poor. 
In the 1980s, citizenship in New Zealand was 
'deregulated' with the introduction of a business 
immigration scheme which gave automatic right of 
entry to immigrants who had at least $500,000 to 
invest. The scheme, which attracted 'business 
migrants' mainly from Hong Kong, Taiwan and the 
Philippines, changed the socio- geography of urban 
centres with wealthy Asians moving into formerly 
all-white middle class suburbs. The new migrants 
triggered unprecedented xenophobia amongst both 
Maori and urban middle class whites (Walker, 
1996: 185). Significantly these groups drew on 
claims to lindigeneityl (legitimated by the bi- 
culturalist reinterpretations of the Treaty of 
Waitangi) to oppose new migrant groups as a threat 
to national unity (Kelsey, 1993: 306). 
The declining role of the nation-state inevitably 
results in a transformation of the Ilegitimising' 
identities of modernity. The autonomous, self- 
constituting (usually white) subject of modernity, 
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organised within civil society and existing within 
a framework defined through autonomous spheres of 
social and cultural reproduction (work, home, 
leisure, culture), is fragmenting (Castells, 
1997: 356). Increasingly-migration, global forms of 
consumption and the emergence of world-wide 
communication networks are giving rise to new 
kinds of identifications which can be 
characterised as 'post-nationalisms' 
(Friedman, 1994: 86). In New Zealand 'post- 
nationalist' identities have seen demands from 
different groupings - Maori and pakeha, Pacific 
Island and Asian - who have made claims to the 
entitlements of nationhood and citizenship. 
Reinterpretations of the Treaty of Waitangi have 
led to a settlement between Maori and Pakeha 
based on a re-assessment of the nation's colonial 
history. However, the shift from colonialist 
Imonoculturalism' to a national formation based on 
the rhetoric of 'two peoples, one nation' means 
certain groups continue to be excluded from 
constructions of nation, not least the large 
number of Polynesians who live in New Zealand. So 
while biculturalism has meant a shift of emphasis 
in terms of the way in which the nation is 
represented, it continues to rely on a binary of 
exclusivity privileging certain groups over other 
'Others'. 
The cultural and social landscape of New Zealand 
continues to be racialised in such a way that the 
commonalities between economically and socially 
disadvantaged groups are obscured. In other words 
identifying as a 'white' New Zealander or a Maori 
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continue to be the dominant organising categories 
for narratives of national 'belonging'. As we will 
see in Chapter 3, while essentialised 
constructions of Maoriness, as pure, authentic and 
relatively untouched by the depredations of 
modernity, have had considerable strategic 
importance in the struggle for reparations and 
justice, they have also been co-opted in order to. 
'brand' the uniqueness of New Zealand as it 
positions itself within the global market. 
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Chapter 3 
The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) is key to any 
investigation of identity in New Zealand. During 
the past thirty years a political and legal 
struggle over the terms of the Treaty has resulted 
in the formation of a pan-tribal Maori movement 
which has been focused on challenging the 
institutional, political and cultural forms which 
have historically disadvantaged Maori. As Kawharu 
writes: 
Land grievances have been used to attack the 
legitimacy of Pakeha society. They provided a 
springboard for a wider all-embracing 
political attack on Pakeha society claiming 
that Pakeha social and economic development 
led to cultural and economic 'genocide'; that 
the empty and obsessive pursuit of material 
wealth had debased the communal and organic 
Maori way of life (Kawharu, 1989: xvi) 
The status of the 'tribe' is central to new 
versions of 'Maoriness', focused on the 
valorisation of a way of life purportedly based on 
'common good' rather than the individualism of the 
dominant white formation. 
The strength of what is now known locally as the 
'Maori Renaissance', together with the fact that 
the large settlements - financial and territorial 
- have been made as a result of Waitangi Tribunal 
rulings, has led to an increasing focus on what it 
means to be a 'New Zealander'. 
This chapter examines the way in which the Treaty 
of Waitangi, remarkable both for its brevity and 
the expedient way in which it was drawn up in the 
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mid-nineteenth century, has subsequently 
functioned as an 'oracle' symbolising and 
articulating, at different historical moments, the 
changing relationship between colonisers and 
Maori. 
For the Maori people, the history of the Treaty 
has been one of betrayal and injustice. The 
steady stream of white settlers to New Zealand 
after 1840, together with the rapidly developing 
colonial economy, meant that the implementation of 
the legal agreement made at Waitangi threatened to 
impede the coloniser's objectives. As a result 
measures were taken to speed up the process of 
land appropriation, despite the Treaty's emphasis 
on continuing Maori control of their resources. 
The apparent weakness of the treaty in controlling 
the appropriation of land was legitimated by 
claims that the Icivilising mission' had failed to 
assimilate and thereby save the Maori, who were 
deemed by 1870 to be a 'dying race'. 
The conflicts which ensued between the British and 
Maori tribal groups followed the treaty-signing 
represented a clash between differing cultural 
interpretations of property rights. On the one 
hand there were Maori perceptions of their land as 
a communally-owned symbol of tribal identity and 
mana and on the other, white settler concerns with 
individual ownership of land for the realisation 
of profit. 
While some of the massive territorial 
confiscations of the nineteenth century have been 
acknowledged, and in many cases recompensed, 
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through the deliberations of the Waitangi Tribunal 
(set up in 1975 to investigate treaty-related 
grievances), there is considerable debate about 
the extent to which there has been any real shift 
of economic and political power away from the 
white majority as a result of the state-brokered 
'bicultural settlement'. This chapter argues that 
Ibiculturalism' represents a strategic adjustment 
designed to appease Maori demands, with the state 
using the Treaty to orchestrate a drama of 
national reconciliation during a period when the 
national economy has been repositioned within the 
orbit of the Asia/Pacific region. 
The first section of this chapter contextualises 
the Treaty of Waitangi in terms of the imposition 
of colonial power in New Zealand; the second looks 
at the way in which recent reinterpretations of 
the treaty principles have brought about the 
bicultural settlement which has to some extent 
incorporated 'Maori values' into the institutional 
structures of the social and political formation. 
The final section of the chapter examines cultural 
practices in New Zealand which valorise particular 
constructions of 'Maoriness'. It focuses in 
particular on the film Once Were 
Warriors(Tamahori, 1994) which represents a return 
to pre-modern lifeways as the solution for the 
contemporary crisis within Maoridom. 
The role of the Law in nation-building 
For the Pakeha majority in New Zealand, the Treaty 
of Waitangi has in the recent past, functioned as 
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a symbol of nationhood rather than as a binding 
legal document. As such it has provided material 
evidence for claims that the colony was unified 
around the ideals of racial harmony and equality 
of opportunity. As such, the Treaty has 
functioned as symbolic cornerstone of a myth based 
on the fiction that New Zealand was an example of 
a benevolent colonisation process, set against, in 
particular, the brutality accorded the Aborigines 
of Australia. 
At the treaty-signing ceremony in Waitangi in 1840 
the British Governor, William Hobson famously 
decreed: 
E hiwi tahi tatou - We are one people. 
Discourses of nation coalesced around this 
mythologised unity as 'We are one people' became 
the rallying cry of a hegemonic national identity 
which naturalised the presence and privilege of 
the white settler majority and implied the 
assimilation of the Maori people had been 
achieved. Such discourses of unity erased 
historical traces of the violence involved in the 
acquisition of land on which the colony was built 
(in particular the nineteenth century 'civil 
war'), until the mid-1970s, when the Waitangi 
Tribunal was set up to consider long-standing 
Maori grievances. 
By this time the political pressure for treaty 
justice had rendered fictions of harmony and 
homogeneity untenable. The subsequent re-writing 
of the Treaty's history has been an important 
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element in the emergence of a new national 
imaginary constructed around biculturalism's 'two 
peoples, one nation'. 
Extraordinary claims have been made about the 
Treaty of Waitangi. Until recently it was a 
conunonplace in New Zealand, that the Treaty was a 
'unique' document in Britain's imperial history, 
reinforcing the notion that, in terms of racial 
harmony, New Zealand was Britain's most successful 
colony. A school textbook from the 1930s provides 
an example of these treaty 'fictions': 
The Treaty of Waitangi has been called the 
Magna Carta of the Maori race. It is a 
unique document in that it was the first 
time in the history of the British Empire 
that such a treaty had been made with an 
uncivilised people. To this day it remains 
the honoured 
1 
ground on which Maori and 
Pakeha meet. 
These claims to uniqueness have no foundation as 
treaties were frequently used by the British in 
their dealings with 'native' peoples. They 
provided one of the many ways in which legal 
discourses were deployed in order to underpin the 
constitutional power of European colonisation. 
Treaties were used extensively to regulate and 
legitimate the economic and political structures 
installed in colonial territories 
(Dirks: 1992: 175). Evidence of the extent of 
colonial treaty-making is revealed in archives 
held by the British Foreign Office in London. 
'The Young Dominion: A Short History of New 
Zealand (Whitcombe and Tombs, 1932: 52) 
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Thirty volumes of treaties - Herslets Commercial 
Treaties -- made by the British in colonial 
territories between 1820 and 1924, contain 
hundreds of treaties for 'peace and cession' and 
'peace and friendship'. The Treaty of Waitangi is 
2 to be found in Volume VI, published in 1845 . 
There was nothing in the text of the Waitangi 
Treaty which had not been similarly expressed in 
other legal statements of British colonial policy. 
However, the Treaty was unique in one important 
respect. While, in legal intent, it replicated so 
many others made throughout the Empire 
(guaranteeing colonial trade and peaceful European 
settlement), it was distinctive in that the 
English version was translated into Maori. It is 
the ambiguities and inconsistencies between the 
two versions which have provided the legal grounds 
for contemporary re-interpretations of the 
document. The Waitangi Tribunal has effectively 
worked within the 'interpretative space' created 
between the two versions - Maori and English - of 
the document and its deliberations have provided a 
radical reinterpretation of the colony's history. 
The Maori translation, signed by the majority of 
chiefs, was hastily drawn up and failed to clarify 
the meanings embedded in the English version. 
Such discrepancies in meaning were almost 
2 Legal historians researching the Treaty of Waitangi in New 
Zealand have examined the similarities between this treaty 
and those made between the British and tribal groups in 
other colonial territories such as the treaties made in 
Africa has involved territories such as the Cape (South 
Africa), the Gambia Fiji and North America 
(Sorrenson, 1989: 18). 
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inevitable for a number of reasons: the oral 
language of the Maori had been Itextualised' by 
British missionaries with little understanding of 
the complexity of tribal lifeways, while the 
treaty document itself was selectively translated 
to ensure the particular objectives of the 
colonisers would be met. The English version of 
the Treaty ceded the sovereignty of New Zealand to 
Britain and gave the Crown exclusive rights to all 
land the Maori agreed to 'sell', in return the 
Maori were guaranteed full rights of ownership of 
their remaining lands, forests and fisheries. The 
discrepancies between the two texts, in particular 
the translation of the English concept of 
'sovereignty' into Maori, the translation of which 
suggested to the chiefs they were ceding 
'governorship' rather than complete 'sovereignty', 
meant that all parties to the agreement were left 
with conflicting expectations about the power they 
could exercise in the colony. (Walker, 1989: 264). 
Dr Paul McHugh, the lawyer who, in recent years, 
has represented the claims of the Tainui tribe to 
the Waitangi Tribunal argues: 
It would be foolish to expect there to have 
been an exact meeting of minds .... the 
cultural gap was wide and Maori exposure to 
the literate European world in which men 
freely entered into bargains in the market 
place was limited. The English notion of 
freedom of contract was a nineteenth 
century idealisation of the way in which 
human beings behaved towards each other. 
Its supposition of equality between the 
contracting parties - the assumption that 
each enjoyed equal knowledge, bargaining 
power and the rational judgement to act in 
and ensure their own interest - was hardly 
one which could be applied. The very 
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difference between th, 
Crown on the one hand 
tribes on the other - 
interpretation of the 
would become an issue 
dry (McHugh, 1991: 6). 
e two cultures, the 
and the various 
meant that the 
Treaty of Waitangi 
before the ink was 
The 'cultural gap' McHugh refers to has been the 
focus of the proceedings of the Waitangi Tribunal 
which has assessed tribal claims for restitution 
and compensation for appropriated land and 
resources. The tribunal is the latest phase in the 
struggle for 'treaty justice' which stretches back 
to the mid-nineteenth century. 
Despite guarantees enshrined in the Treaty, the 
Crown's strategy in exercising its pre-emptive 
right to buy land at the cheapest possible price, 
largely by taking advantage of Maori ignorance 
about the appreciation of land values, ensured 
that funds were generated to finance the 
infrastructural development of the colony. Thus 
whilst the Crown appeared to be protecting Maori 
from unscrupulous land speculators it was 
simultaneously 'pauperising' them (Ward, 1997: 28). 
Maori chiefs were told that the treaty was the 
means to protect their rights while ensuring the 
control of European lawlessness; loss of tribal 
sovereignty was played down. As Orange puts its 
The impersonal nature of Crown authority 
and the potentially restrictive effect of 
British law were diminished. Most 
importantly , there is an absence of any 
explanation that Maori agreement to 
kawanatanga ('sovereignty' in the English 
text) would mean British annexation; a 
substantial transfer of power that would 
bring international recognition of New 
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Zealand as a British colony. On the 
contrary, from the emphasis on protection, 
Maori might have expected that they were 
being offered an arrangement akin to a 
protectorate (Orange, 1987: 10). 
A diary account by the missionary, Henry Williams, 
suggests that in discussions with tribal leaders 
he played up certain aspects of the Treaty in 
order to secure Maori agreement. His diary (which 
hints at the paternalistic way in which the 
missionaries dealt with the Maori) recounts how, 
during the proceedings he read the Maori text to 
the chiefs and then explained its meaning 
I told them all to listen with care, 
explaining clause by clause... telling them 
we, the missionaries, fully approved of the 
treaty, that it was an act of love towards 
them on the part of the Queen, who desired 
to secure them their property, rights and 
privileges. That this treaty was a fortress 
for them against any foreign power which 
might desire to take possession of their 
country (Carleton, 1874: 12). 
McHugh suggests that disputes over the treaty 
which began 'before the ink was dry', were the 
result of cultural misunderstandings in 
particular, around notions of 'sovereignty' but 
also in relation to definitions of 'private 
property' and appropriate land use. Maori saw land 
deals in the context of complex social relations; 
there were expectations that colonial purchasers 
were entering not only a transaction but an 
extended relationship with the tribe which would 
bring longer-term benefits through connections 
with Pakeha settlements (McHugh, 1991: 137). 
Instead, Maori were rapidly caught up in a 
'tenurial revolution' in which the European 
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concept of 'exclusive possession' in terms of 
fixed boundaries gave property owners rights to 
all resources (such as forests) contained within 
that boundary. 
Thus the wording of the Treaty and its 
presentation to Maori groups involved a set of 
discursive compromises which contained sufficient 
ambiguities that each party emerged with their own 
version of promises made. Hobson's goal was 
presented in the first article of the English 
translation of the Maori text of the treaty: 
the chiefs of the confederation and all 
chiefs who have not joined that 
confederation give absolutely to the Queen 
of England forever the complete government 
over their land. 
This wording however, is immediately undercut by a 
guarantee in the second article of the Treaty. In 
the English translation of the text this guarantee 
reads as: 
Her majesty the Queen of England confirms 
and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of 
New Zealand and to the respective families 
and individuals thereof the full exclusive 
and undisturbed possession of their Lands 
and Estates, Forests and Fisheries and 
other properties which they may 
collectively or individually possess as 
long. as it is their wish and desire to 
retain the same in their possession. 
In addition, there are crucial ambiguities evident 
in the translation between Maori and English 
versions of the treaty indicating the difficulty 
of meshing very different cultural understandings 
of property, ownership, government and 
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sovereignty. In Maori 'full exclusive and 
undisturbed possession' was rendered as Ite tino 
rangatirtangal which translates more broadly not 
simply as property ownership but rights of control 
and cultural and political independence. 
Similarly, the Maori term used for government is 
likely to have been interpreted as referring only 
to civil government, a 'governor's authority', 
rather than sovereignty and control in any more 
pervasive sense. From these confusions, questions 
of exactly who owned the 'shadow' and who owned 
the 'substance' of the land predictably arose. 
Ranginui Walker argues that a comment of the 
Kaitaia chief Nopero Panakareo at the treaty - 
signing makes explicit Maori understandings of the 
Treaty: 
The shadow (kawananatanga, governance) of 
the land goes to the Queen but the 
substance, rangatiratanaga i. e. 
chieftanship, (mana) remains with us. 
(Kawharu, 1989: 265) 
The third article of the Treaty proved to be the 
least contentious, although its underlining intent 
was the assimilation of the Maori. This article 
is important in terms of 'identity' because of the 
use of the word Imaori' in the Maori version. In 
English the article states: 
In consideration thereof, Her majesty the 
Queen of England extends to the Natives of 
New Zealand Her Royal protection, and 
imparts to them all the Rights and 
Privileges of British subjects. 
The translation of the Maori version back into 
English states: 
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This (the third clause) is in consideration 
of the acknowledgement of the Queen's 
governance. The Queen of England will 
protect all the maori people of New 
Zealand. They will be given all the rights 
equal to those of the people of England. 
The English text of the treaty was used to lend 
legitimacy to the appropriation of the territory 
and to the emerging mythology that New Zealand 
was the site of a benevolent and harmonious form 
of colonisation. 
National Identity and the Treaty of Waitangi 
February sixth is a national holiday in New 
Zealand. It marks the annual commemoration of the 
founding moment of nationhood, when Maori chiefs 
and representatives of the British Crown gathered 
in the northern settlement of Waitangi to sign a 
treaty which, in dominant discourses of nation, 
claimed for more than a century to have 
'peacefully' secured Maori agreement for the 
transfer of sovereignty to the colonisers. 
Despite the contemporary struggles over the 
Treaty, Waitangi continues to be an important 
tourist site in a country which boasts few markers 
of 'heritage'. In contrast to Britain's heritage 
industry, New Zealand's colonial legacy has meant 
that heritage has always been an uncomfortable 
reminder of a short and violent past. During the 
1980s, at the height of the Waitangi disputes, 
economic deregulation and privatisation was 
accompanied by a process of lorganised forgetting' 
as an inner-city rebuilding programme, financed by 
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international capital, resulted in the demolition 
of the colonial architecture of the main business 
areas of Auckland and Wellington. (The city of 
Dunedin slipping off the end of the map, and now a 
world heritage site, is the only place which 
displays a built environment with any colonial 
features). 
In 1932 Busby's residence at Waitangi was gifted 
to the nation and the site was subsequently made a 
national memorial. Set in an immaculate rose 
garden, the residence is now a museum which 
displays the signifiers of a particular version of 
national History. Here we find the bungalow 
furnished with the original Victoriana brought 
from England. Military uniforms and medals are 
displayed in glass cases; resting on a wooden desk 
in the study are facsimile copies of the treaty 
(in Maori and English), quill pen and blotter 
nearby. The actuality of the event is frozen here 
in a tranquil mise-en-scene which suggests the 
treaty-signing ceremony at the residence was an 
uncomplicated transfer of power; in fact the 
gathering of signatures was a lengthy affair. 
Waitangi Day and the museum at the treaty-signing 
site are aspects of an inventory of invented 
traditions surrounding the Treaty. The 
'rediscovery' of the Treaty of Waitangi in the 
period following the Second World War provided a 
focus for an emerging nationalism amongst the 
white majority. The establishment of the Waitangi 
site as a national monument, together with the 
introduction of annual ceremonies commemorating 
the treaty-signing, were part of a process which 
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re-invented the treaty as a symbol of nationhood 
(Oliver, 1984: 329). 
In 1940, to mark the centenary of the treaty, a 
re-enactment of the signing ceremony was held at 
Waitangi. The ceremony provided a moment for 'a 
demonstration of national pride and unity' (ibid). 
For the first time the official documents relating 
to the treaty were publicly displayed 
(Orange: 1987: 236). The centenary of the treaty- 
signing coincided with the New Zealand 
government's declaration of war against Germany. 
In global terms this was a whimper from the outer 
reaches of the Empire but it proved to be a 
defining moment in terms of the colony's sense of 
nationhood. Newspaper coverage of the Waitangi 
celebrations described the site as 'the cradle of 
the nation' while the treaty became 'the bulwark 
and foundation of nationhood 13 . Significantly the 
Maori did not support the 'celebrations' and used 
the centenary to focus on land grievances which 
continued to be ignored by the government. 
New Zealand finally attained 'dominion' status in 
1947 when the government adopted the terms of the 
Balfour Report (1926), severing colonial links 
with Britain. (The delay in legislating for 
independence was an indication of the continuing 
importance of economic ties with Britain 
(Oliver, 1984: 330). The nation's new independence 
gave rise to nationalist discourses which placed 
even greater emphasis on the Treaty as the 
founding document of nation. 
3 New Zealand Herald, 7 February, 1940. 
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In 1946 a flagpole was erected at Waitangi which 
provided the focus for an annual naval display in 
the harbour opposite the treaty-signing site. In 
1953 the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh visited 
Waitangi for the first time. The national 
newspaper, The Dominion opined: 
At last Waitangi comes into its own to a 
degree worthy of its significance and New 
Zealanders must see its status is 
maintained and heightened 4 
Following the Royal Visit in 1953, the annual 
ceremonies at Waitangi on 6th February became 
increasingly important as state occasions. From 
1954 speeches, broadcast live to the nation from 
Waitangi, were used to emphasise the good 
relations between Maori and Pakeha. The theme of 
these speeches, reported extensively in 
newspapers, was the forming of one nation from the 
'partnership' of two races. At the 1960 ceremony 
Lord Cobham claimed the Treaty was a 'sacred 
compact' which: 
brought together two fine races who settled 
down together to achieve full nationhood 
for a young and undeveloped country under 
the Queen's peace and law. 5 
The following year his reiteration of the theme 
drew on Icivilising' metaphors of light and dark 
to proclaim a vision of racial assimilation and 
national unity: 
The Dominion 15 December, 1953 
5 New Zealand Herald, 6 February, 1959 
104 
120 years ago the pattern was set and a new 
tapestry planned in which light and dark 
threads were interwoven to form the 
completed study of a new nation 6. 
Thus the Treaty of Waitangi has provided the 
symbolic material for dominant discourses of 
nation which have valorised a temporal narrative 
(based on a myth of national progress and 
development) whilst occluding spatiality - 
rendering invisible, colonial property relations 
and the role of the Law in that process. The 
recent re-assessment of colonial history has seen 
the emergence of a counter-narrative through which 
spatiality has been re-inscribed into treaty 
discourses. 
Reinterpreting Treaty Law 
The setting up of the Tribunal in 1975 triggered a 
period of intense struggle over the meaning of the 
two versions of the Treaty. This struggle was 
played out politically, legally and culturally. 
During the first ten years of the Tribunal's 
existence, almost every tribal grouping in New 
Zealand made claims relating to land and 
fisheries. The extent of these claims provides 
testimony to the fact that there was scarcely any 
territory or foreshore in New Zealand which was 
uncontested in terms of colonial appropriations. 
6 New Zealand Herald, 8 February 1960. This 'melting pot' 
fantasy of assimilation was a common theme. According to 
Sharp, during the sixties the Prime Minister Keith Holyoake 
'spoke cheerfully of the day when there would only be 
'light-brown-skinned New Zealanders' (Sharp, 1990: 44) 
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When the Government extended the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction in 1985, giving it powers to address 
grievances dating back to 1840, the widened remit 
produced a flood of claims which went beyond 
issues relating to specific territory. 
Increasingly the Tribunal was called upon to 
consider the 'cultural treasures' guaranteed by 
the Treaty, in particular the destruction of the 
Maori language. 
And while the deliberations of the tribunal 
focused on reinterpreting the treaty text in 
relation to specific tribal grievances, broader 
political and social issues raised in the hearings 
became publicly contested. As the Tribunal 
deliberated on the place of the Maori language 
within the terms of the treaty, disputes arose 
over the use and pronunciation of Maori. Calls 
were made for the restoration of Maori as an 
official language alongside English, and for all 
place names to revert to their original Maori. As 
a result, New Zealand became known as Aotearoa/New 
Zealand 7 and in May 1988 the government announced 
New Zealand Post would accept letters addressed in 
Maori. 
The formalities surrounding the tribunal hearings 
provided the means to contest the unequal power 
relations inherent in European legal protocol 
7 Aotearoa/New Zealand was hyphenated to show the disjunction 
in understandings and purposes that would be hidden if one 
of the two words were used alone. Sharp argues that the 
Maori word for New Zealand 'Aotearoal (Land of the Long 
White Cloud) was a late nineteenth century invention of 
pakeha ethnologists who constructed a name the original 
inhabitants neither used nor needed (Sharp, 1990: 12) 
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(which in turn impacted on all other areas of the 
public domain). The first tribunal hearing took 
place in the plush and intimidating setting of the 
ballroom of Auckland's Intercontinental Hotel. 
Following protests from tribal appellants and 
their lawyers, subsequent tribunal hearings were 
held on tribal marae and run in accordance with 
Maori protocol. This was an important step in 
transforming opaque legal practices which as 
Goodrich argues, are based on 
an ideology of consensus and clarity - we 
are all commanded to know the law - and yet 
legal practice and legal language are 
structured in such a way as to prevent the 
acquisition of such knowledge by any other 
than a highly trained elite of specialists 
(Goodrich, 1987: 7) 
The lengthy deliberations published by the 
Waitangi Tribunal on each case included rulings on 
the place of the Treaty of Waitangi within the 
legal and political framework of the state. The 
re-assessment of the Treaty, contained in the 
rulings relating to specific tribal claims, has 
been both an affirmation of Maori belief systems 
(and it is beyond the scope of this work to 
investigate the extent to which these are 
themselves 'invented'), and a reassessment of the 
nation's Eurocentric forms of 'governmentality' 
which historically privileged scientific 
rationality and economic 'progress'. 
In interpreting the meaning of the Maori and 
English versions of the treaty the Waitangi 
Tribunal was required, in Sorrenson's words, to 
'examine the nineteenth century climate of opinion 
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to assess what was in the minds of the men who 
made, negotiated and signed the Treaty' 
(Sorrenson, 1989: 160). Each of the Tribunal's 
reports comprised rulings and recommendations on 
the specific claims together with historical 
analyses of centuries of British jurisprudence 
interpreted within the context of Maori lore and 
customs, which were often based on orally recorded 
accounts. 
Eventually the Treaty was recognised as the basis 
for a social contract between the Maori as tangata 
whenua and the rest of the population - this 
became known as the 'bicultural settlement'. The 
areas addressed in tribunal rulings such as 
social*equity and reparative justice were 
gradually institutionalised within the framework 
of Ibiculturalism' as the Treaty of Waitangi 
effectively became a bill of rights for New 
Zealand. 
The introduction of wider treaty-driven protocols 
transformed the organisation of New Zealand's 
political and social institutions. Local and 
national government, social welfare and education, 
and the criminal justice system were all required 
to incorporate 'Maori ways' into their procedures. 
After 150 years, notions of 'partnership' 
contained in the Maori version of the Treaty were 
reinstated and, more importantly, reinterpreted, 
to deal with contemporary forms of inequality 
injustice. As Judge Durie, one of the Tribunal 
members noted: 
as a constitutional document the Treaty 
must always be speaking. To be speaking in 
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our time it must be stripped of its old law 
clothing and its essential body exposed to 
view ( Kawharu, 1989: 163). 
To this end the historian J. A. Pocock has 
suggested that: 
The treaty has rapidly become New Zealand's 
ancient constitution, fundamental law and 
social contract, rendering it perhaps the 
only unitary state in the modern world 
prepared to regard its sovereignty as 
8 perpetually renegotiable and debatable. 
Despite Pocock's positive reading of the political 
implications, there has been an on-going debate in 
New Zealand about the extent to which the re- 
assessment of the Treaty of Waitangi has produced 
significant redistributions of economic wealth and 
power. Despite some large financial and 
territorial settlements made to tribal groups as a 
result of various Tribunal rulings, critics argue 
that the treaty re-negotiations have 'watered 
down' substantive issues raised by the Maori 
concerning autonomous sovereignty and development. 
The foregrounding of Maori beliefs and customs has 
been used as an effective strategy in a number of 
legal challenges made to the Tribunal, 
particularly relating to environmental 
destruction. The struggle over developments around 
Auckland's Manukau Harbour which threatened 
environmental damage, provide an example of the 
way in which the terms of the Treaty have been 
reinterpreted to deal with contemporary issues. 
In the case detailed below, the Tribunal over- 
8 'Removal from the Wings', J. A. Pocock, London Review of 
Books, 20 March, 1997. 
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ruled local authority procedures which had 
traditionally drawn on the discourses of 
'progress' to deal with planning issues. 
The conurbation of Auckland, New Zealand's largest 
city, stretches some forty miles along an isthmus 
which spans a narrow piece of land between the 
Tasman Sea and the Pacific Ocean. The city is 
built between two natural harbours, the Manukau on 
the west coast and the Waitemata on the east. The 
foreshores and fishing grounds of these harbours 
traditionally provided the base for a number of 
Maori tribal groups and have been the focus of 
numerous claims made to the Waitangi Tribunal. 
The geography of the isthmus is unusual; the city 
is built around sixteen extinct volcanoes which, 
before European settlement, were used by tribal 
groups as fortified settlements. The volcanic 
soil in the region is exceptionally fertile - the 
northern-most points of the city border a wealthy 
wine-growing region while the southern reaches are 
surrounded by extensive market-gardening. The 
black sands of the city's west coast, including 
the Manukau Harbour, are rich in iron ore. Such a 
well-resourced region was an obvious choice for 
New Zealand's first provincial centre but the cost 
to the Maori was enormous. As Kawharu notes 
For more than a century the Tainui tribes, 
centred today on nine marae around the 
periphery of the Manukau Harbour, watched 
the development of the harbour to the 
detriment of their fisheries. Some 
developments on the harbour they accepted 
with equanimity. Others, by private 
enterprise and local bodies, including 
enclosures, reclamations, freezing works, 
110 
sewage treatment plants and the New Zealand 
Steel Mill, they viewed with misgiving. 
(Kawharu, 1989: 250) 
In the early 1980s the Tainui tribe attempted to 
prevent further development at the New Zealand 
Steel plant located at the mouth of the Waikato, a 
river which runs into the sea at the Manukau 
Harbour. The steel company had been granted a 
water right to take water from the river in order 
to pump iron-sand slurry into its mill and then 
discharge the waste into the Manukau Harbour. 
The Tainui had initially appealed against this 
decision through local authority planning 
procedures, on the grounds that the mixing of the 
waters from two separate sources - the river and 
the harbour - was sacrilege. According to Maori 
lore each body of water had its own Iwairual 
(spirit) which tribes were bound to protect. To 
maintain the purity and wairua of the water no 
'unnatural' mixing or heating should occur. The 
steel company's plan to use the river water for 
slurry involved both heating the water as it 
passed through the slurry pipes and mixing the 
waters of the river and the harbour when the waste 
was discharged into the harbour. The Planning 
Tribunal dismissed the appeal ruling that the 
Water and Soil Conservation Act did not allow 
'purely metaphysical concerns' to be taken into 
account in planning procedures, the appeal judge 
ruled that: 
the purpose of planning is to achieve 
orderly coherent land use. The appeal is 
dismissed on the grounds that planning 
requires rational and scientific techniques 
ill 
in the management of the natural 
environment. 9 
The appeal had been lodged by a local Tainui 
woman, Nganeko Minhinnick, who had campaigned 
extensively to have planning recognition for Maori 
spiritual values relating to water. After the 
appeal was turned down she drew attention to the 
way in her tribe had been forced to engage with 
the specialised discourses of 'governmentality' in 
order to air their grievances: 
To put forward our view we have become 
involved in procedures which are foreign to 
our way of life. We have had to undergo a 
whole learning process trying to understand 
planning applications, rights for intakes, 
rights for discharge, rights of objection 
and appeal, water and soil legislation, 
planning legislation, only to be told that 
despite all these procedures there is no 
provision for spiritual and cultural 
matters Maori to be taken into account 10. 
Despite his dismissal of the appellants 
'metaphysical concerns' the appeal judge had 
conceded that he could find no historical evidence 
to show how possession of the Manukau Harbour had 
passed into Crown control. This admission enabled 
Nganeko Minhinnick to take the Tainui's case to 
the Waitangi Tribunal based on a much wider range 
of grievances relating to appropriations going 
back to 1840. These included: 
the confiscation of 60,000 hectares of 
tribal land during the Land Wars, loss of 
9Auckland Regional Authority Planning Tribunal report, 1981. 
10 Auckland Regional Authority Planning Tribunal report. 
1981 
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mudflat fisheries to Auckland Airport, 
pollution from the sewage treatment plant 
into the Manukau, degradation of the 
harbour by farming and industrial 
development, mining of sands by New Zealand 
Steel and the compulsory acquisition of 
land under the Public Works Act (1932) 
for sand dune reclamation 
(Kawharu, 1989: 253). 
When the report on-the Manukau claim was finally 
made public in 1985 the Waitangi Tribunal detailed 
an extensive history of oppression and injustice 
toward the Tainui people from the time of European 
settlement. " The report supported the tribe's 
claim that the development of the Manukau Harbour 
- in particular the steel works - contravened the 
Treaty's guarantee to full, exclusive and 
undisturbed possession of Maori lands, homes and 
fisheries. As the Tribunal put it: 
The harbour was as much owned and 
apportioned to the care and use of 
different tribes as the land was. To the 
local tribes the Manukau was their garden 
of the sea ... any loss of the use of the 
harbour is as much as the loss of land. We 
are appalled at the events of the past and 
the effect they have had on the Manukau 
tribe S12. 
The Tribunal argued that the Manukau Harbour was a 
'treasured possession' and should have been 
protected by the terms of the treaty: 
In the Manukau the tribal enjoyment of the 
lands and fisheries has been and continues 
to be severely prejudiced by compulsory 
"Finding of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim 
(1985) . 
12 Findings of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim 
(1985). 
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acquisitions, land development, industrial 
developments, reclamations, waste 
discharges, zonings, commercial fishing 
and the denial of traditional harbour 
access. 13 
However the recommendations contained in the 
report, seen by many to typify the mild and 
compromising position taken by the Tribunal in 
many of the disputes, did not support the view 
that the Manukau tribes could claim sole ownership 
of the harbour: 
In our multicultural society the values of 
minorities must sometimes give way to those 
of the predominant culture, but in the 
Treaty of Waitangi gives Maori values an 
equal place with British values and a 
priority when the Maori interest in their 
taonga (treasures/cultural heritage) is 
adversely affected 14 
According to the Tribunal, the Crown's failure to 
provide protection guaranteed under the Treaty had 
begun in the nineteenth century, with colonial 
policies which had led to war and the confiscation 
of land, and had continued to the present day. It 
recommended that legislation should be introduced 
ensuring that Maori 'sensibilities, rights and 
interests' should be taken into account in all 
future planning and development relating to the 
harbour. It called for the formulation of what 
became known as the Manukau Harbour Action Plan to 
clean up the harbour and demanded that the 
government appointment guardians to represent 
13 (ibid: 100) 
14 Findings of the Waitangi Tribunal on the Manukau Claim 
(1985): p. 77. 
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Maori and environmental interests in all future 
developments. 
In relation to the proposed New Zealand Steel 
pipeline, the tribunal concluded that the proposal 
did not pose any great environmental threat and 
although the tribes considered the transfer of 
water from river to harbour to be culturally 
offensive it accepted that the steel company had 
already been granted planning permission for the 
pipeline. The tribunal suggested that New Zealand 
Steel and the Tainui people work together to reach 
an acceptable compromise. 
In controversial cases the Waitangi Tribunal has 
tended to recommend that compromise solutions be 
voluntarily negotiated between Maori claimants and 
appellants; the Manukau ruling was similar to a 
number of other claims considered in the early 
1980s. For example, further down the west coast 
of the North Island from the Manukau, the Atiawa 
tribe had lodged a claim against a proposed 
sewerage outfall which it claimed would pollute 
the tribal fishing grounds at Motonui. The 
Tribunal recommended the tribe and the local 
authority reach a compromise; after five years of 
negotiations it was agreed that the sewage 
treatment plant would be land-based. However in 
Rotorua, the proposal by the city corporation to 
build a pipeline for the discharge into the 
Kaituna River was deemed to be a threat to the 
local tribe's spiritual and cultural values and 
the Tribunal recommended the city corporation find 
an alternative land-based solution to the disposal 
of effluent. As Claudia Orange put it: 
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An uneasiness, even a hostility shown by 
many Pakeha, suggests that satisfaction of 
Maori claims depends, as it always has, 
upon whether or not Maori and Pakeha 
interests coincide (Orange, 1987: 250). 
Compromise solutions offered by the Tribunal 
generally failed to satisfy tribal groups and in 
the case of the Tainui the claim lodged over the 
Manukau Harbour was the beginning of a long 
campaign for reparations. A decade after the first 
Manukau report the New Zealand Government finally 
agreed a $170 million financial settlement for the 
Tainui people together with the return of 30,000 
acres of Crown land confiscated in 1863. The 
settlement was accompanied by an apology from the 
British Queen for 'loss of life in the wars 
arising from the invasion of Maori land and the 
resulting devastation' (Reported in Guardian and 
Financial Times, 23 May 1995). 15 
In 1986 the Waitangi Tribunal ruled on the first 
non-resource based claim made to the Tribunal; the 
claim focused on issues to do with Maori cultural 
heritage. The Te Reo Maori claim was made by Nga 
Kaiw. hakapumau i te Reo (the Wellington Board of 
Maori Language); it asked that Maori be recognised 
as an official language in New Zealand. 
By the time the Waitangi Tribunal addressed the 
issue of language and culture the revival of the 
language was already underway as part of a 
15 At the time of the Tainui settlement the New Zealand 
government was negotiating a 'fiscal envelope'. On offer to 
the Maori people of New Zealand was a one-off payment 
totalling $1 billion which would be settle all outstanding 
grievances. The offer was rejected. 
116 
campaign by Maori to address the systematic 
failure of Maori children in the education system. 
A survey conducted in 1970 by the Department of 
Maori Affairs had provided evidence of the extent 
to which Maori language had disappeared. At that 
time fifty per cent of the Maori population was 
under fifteen years of age; only 15 per cent of 
that group could speak Maori (Kawharu, 1989: 242). 
In 1981 a nation-wide scheme known as Ikohanga 
reol (language nests) was introduced. This 
project, based around community-run pre-school 
classes taught entirely in Maori, was designed to 
ensure that all Maori children were bilingual by 
the time they entered primary school: 
Without the Maori language there can be no 
Maori culture; the survival of Maori 
identity is the spiritual force behind 
kohanga reo (ibid: 238). 
The Te Reo report from the Waitangi Tribunal was 
an example of the way in which the Treaty was re- 
interpreted to address contemporary concerns 16 . The 
Maori language was not specifically listed amongst 
the Maori possessions guaranteed in the second 
article of English text of the treaty but the 
Tribunal argued that it was covered by the heading 
of Io ratou taonga katoal in the Maori text, 
variously translated as 'all their valued customs 
and possessions' or I all things highly prized'. 
In a section of the report headed Te Reo in the 
Past the Tribunal outlined the history of the 
26 Waitangi Tribunal (1986) Report of the Waitangi Tribunalon 
i-hp tp rpn MAnri rinim 
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Maori language since European settlement. 
Initially the language was not in danger: 
Many settlers were bilingual ... missionary instruction was given in Maori, Governor 
Grey recorded the myths and legends of the 
Maori in the Maori language. 17 
However the 1847 Education ordinance introduced 
assimilationist policies which put an end to 
mission teaching in Maori; English was made the 
compulsory language and as a consequence the 
number of Maori speakers gradually declined. Maori 
elders who gave evidence to the Tribunal described 
beatings at school for speaking Maori; one man 
recounted an incident where a school inspector had 
told him: 
'English is the bread-and-butter language 
and if you want to earn your bread-and- 
butter you must speak English. ' 
(Kawharu, 1989: 15). 
The Te Reo Report pointed out that the Maori 
chiefs would have been unlikely to have signed the 
Treaty if their language had not been covered by 
its guarantees. Some commentators, however, have 
argued that 'it is probably more likely that the 
question of language never crossed anyone's mind 
in 18401 (Sharp, 1990: 135). Sharp speculates that 
the attempt to extend the meaning of 'taonga' to 
include language, culture and education was not so 
much to rewrite the history of the signing of the 
Treaty from a contemporary perspective, but 
rather, to ensure that injustices to the Maori 
17 ibid: 13. 
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could be addressed under the aegis of breach of 
contract (ibid: 136). 
This was an important principle in terms of the 
way in which Treaty was seen to function as an 
'oracle', as a document which was not simply a 
tract for its time: 
It was not intended to fossilise a status 
quo, but to provide direction for future 
growth and development; the foundation for 
a developing social contract 18. 
While the Tribunal recommended that Maori be 
recognised as an official language it turned down 
a demand that all public documents including 
newspapers should be printed in both English and 
Maori arguing that the cost of this requirement 
would be prohibitive. But perhaps more - 
significantly, by the time the Tribunal published 
its report there was not a single newspaper or 
magazine in the country which was owned by a New 
Zealand-based company - thus any recommendation 
for bi-lingudlism in the print media may well have 
been impossible to implement and regulate 
(Chapter 5 discusses in more detail the 
globalisation of media and cultural production and 
the resultant difficulties of regulating 'national 
culture'. ) 
The claim to the Tribunal to have Maori officially 
recognised alongside English was also focused on 
the cultural industries. Broadcasting, in 
particular, was seen as an important way of 
18 Waitangi Tribunal (1986) Report of the Waitangi Tribunal 
on the Te Reo Maori Claim: 28. 
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promoting the use of Maori language. 19 A submission 
to the Waitangi Tribunal argued that as the radio- 
spectrum was a 'taonga', the broadcasting 
institutions were failing to meet their treaty 
obligations: 
It is accurate to describe the Broadcasting 
Corporation of New Zealand as Pakeha. 
Minute by minute, hour by hour, day by day 
the non-Maori culture of New Zealand has 
dominated the environment and activities of 
broadcasting20. 
The tribunal upheld this view, concluding from the 
evidence presented during a month-long hearing 
that: 
by the Treaty the Crown did promise to 
recognise and protect the language and that 
promise has not been kept. The 'guarantee' 
in the Treaty requires affirmative action 
to protect and sustain the language, not a 
passive obligation to tolerate its 
existence and certainly not a right to deny 
its use in any place. 21 
The Tribunal concluded: 
The language is an essential part of the 
culture and must therefore be regarded as 
a valued possession. It is consistent with 
the principles of the Treaty that language 
and matters of Maori interest should have a 
secure place in broadcasting22 
19 In 1981 the output of radio and television included only 
one and half hours a week of programming in Maori). 
20 Waitangi Tribunal (1986) Report of the Waitangi Tribunal 
on the te reo Maori Claim: 20. 
21 ibid: 11. 
22 ibid: 2 6. 
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However the recognition of treaty obligations in 
relation to Maori language and culture coincided 
with the deregulation of broadcasting in New 
Zealand. Maori campaigners attempted to block the 
corporatisation of state-run radio and television 
in the courts; the case was taken to the Privy 
Council in London in 1993 which accepted that the 
Maori language was in a 'perilous state' but that 
the Crown was not required 'to go beyond what was 
reasonable in the prevailing circumstances' 
(Durie, 1998: 70). As Chapter 5 discusses, Maori 
language programmes do appear in the schedules of 
New Zealand's deregulated broadcasting system, 
albeit marginalised in schedules which are 
designed primarily to target particular sections 
of the audience , namely consumers of advertised 
products. 
The deregulation of the New Zealand economy, which 
has been going on in parallel to the treaty 
negotiations, has resulted in an 
linternationalised' economic infrastructure with 
the regulatory functions of the state reorganised 
into privatised corporate enterprises. Decisions 
about the New Zealand economy tend to now be made 
in relation to pressures emanating from outside 
the national borders - the state's role is 
increasingly to broker the flow of capital through 
the territory and to engender corporate confidence 
through guarantees of political stability. 
Thus while institutional structures (health, 
education, social welfare and the courts for 
example) operate new Treaty-driven protocols, 
particularly in relation to the use of Maori 
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language, there continues to be considerable 
conflict between the cultural and political forms 
demanded by the Treaty re-negotiations, stressing 
notions of social justice based on the collective 
rights which have been enshrined in the 
'bicultural settlement', and the monetarist 
economic agenda. 
Examining the 'bicultural settlement' in New 
Zealand without addressing these issues could 
arguably lead to an overly-celebratory reading of 
the way in which the struggle has unfolded in New 
Zealand. Among other things, it would mis- 
represent aspects of the interests and ideological 
character of Pakeha. 
It is significant that so many of the economic, 
political and cultural issues dealt with through 
the Waitangi Tribunal - such as environmental 
destruction and the deregulation of media 
potentially impact on the wider New Zealand 
population. For example, the debate over Maori 
language and broadcasting touch on important 
debates about globalisation and the loss of 
cultural identity. However, public perceptions of 
bi-polar 'race' differences have ensured that 
issues dealt with by the Waitangi Tribunal 
continue to be represented as solely the concern 
of Maori. Thus the potential for a more radical 
use of the Treaty to contest the power of 
multinational capitalism has been lost as 
culturalist discourses about identity obscure 
wider inequalities inherent in New Zealand's 
social and economic relations of production and 
consumption. 
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Representing 'Maorinessl: Te Maori and Lee 
Tamahorils Once Were Warriors 
The history of the long struggle by the Maori 
people for legal recognition of the terms of the 
Treaty of Waitangi has only recently been written 
(Orange, 1987; Belich, 1986,1997; Kawharu, 1990). 
The new historiography, dispensing with 'fatal 
impact' narratives, based on the progressive 
decline and destruction of the indigenous people, 
emphasises instead, Maori agency from the 
earliest days of colonisation. Historians have 
shown that after Cook's landfall in 1769, tribal 
groups were keen to engage with European explorers 
and traders. Alan Ward suggests this early success 
in accommodating and adapting to the forces of 
modernity was in part due to the fact that Maori 
society was competitive and hierarchical (i. e. the 
interests of group members were not equal). He 
writes: 
In most respects their achievements were 
outstanding. They showed both a desire and 
a formidable ability master and manage the 
forces of modernity to their own enrichment 
(Ward, 1997: 11) 
This apparent agency runs counter to notions of 
Maori communalism and spirituality deployed in 
contemporary biculturalist discourse. Rather, as 
Mason Durie suggests, contemporary pan-tribal 
forms of identification echo nineteenth century 
constructions 'textualised' by anthropolgists and 
missionaries whose versions of Maoriness 
reproduced Eurocentric and homogenising 
constructions of Maori as 'primitives': 
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The construction of a Maori identity was 
accompanied by the promotion of a range of 
stories, legends and traditions based on 
various tribal accounts but amalgamated to 
form new pan-Maori versions which drew 
heavily on both European anthropology and 
the Old Testament (Durie 1998: 53). 
The emergence of 'ethnic nationalism' during the 
past twenty years has mobilised and unified 
diverse Maori groupings around the notion of 
'peoplehood' and 'sovereignty'. By valorising an 
authentic indigeneity and spirituality and 
stressing pan-tribal cultural traditions and 
customs, Ibiculturalism' has produced an 
empowering but essentialist version of 'Maoriness' 
in opposition to Pakeha identity which has been 
stereotyped as hedonistic, aggressive and 
materialistic. 
The classic text of 'ethnic nationalism', Donna 
Awatere's Maori Sovereignty, called for Maori 
self-determination. Awatere's tract combined 
Marxist/Third World Liberationist rhetoric with 
primitivist mysticism; she compares the 'mowed 
lawn mentality' of white New Zealanders with the 
authenticity of the Maori: 
Before colonisation we had all the land in 
communal hands. We knew who were in 
relation to each hill and tree and to each 
person in this country. Justice was 
mediated by the philosophy of reciprocity. 
We had prodigious memories, intellects 
trained in the oral tradition, in real 
lived history, in reading the stars, the 
trees the cosmos, all the signs of nature 
(Awatere, 1984: 58). 
124 
Clearly such 'primitivist, idealisations have 
strategic political value, playing an empowering 
role in the affirmation of indigenous culture 
nationally and internationally. However the 'truth 
claims' of these discourses police the boundaries 
of Maoriness by marginalising the inauthentic and 
inappropriate and have had material effects on 
significant numbers of New Zealanders identifying 
as Maori but with no tribal affiliations. For 
example, all financial and resource settlements 
resulting from the Waitangi hearings have been 
allocated to specific tribes groupings; those 
Maori positioned 'outside' (twenty per cent of 
those identif ying as Maori23 ) have been effectively 
j24 'disinherited 
Two major cultural 'moments' - the first, the 1984 
Te Maori exhibition in New York, and the second, a 
decade later, Tamahorils film Once Were Warriors 
- exemplify the way in which an essentialised 
version of Maoriness has been on the one hand 
productive (in terms of the national and 
international recognition of Maori culture) but at 
the same time limited in terms of the 
marginalisation of political and economic issues 
in relation to New Zealand's colonial history. 
Te Maori, an exhibition of nineteenth century 
Maori artefacts, opened at New York's Metropolitan 
Museum in 1984. In terms of the context in which 
23 Based on figures from New Zealand's 1996 census. 
24 A number of counter-claims by urban Maori with no tribal 
affiliations, have recently been lodged in the New Zealand 
High Court, contesting the fishing quota allocation to 
tribal groupings (New Zealand Herald, 23 April, 1998) 
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the exhibition was held, Te Maori represented a 
significant departure from usual museological 
practice in relation to Maori material culture. 
For the first time the artefacts were displayed as 
objects of art rather than as ethnological 
specimens; over a period of more than a hundred 
and fifty years, they 'had been by turns 
curiosities, ethnographic specimens and major art 
creations' (Clifford, 1988: 189). Nevertheless, the 
objects' journey across the classificatory divide 
between ethnography and 'art' was still determined 
by a primitivist discourse which drew on 'western' 
aesthetic values and thus marginalised innovative, 
non-traditional forms made by Maori artists in 
favour of 'non-industrial authenticity (Thomas, 
1994: 185). 
The exhibition was restricted to objects rendered 
in 'traditional' materials - wood, bone and stone 
- and made before 1860. Despite the fact that the 
artefacts were made in the nineteenth century 
(obviously a period of intensifying colonial 
contact and rapid change) the collection 
represented 'Maoriness' as spiritual and 
unchanging. (There were no representations of the 
colonisers for example). 
Importantly the restricted range of materials 
exhibited effectively excluded artefacts produced 
by Maori women who used fibre materials in the 
production of weaving and basket work, while the 
arbitrary 'cut-off' point - 1860 - was based on 
the presumption that European influences would 
have negligible at this time. The collection 
excluded non-traditional contexts of production 
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(rendering invisible the colonisation process and 
European influences of all kinds), but what was 
also conspicuously missing from the selection was 
any sign of Maori response to the white 
colonisers. 
While the exhibition was an important act of 
cultural validation (not least because, as with 
all New Zealand cultural products, international 
exposure is more prestigious than local), as 
Clifford argues: 
The Maori have allowed their tradition to 
be exploited as 'art' by major Western 
cultural institutions and their corporate 
sponsors in order to enhance their own 
international prestige and thus contribute 
to their current resurgence in New Zealand 
(Clifford, 1988: 210). 
The selection of objects for Te Maori was made by 
the director of the Metropolitan's primitivist 
department, Douglas Newton, who drew on a list 
compiled by the Art Galleries and Museums 
Association of New Zealand (AGMANZ), an 
organisation dominated, at that time, by white 
ethnologists and art historians 
(Kaeppler, 1994: 29). However Newton's final 
selection of artefacts from the AGMANZ list was 
based solely on his judgement of their aesthetic 
qualities (McManus, 1992: 193). As Clifford 
argues, the exhibition reproduced the modernist 
impulse 'for appropriating or redeeming otherness, 
for constituting non-Western arts in its own 
image, for discovering universal, ahistorical 
'human' capacities' (Clifford, 1988: 220). 
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The exhibition's version of 'Maoriness', by 
glossing differences of gender, religion, social 
strata, tribal affiliations and so on, positions 
the indigenous culture as 'authentic' and 
unchanging. The catalogue states: I 
The Maori psyche revolves around tribal 
roots, origins and identity. The answer to 
the question 'Who are the Maori people? ' is 
about many tribal traditions, myths and 
stories which provide a solid foundation 
for our lives .... it is about love and 
respect for our culture, our fellow man and 
our environment.. 25 
When the exhibition subsequently toured New 
Zealand's four main cities as Te Maori: Te Hokinga 
Mai- The Return Home all previous visitors records 
were broken; by the end of its run a third of the 
population had seen the exhibition - Te Maori had 
transformed the way in which Maori culture was 
perceived in New Zealand. A quote from a young 
Maori visitor to the exhibition, appearing in an 
academic review, provides a glimpse of a different 
take on 'Maoriness' (one that is rarely 
articulated in public accounts): 
This exhibition is a bit spooky in a 
preachy sort of way - it's Pakeha 
worshipping us like we're a bunch of tree - 
hugging gurus and we ain't like 
that! (quoted in McCarthy, 1992: 112). 
The comment echoes the findings of Wetherall and 
Potter's analysis of 'race talk' in New Zealand 
which highlighted a discursive shift with 
Iculturalism' replacing 'race' in New Zealanders 
25 Taonga Maori: Treasures of the New Zealand Maori, 
Metropolitan Museum, New York, 1984. 
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accounts of ethnicity (Wetherall and Potter, 
1992: 129). They suggest this form of discourse 
'freezes' Maori culture as pure and distinct, 
separated from the realm of politics: 
Maoris ... become museum keepers. Theirs is 
the privilege and the burden of heritage. 
They are the custodians required to hold 
the archaic for the national psyche... only 
those who identify with the past can be 
seen as authentic actors of ethnic culture 
(ibid: 130). 
However, a decade later, the film Once Were 
Warriors (Tamahori, 1994) marked a significant 
cultural shift in terms of the way 'Maoriness' was 
represented. To date New Zealand's top-grossing 
film, Once Were Warriors was the first 'Maori' 
film to be seen by an international audience. 26 
Significantly the only white characters in the 
film are representatives of the repressive state 
apparatus, a judge and two police officers, while 
the rest of the cast and the production crew 
(including director, Lee Tamahori) were all 
identified in publicity material as Maori. 
The film explores the tensions existing between 
contemporary versions of 'Maoriness' in terms of 
gender, generational differences and the 
urban/rural divide. Narrative resolution involves 
a return to the pre-modern lifeways of traditional 
Maoridom - the extended family and the rural marae 
- as the means to heal the wounds of urban 
deprivation, alienation and violence. 
26 The 'whiteness' of New Zealand cinema is discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
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The central characters, the Heke family, live in 
suburban poverty on the periphery of a 
metropolitan sprawl (the unnamed location 
emphasises the sense of urban alienation and 
anomie). Cars on a six lane motorway thunder past 
the bottom of the family's barren back yard, a 
wasteland except for a sagging wire clothes line 
tied to a solitary tree stump. Most of the film is 
set inside the cramped two-storey state-owned 
house where the lives of Jake (Temuera Morrison), 
Beth (Rena Owen) and their five children are 
dominated by the multiple deprivations of poverty, 
racism and alcoholism. 
In the context of contemporary debates about 
identity in New Zealand, the film importantly 
moves beyond limited, stereotypical representation 
of Maoridom (based around the binary good/bad 
Maori); presenting instead a cast who are situated 
in a contemporary urban environment and whose 
complex characterisations drive the narrative. 
The film draws on syncretic elements of global 
'black' culture urban street culture, music and 
body adornment to contextualise the struggles of 
young urban Maori while at the same time making 
specific reference to key sites of racial tension 
in New Zealand. As with Te Maori, the overarching 
theme is constructed around primitivist 
idealisation - those Maori who recognise their 
culture and tradition are saved whilst the central 
character in the film, Jake Heke, alienated from 
an authentic Maoriness, is finally abandoned by 
his family and condemned to live out an aimless 
urban existence which is dominated by alcohol and 
violence. 
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In the opening scenes Jake loses his job and 
teenage son Boogie is cautioned by the police. 
After the pub closes Jake hosts an impromptu party 
in the Heke's living room. Their 13 year old 
daughter Grace looks after the two youngest 
children sleeping in a cramped upstairs bedroom. 
Grace promises her brother Boogie she will 
accompany him to his court appearance the 
following day. During the party Nig, the eldest 
son who, alienated from his father lives away from 
the family home, arrives on the doorstep 
requesting money. Beth, finding her. house-keeping 
money has disappeared, quarrels with Jake who has 
used the money for drinking and gambling. In a 
scene of shocking violence he repeatedly beats her 
to the ground. 
The next day Grace takes Boogie to court where 
they learn he is to be sent to a reform school. 
His mother, face swollen and bruised from the 
previous evening's beating, is devastated. 
Meanwhile Nig, in a final rejection of his father, 
is initiated into the local gang. 
Weeks later Beth and Jake are still distant; he 
spends his time drinking with friends in the local 
public bar. The couple finally establish a 
rapprochement when Beth persuades Jake to take the 
family to visit Boogie in the reform school. They 
hire a car but never arrive; Jake stops off at his 
favourite bar and after a long wait, in, the car 
park Beth takes the children home in a taxi. 
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That night Jake returns from the pub with friends 
for another impromptu party. One of the men, 
'Uncle Bully' to the Heke children, slips upstairs 
and rapes Grace in her bedroom. The next day, 
Beth, sensing something is wrong, tries to talk to 
Grace but the girl runs away to visit her friend 
Toot who lives in a derelict car under the 
motorway. While Beth and her friends are out 
looking for Grace the girl returns home. When her 
father shouts at her for refusing to kiss 'Uncle 
Bully' goodnight she runs into the backyard and 
hangs herself using a piece of rope tied to the 
tree. Beth finds her body. The following day she 
organises a funeral at the rural marae. During 
the traditional ceremony Beth whispers to Grace's 
coffin: 'We've come home'. Meanwhile Jake remains 
in the city drinking with friends. When Beth 
returns, she reads Grace's diary and discovers the 
truth about her suicide. She confronts Jake, 
drinking with Bully in the local bar. At first he 
refuses to believe her but after reading the diary 
he violently attacks Bully. Beth walks out, 
telling Jake she is leaving him for good and 
taking the children with her. He is left standing 
in the pub car park as the sound of police sirens 
herald the end credits. 
The claustrophobia of the film's mise-en-scene - 
most of the action takes place in either the 
cramped house where the family live or the 
overcrowded and smokey bar - not only creates a 
powerful sense of the enforced stasis and 
immobility induced by poverty, but also provides 
the bleak urban backdrop for the brutalising cycle 
of domestic violence which is only broken by 
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Beth's return to the rural marae at the end of the 
film. 
The family's poverty condemns them to an existence 
on the margins of a city which remains 
unrepresented but is signified as a 'white space'. 
precisely by the absence of Pakeha in the film. 
The family live out their lives in spaces created 
around and underneath the motorway which signifies 
a thrusting and progressive modernity from which 
they are sidelined. As the credits role, an 
opening shot represents the film's central theme - 
the connection between modernity, urbanisation and 
the loss of Maori spiritual ties to the land. A 
close-up fills the screen with a verdant 
wilderness scene, as the camera pulls back the 
vista is revealed to be part of an advertising 
billboard overlooking a tangled motorway junction 
bathed in a sickly yellow haze of pollution. The 
billboard logo - EnZpower - is reminiscent of 
'national' corporate branding used to advertise 
New Zealand internationally (but can also be read 
as the injunction 'Enpower), while the landscape 
image projects dominant constructions of New 
Zealand as a nature paradise. By implication the 
marginal urban space within which the Heke's exist 
is far from the highly mobile lifeworld signified 
by the six-lane motorway or the promised escape 
offered by the touristic image on the billboard. 
In their suburban hell stray dogs eat the rubbish 
and the children play in cars abandoned beneath 
the motorway. 
As the camera pulls back from the opening shot of 
the motorway billboard, Beth Heke is seen pushing 
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a shopping trolley along an alleyway running 
beside the motorway. She passes young Maori men 
working out in an empty lot (their bodies 
providing the only available site for power and 
control) while on the street Maori street 
musicians (marginalised from mainstream culture) 
play reggae and rap. As Beth gazes across the 
motorway her elder daughter Grace, is seen sitting 
under the broken tree in their backyard reading a 
Maori myth to the younger Heke children. The 
story concerns a protective Maori spirit, the 
taniwha and when uniformed white police arrive at 
the house shortly afterwards to question Boogie, 
the youngsters ask their mother, 'Are they 
taniwha, Mum? '. This questioning of the role of 
the state 'protectors' implicitly refers to the 
colonisers Treaty promise to provide protection to 
Maori -instead of course (as the film 
demonstrates) Maori youth in particular have been 
criminalised and disenfranchised. When questioned 
by the officers Beth looks straight at the camera 
and says - 'You think you know everything about 
us, don't you? ' - her question appears to be 
aimed as much to the cinema audience as the police 
officers to whom it is ostensibly addressed. 
Jake's violent behaviour, his failed masculinity 
(and by implication his non-warrior status) is 
attributed to his alienation from his roots. The 
gambling, drinking and maltreatment of Beth mark 
him out as a victim of corrupt and decayed 
European values.. A band of barbed wire tattooed 
around his upper arm, reinforces his perception of 
himself as a slave; at one point he refers to 
himself as a 'blackfacel (i. e. not a 'real 
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Maori' . By contrast Beth, despite having 
temporarily lost her way in the city, finally 
emerges resilient and empowered through her 
reconnection to her marae and its wise elders. At 
the end of the film Beth, preparing to return to 
the marae for good, tells Jake 'Our people once 
were warriors, people with spirit'. In reply he 
screams defiantly after her 'You think I need your 
spirit - fuck this warri or shit'. 
His sons - Nig and Boogie - find ways to channel 
their aggression and disaffection into more 
ritualistic expressions of anger - each in their 
own way attaining warrior status by the end of the 
film. Nig joins an urban 'tribe' - the Toa 
Aotearoa - where he participates in a rite of 
passage in order to refashion himself as 'urban 
warrior' signified by a masculinist code - leather 
jackets, partially shaven heads with mohican-like 
locks and full body tattoos. The younger son 
Boogie meanwhile, undergoes rehabilitation at a 
Maori-run borstal for young offenders. Here he is 
told he will learn to carry his weapons inside 
himself; he is taught to use the haka as a means 
of acting out his anger. The instructors tells 
him: 'The haka won't work until you reach out and 
pull your ancestral lands into your body'. Thus 
Boogie becomes a true warrior by drawing on 
traditional Maori custom; in this way he is saved 
from his father's fate and through his performance 
of the haka at Grace's funeral wins the approval 
of his mother's tribe. 
Once Were Warriors provides testimony to 
significant cultural shifts which have been 
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achieved in New Zealand as a result of the treaty 
negotiations. An all-Maori film production on 
international release would have been 
inconceivable twenty years ago. The film is 
testimony to the limited extent the Waitangi 
negotiations have brought about changes in 
institutional structures and forms of public 
funding in this case enabling Maori director Lee 
Tamahori to finance his project. However, it is 
unlikely that a more radical film one which 
challenged white hegemony directly would have 
been successful in attracting funding and 
promotion by the New Zealand Film Commission. 
Instead Once Were Warriors focuses on the plight 
of an urban Maori family whose victimhood is 
resolved by staging a return to authentic 
community and tradition, rather than through a 
challenge to the dominant social order. Thus, 
despite the fact that the film produces complex 
characterisations it finally reiterates the 'fatal 
impact' thesis in as much as the Heke's are unable 
to cope with the vissitudes of modernity. 
To conclude, while it has been argued that the 
contemporary reinterpretations of the Treaty of 
Waitangi have imbued th e document with an 
authority which is disproportionate to the 
motivations of nineteenth century colonialists 
(who were simply using available legal means to 
expedite the appropriation of land), it is clear 
that after 150 years of struggle, the 
Enlightenment principles underpinning the colonial 
project in New Zealand have brought some measure 
of reparation and justice, albeit through a 
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process of accommodation rather than 
transformation. 
But for the purposes of this thesis, the 
renegotiation of the meaning of the treaty has 
been one aspect of an active process of a re- 
constitution of Maori identities which has in turn 
brought about a significant redefinition of 
pakeha identity to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 4 
The construction and reconstruction of white 
settler identities 
Historically constructions of race in New Zealand 
have legitimated the installation of a white 
settler majority by equating whiteness with 
Icivilisation'. Recently taken-for-granted notions 
of white identity, formerly hegemonic and thus 
coeval with the idea of 'nation' (that is, white 
New Zealanders were the New Zealanders), have been 
delegitimated by Maori claims to indigeneity as 
tangata whenua ('the people of the land'). While 
the response to the Maori Renaissance by some 
sections of the majority population has been 
overtly racist - referred to locally as 'the white 
backlash" - there has also been the articulation 
of an indigenised 'whiteness' which positions 
itself alongside essentialised versions of 
'Maoriness' by laying claim to a pakeha identity 
which is 'uncontaminated' by 'Europe'. This 
chapter investigates the way in which changing 
constructions of whiteness in New Zealand have 
emerged in response to specific political and 
cultural conjunctures. 
Drawing on nineteenth century travellers' accounts 
together with publicity material which 'sold' the 
colony to would-be settlers, the first section 
considers the way in which representations of the 
landscape and nature have been central to whites 
For example - Te Pakeha: The Search for White Identity - 
which appeared in the national magazine Metro asked 
defensively 'Is it still OK to be a whiteman? l (Carrol 
Wall, Metro, November, 1986: pp 34-48. 
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in New Zealand. White settlers saw themselves 
bringing progress and civilisation to the 'pre- 
modern' culture of the Maori but the settlement of 
New Zealand was also energised by the utopian 
fantasy of building a society free of the 
political and economic divisions and inequalities 
of Europe. 
As previous chapters have shown, land has been the 
focus of contestation in New Zealand because 
wealth in the colony was generated primarily 
through territorial appropriations. For the Maori 
people, (in as much as Maori nationalism has been 
an 'invention' of colonialism), land came to 
symbolise tribal connections with nature , while 
for the white settlers, it symbolised the promise 
of a New Jerusalem. 
The taming of nature and the productive use of 
land were themes central both to the Icivilising 
mission' and a narrative of progress which drew on 
the imagery of the New Jerusalem to energise 
nationalist versions of whiteness. Any 
discussion of white identity in New Zealand must 
therefore take account of signifying practices 
which produced particular versions of the 
landscape at certain historical moments. Several 
key texts from the relatively limited corpus of 
European travel writing about New Zealand provide 
examples of these constructions. 
The second section examines the way in which the 
defining features of whiteness in the colony - 
'Europeaness' and 'civilisation' - were delineated 
through the shifting discourses of race. Despite 
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the myth of national unity first articulated at 
the Waitangi treaty-signing in 1840 - 'We are one 
people' - white settlers imagined themselves as a 
collectivity primarily in terms of their 
difference from the Maori. But while racial 
difference defined internal ethnicities, the 
settlers were also represented within discourses 
of nation as 'heroes' of a new imperial frontier 
and were presumed to be male. Such versions of 
masculinity defined settler males (agents of 
Empire) in opposition to the leffeminates' who 
stayed in Britain. The colonial frontier was a 
space carved out by 'real men'; white women were 
largely invisible aside from their role as 
'mothers of the nation' (Ware, 1992). 
Despite the myth that the colony was a classless 
society, it was, from the earliest days, riven by 
divisions which were to some extent legacies of 
regional, religious and class-based differences 
translated to the colony, for example between 
Protestant and Catholic Irish, Highland and 
Lowland Scots or more ephemerally between those 
with 'old' and those with 'new' money (Belich, 
1997: 326). While white New Zealanders could 
imagine themselves 'above' the Maori and a range 
of racialised Others in the territory, economic 
divisions and inequalities also existed between 
settler groups; in other words there was-no 
homogenous form of identification amongst settler 
groupings. 
Nineteenth century travel writers described the 
colony as 'the Britain of the South'. By the turn 
of century white New Zealanders were defined (from 
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outside the boundaries of their nation) as having 
distinctive 'national' characteristics. From the 
imperial centre they were constructed as an ethnic 
group seen as 'the same but not quite' due to 
perceived cultural 'lack'. This notion of 
'cultural lack' articulated an ambivalent 
relationship between the centre and periphery with 
the Icreolised' cultures of white settler colonies 
generally regarded as producing inferior versions 
of 'Europeaness'. 'Cultural value' in the colonial 
context was defined in terms of the 'privileging 
norms' of the European cultural canon. The 
'cultural cringe' -a colloquial expression for 
the national 'pathology' where these 
discriminations of value were internalised by 
colonial whites and as Chapter 5 explicates, have 
historically been used to discriminate against 
locally produced cultural artefacts (Morris, 
1992). 
In recent years the strength of contemporary Maori 
claims as an ethnic group has engendered new 
versions of white identity; in particular the 
renovated 'pakehal identity which claims 
indigeneity for the descendants of white settlers. 
Such versions of whiteness have re-worked the 
Isedimented traces' of nineteenth century 
constructions, re-presenting early settler myths 
in relation to nature and the colonial landscape 
through discourses of white belonging which are 
now no longer so much about belonging to the 
nation as they are about belonging to the land 
through a metaphysical relationship emptied of 
colonising traces. 
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The final section of the chapter explores the ways 
in which refashioned constructions of whiteness 
are reproduced in two recent films; Jane 
Campion's, The Piano which draws on 'primitivist 
idealisations' to represent an indigenised 
"whiteness', and Alison McLean's Crush, which 
provides a more pessimistic and critical portrayal 
of hybridised white identities. This section also 
analyses a touring exhibition of popular cultural 
artefacts - 'Kiwiana' - which constructs a 
nostalgic vision of a golden era when a particular 
kind of 'Kiwi' lifestyle was in the ascendant. 
White Landscapes 
Economic expansion and the imperial aspirations of 
empire-building were encoded and legitimated 
through the creation of a 'global consciousness' 
in Europe (Pratt, 1992: 57). An imperial archive 
produced 'the rest of the world' for public 
consumption through a signifying process which 
defined what it meant to be white and European. 
Travel writing , by mainly British explorers, 
colonial administrators and missionaries, 
produced detailed accounts of colonial territories 
for reading publics in Europe. These texts were 
made available through public libraries, while 
collections of flora and fauna were displayed in 
botanical and zoological gardens. Museums (usually 
attached to scientific institutions), exhibited 
anthropological artefacts and local geographical 
societies encouraged hobbyists to participate in 
the study of Empire (Bell, M, 1995; 
MacKenzie, 1990). For potential emigrants, the 
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imperial archive was augmented by a plethora of 
material produced by associations, such as the New 
Zealand Company, which detailed the suitability of 
colonial territories for settlement (Hursthouse, 
1857; Ward, 1860). 
As a result white settlers emigrating to New 
Zealand were travelling to a place which had been 
produced textually in Europe. The space 
represented on maps as 'New Zealand' had been 
stamped with European authority and the geography 
'domesticated' by the imposition of familiar Euro- 
Christian place names. 
One corpus of particular interest in this context 
is material published during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century relating specifically to 
New Zealand. 2 Accounts, written mainly by 
British-born and educated men who were 'passing 
through' the country, had an instrumental purpose 
in legitimating the imposition and extension of 
European power in the colony. The dominant forms 
of writing along these lines were non-fictional, 
either autobiographical travel narratives or 
publications which constituted a 'propaganda of 
migration'. The account of such material which 
follows draws on a range of texts from this 
'literature of invasion' (Sturm, 1991: 34), in order 
to examine the textual production of 'New Zealand' 
in the nineteenth century. 
I Many of the nineteenth century texts used for this thesis 
were located in a dusty and forgotten 'special collection' 
located in a back room of Homerton library in the London 
Borough of Hackney. The layers of withdrawal slips attached 
to the inside covers of these old tomes provide a palimpsest 
for an imperial archive once publically displayed throughout 
London's extensive public library network 
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Travel writers invented a discursive entity, a 
colonial canvas, onto which white identities were 
projected. The landscape was represented as an 
'innocent' spectacle through panoptical surveys of 
the colony's geography, flora and fauna. This was 
a space of 'anti-conquest' where European 
travellers could detach themselves from the 
unequal or exploitative political and economic 
contexts of imperialism through their communion 
with 'Pure nature' (Pratt, 1992: 39). Rhapsodic 
descriptions of landscape, with the all-seeing 
male traveller positioned to take in an impossibly 
broad sweep of countryside, were woven together 
with technical information about soil quality, 
climate and classificatory material detailing the 
characteristics of native flora and fauna. 
These accounts produced the landscape as an 
aestheticised, uninhabited space. The generic 
conventions of travel writing 'sealed off' the 
indigenous - plants, animals and people - from a 
landscape which was represented as an empty space, 
an imaginary country. The Maori were textually 
marginalised from this 'scapel, which appeared to 
reveal no trace of their existence. They were 
typified as an ahistorical and knowable 'species' 
and assigned to ethnographic chapters which, in 
line with the generic codes and conventions of 
travel writng, usually followed sections on 
geography, climate, flora and fauna ( Hursthouse, 
1857; Thomson, 1859; Kennedy, 1874). 
As Thomas has argued on this topic: 
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If a colonial imagining was to be rounded and 
coherent it had to draw together an affective 
and aesthetic response to a place with a 
scientific delineation of resources and some 
reduction of the natives to barbaric, 
picturesque or vanishing types .... construed 
as incapable of asserting serious claim to 
the land (Thomas, 1994: 166). 
In a journal account typical of the genre, Kennedy 
writes of his explorations through the 'interior' 
of the North Island. Describing the view from a 
promontory, Kennedy presents the scene with the 
precision and symmetry of a landscape painter: 
We obtained a magnificent view of the country 
and looked down on the plains below 
interspersed with clumps of forest and 
intersected with streams and rivers which in 
the brightness of the cloudless sunshine 
glittered like fountains of liquid silver. 
We could not resist the attractions of this 
enchanting view altogether unbroken and 
bounded only by the horizon (Kennedy, 
1874: 180). 
The aestheticisation of the landscape evident in 
the quotation suggests a mastery predicated on a 
relation of power between the seer and the seen. 
This discourse of mastery was linked to a common 
rhetorical device used in travel narratives which 
Ifeminised' the land as an abundant, virginal 
form. Nicholson's account of his journey through 
New Zealand makes this explicit, with eulogising 
descriptions of the seductive landscape which 
appeared before him in all its 'sumptuous 
fertility': 
The coast of the North Cape presents to the 
eye of the passing observer, a bold and 
romantic appearance. A narrow neck of land 
running some distance forms a promontory 
which discloses to view an expanse of fertile 
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grounds with romantic curvities, swelling on 
sight in beautiful irregularity and covered 
with perpetual verdure. It is difficult for 
the votary of unaffected Nature to withhold 
his admiration when she presents herself in 
all the simplicity of innocence and all the 
imposing grandeur of dignified sublimity 
(Nicholson, 1817: 99). 
Such descriptions draw on a 'discourse of mastery' 
through which an implied compliant sexuality is 
invoked to support a narrative which transforms 
nature into 'natural history' through an act of 
subjugation and domestication (Pratt, 1992: 51). The 
untamed beauty of nature, in all its innocence, 
could only be improved by European 'penetration'. 
By implication, colonisation was the means to 
harvest the potentialities inscribed in the 
'essence' of the landscape. Just as the Maori 
people could be improved through Icivilising', so 
the 'natural abundance' of the colony would be 
realised through 'cultivation'. In Hursthouse's 
opinion the raw features of the landscape 
constituted the 'foundational' material of a 
potentially 'civilised' landscape: 
The natural scenery of New Zealand is both 
bold and beautiful. The scenery we admire in 
England is often the costly coat of art, 
rather than the primeval dress of nature. As 
regards polish of cultivation, the garden's 
glories, the plough's court robes, New 
Zealand is much the state that Britain was 
when Caesar landed; and if Caesar's Britain 
could now be shown us, many a bright 
champaign country which we call beautiful, 
would vanish, to reveal the gloomy forest and 
repulsive rugged waste . ..... This stock of 'raw beauty' is a fertile cultivable country 
where plough, sickle and mill would enrich 
and brighten the land (Hursthouse, 1861: 97). 
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Towards the end of the nineteenth century accounts 
of settler life were published in both New Zealand 
and Britain in the form of texts marking the 
incorporation of 'travel' narratives into a 
nationalist rhetoric. By this time representations 
of the landscape had been incorporated into a 
repertoire of 'national' iconography. (for example, 
in 1898 Mount Cook and Lake Taupo joined Queen 
Victoria on issues of postage stamps). By this 
time the use value of 'travel writing' had changed 
as the colony was advertised in Europe as a 
tourist destination as well as a place for 
settlement. 
A guide to New Zealand, published in London in 
1893, uses the familiar categories of nineteenth- 
century travel writing to construct a tourist 
experience replicating early colonial 
explorations, including the collecting of 
'ethnological' artifacts in the form of souvenirs: 
New Zealand, as would be expected, possesses 
but little of interest in the way of 
architecture; but in its natural features 
in geology, botany, ornithology, ethnology 
there is enough to delight the most exacting 
travellers .... the principal curios to be 
collected are specimens, of Maori work 
including carvings in wood and greenstone, and 
mats woven in native flax; in-laid wood work; 
pressed ferns and skins of native birds 
(Pennefather, 1893: 12). 
The exclusion of the Maori from the national 
landscape saw their cultural forms re-located in 
local museum collections as synechdoches of 
primitivism . Travel guides from the period give 
details of museums in major towns where tourists 
can view artifacts of Maori culture. Already, 
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through the emerging discourses of 'nation', 
indigenous cultural traditions were being 
preserved (frozen in time) as national 
'treasures', their way of life Imuseumified' to 
form part of the regalia of the colonial state 
(Anderson, 1996: 182 )3. 
At the same time the iconography of a distinctly 
'nationalist' landscape was taking shape. In 
Pennefather's guide and in another, 
, 
Pictorial New 
Zealand (Perceval, 1895: 140), tourists are 
encouraged to visit regional monuments 
commemorating European heroes of the land wars. 
Pennefather directs visitors to read the 
inscription on a monument in the small town of 
Wanganui which is dedicated to 'the memory of 
brave men who fell.. in 1864 in defence of law and 
order, against fanaticism and barbarism' 
(Pennefather, 1893: 72). 
The taming of nature in the colony was part of a 
narrative of progress which legitimated European 
intervention; all indigenous species were subject 
to what has been characterised as the 'fatal 
impact' thesis. For example, Hursthouse's account 
of the success of introduced flora provides a 
metaphor for the fate of the Maori who would also 
be the victims of a process of 'natural selection' 
which would see, he claims, the 'indigenous' give 
way to superior forms imported from Europe. 
3 As Chapter 5 discusses in more detail, national museums function as the repository of the 
pre-modem, representing the nation through modernity's narrative of 'progress' assigning 
the colonised to a different time (outside national history) frozen in the archive of the 
museum. 
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Hursthouse's descriptions of native flora and 
fauna are contemptuous; New Zealand's flightless 
kiwi is 'a grotesque looking creature' while the 
native fruits such as tawa 'tasted like sloe 
steeped in tar' and the karaka was like 'a wizened 
quince' (Hursthouse, 1861: 136). Species imported 
from Britain on the other hand, flourish in their 
new environment. Hursthouse here provides a 
perfect metaphor for colonialism in his 
description of the domestication of flora and 
fauna: 
Clover, turnip, cabbage, carrot, spinach, 
mint, thyme... spreading themselves over the 
countryside in some unaccountable manner are 
found in many districts mixed up with the 
indigenous vegetation of the country and 
almost threatening to oust even the most 
vigorous natives of the soil (ibid: 140). 
The domestication of the space, presented in early 
accounts of the colonial landscape, informed a 
nationalist discourse in which industry on the 
part of white settlers produced the 'good things 
of life'. By the turn of the century white 
settlement had reproduced 'the garden's glories' 
in the colony which by then was known as 'the 
Britain of the South'. A settlers handbook 
published in Britain in 1883 presents a pastoral 
idyll filled by: 
lazy too well-fed herds of cattle browsing 
upon pasture lands, the green English grass 
growing well-nigh high up to their haunches 
upon land that had never seen the sight of a 
cartload of manure (Simmons, 1883: 32). 
In 1895 New Zealand's Department of Education 
produced a reader for school children which 
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celebrated the enrichment of the colonial 
landscape through the transplanting of English 
flora and fauna 4: 
Grass land spangles with marguerites, just as 
in English meadows, and whole choirs of Old- 
country song-birds. The rich cocksfoot grass 
escaping out of paddocks with clover 
overflowing ... billow after billow of meadow 
withplump cattle, sheep and horses grazing 
and corn-land rolling away through hill and 
dale (Reeves, 1895: 226). 
In these accounts, introduced into schools at the 
turn of the century with the explicit purpose of 
engendering 'national spirit', the fecundity of 
the tamed land - the plumpness of the herds, the 
billowing meadows, the choirs of birds - produces 
a 'cornucopia' which is constantly compared to the 
poverty of Britain and of course, in an historical 
context, are co-present with legal arguments being 
made at that time about Maori failures to develop 
their own lands. 
Thus a nationalist vision is articulated through 
the image of a New Jerusalem in which whiteness is 
redeemed and purified in a domesticated landscape, 
'civilised' by colonial, intervention: 
We must all work together so that the 
sickness, the grinding poverty, the class of 
hopeless paupers and professional criminals 
which disfigures so many a spot in the old 
World shall never darken our New Zealand 
lives. (quoted in Malone: 1973,5) 
4The journal was produced following public calls for the fostering of 'national spirif in 
schools. Before the journal was introduced into New Zealand schools all textbooks used 
were British: It was clear such textbooks were inadequate, for example, to find New 
Zealand on the globe students were advised to first find Britain and then turn the globe 
through 180 degrees'. (Stenson, 1990: 169) 
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During the latter part of the nineteenth century 
the colony's 'natural advantages' were seen to be 
harnessed by settler 'industry and perseverance' 
with the 'character' of the settlers replacing 
'class' as a social marker. Hursthouse writes 
The business of pioneer generations has been 
to turn a wilderness into a happy if not 
splendid state. Industrious, moral and strong 
it is too soon to complain that this race has 
not produced a genius amongst its scanty 
numbers. Its mission to lay the foundations 
of a true civilisation has called for solid 
rather than brilliant qualities - for a 
people, morally and physically sound and 
wholesome and gifted with 'grit' 
(Hursthouse, 1861: 169). 
This extract encapsulates many of the key elements 
of settler identity based on a masculinist vision 
of independence and individualism made manifest by 
the transformation of 'wild' nature into civilised 
'pasture'. Images of a New Zealand 'way of life' 
focused primarily on rural and domestic idylls, in 
particular the harvesting, preparation and 
consumption of food. The profusion of nature's 
bounty made its way to the table of the settler 
household: 
There were fowls baked or boiled, fresh pork 
and smoked hams .... peach jam tarts and 
gooseberry Iroley-poley' and it was a poor 
home which did not have 'plumduff' too. 
There was always plenty of milk and and cream 
and mead made from wild 
honey... (Saunders, 1886: 7) 
As in exhibited traditions of 'the pastoral' 
(Williams, 1975; Jordanova, 1986), workers 
(including 'housewives') are curiously absent from 
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this 'whitened' landscape, as is the gendered 
division of labour required to create the 'land of 
plenty'. Given that these texts were addressing 
potential emigrants it may have been important to 
underplay the hardships of settler life but 
perhaps more importantly the invisibility of 
Ilabourl ensured that the Icivilised' colonial 
space, ordered, clean and dominated by mundane 
rituals, appeared to represent inherent 
characteristics of 'whiteness'. 
Even when physical labour is mentioned, the very 
abundance of the pastoral idyll minimises the work 
required to harvest the bounty: 
Peach groves everywhere.... trees laden with 
big honey peaches ... and those wanted were 
gathered by the simple process of driving a 
cart underneath and sending youngsters up to 
shake the branches until the cart was full. 
The best peaches were sliced and strung, hung 
in the high-ceilinged kitchen, criss-crossed 
festoons, until required for pies (Saunders 
1886: 11). 
Local museums in New Zealand continue to represent 
this 'whitened' version of the colony's history. 
In a recent survey of local museums the New 
Zealand sociologist, Claudia Bell found the story 
of the 'good (white) citizen' reproduced across 
the country. Domestic tableaux, glossing 
inequalities and divisions, presented a past of 
'charming innocence': 
I saw many tableaux of domestic interiors. 
These were always immaculate and eagerly 
displayed the genteel colonial life. Each 
tableau or diorama maximised the comforts and 
superior taste of the idealised colonial 
dweller. The piano or spinnet implied 
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refinement and leisure; the Sunday dinner 
service, large-lidded tureens and silver- 
plated accessories on the table implied a 
comfortable, bountiful life ...... good 
citizenship, stable family life, cleanliness 
and good health (Bell, 1996: 58) 
Bell found that many local museums were reliant on 
volunteers who contributed artifacts and designed 
the exhibits themselves, suggesting the extent to 
which settler myths continue to be lived out: 
One museum curator of a reconstructed family 
cottage told me how good it had been for 'the 
community'. It brings people together with a 
sense of common purpose. It's a brilliant 
retirement hobby ... older people are happy to 
see their family treasures put to such good 
use (ibid: 57). 
This. suggests a relationship betweei7f bourgeois 
collecting practices (in particular the way in 
which personal possessions are transformed into 
'heirlooms') and the privileging of 'whiteness' 
in these local museums. As Clifford argues, all 
collections (however personal) 'embody hierarchies 
of value, exclusions and rule governed territories 
of the self' (Clifford, 1988: 143). In the case of 
local museums, personal possessions are reworked 
through a display-of artefacts in reconstructed 
domestic settings which mythologise white settler 
lifestyles as the embodiment of particular 
characteristics of the nation and citizenship. 
The installation of white settlers on the colonial 
territory was accompanied by a shift in the way 
the colonial landscape was represented. Initially 
the textual production of 'New Zealand' in Europe 
was an important element in representing an 
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imagined space for the realisation of the New 
Jerusalem; crucially this was a landscape from 
which the indigenous people were excluded. 
As forms of national identity emerged based on a 
narrative of progress, white settlers were 
encouraged to identify with a 'tamed' landscape 
which saw the territory Icivilised' through a 
domestication of nature which involved the 
importation of English flora, fauna and of course, 
'European' lifeways. The productive use of the 
land, made possible by the 'character' of white 
settlers, was set against the perceived indolence 
of the Maori, thus legitimating territorial 
appropriations of 'waste' land. At the same time 
these constructions were gendered, with the 
settlers defined as strong, masculine and 
independent in relation to the 'effeminate' 
English. The dominant group developed a strong 
sense of themselves as a collectivity of white 
Europeans through the incorporation of a 
repertoire of myths, memories and symbols which 
energised a local version of 'whiteness' organised 
around a Janus-like matrix looking inward and 
outward from the nation: nature/(Maori)/ 
culture(Pakeha) and in relation to the 
metropolitan centre: 'tamed' nature (white 
settlers)/culture (metropolitan Europeans). 
Gendered and racialised identities 
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Early colonialist writing referred to the Maori as 
'New Zealanders' but towards the end of the 
nineteenth century, as discourses of nation 
emerged, white settlers became the New Zealanders; 
in other words the majority group was unified by 
the designation 'white' and made coterminous with 
the idea 'nation'. This was a concept which not 
only naturalised a Iracialised' national identity, 
it also glossed gendered constructions of nation. 
The transformation of the colonial landscape 
required the perceived masculine attributes of 
'physicality' and 'character'. The colony provided 
a challenge for 'real men'; as Hursthouse puts it: 
Emigration is a career which calls up pluck, 
bottom, energy, enterprise - all the 
masculine virtues. The feeble-minded the 
emasculate, the fastidious, the timid do not 
emigrate, they bow their heads to the yoke, 
ply the distaff and spin wealth for the great 
at home (Hursthouse, 1857: 169). 
Hursthouse's guide goads men with 'character' to 
escape; his invocation narrates the possibilities 
of migration as an Oedipal drama with the 'boy' 
escaping the 'apron-strings' of the Mother Country 
to become a 'real' man: 
Rather than grow up here cumberer of the 
earth with no better chance than that of 
finding myself some day behind the counter 
with a bonnet on, measuring tape and bobbin 
to mincing misses, or of becoming the snubbed 
clerk with a pale wife and seedy children 
nailed to the dingy desk for life, I would 
turn, pull on my coat, take six months at 
some manly handicraft and then, spite the 
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dark warning of Aunt Tabitha, spite the 
twaddle of my male friends in petticoats I 
would secure cheap passage to New 
Zealand... trusting to God and myself to 
achieve me a happy escape and a good 
deliverance from that grinding social 
serfdom, those effeminate chains, my born and 
certain lot in England. (Hursthouse, 1857: 637) 
In these versions of national identity, white men 
represent the progressive agents of modernity: 
forward-thrusting, potent, and historic 
(McClintock, 1993: 66). Captain James Cook has been 
such a figure in New Zealand historiography. He is 
represented as an exemplar of white masculine 
virtues: a man of 'character', a figure of 
historical agency, hero of the Enlightenment and 
the father of the nation: 
He embodied all the pioneer virtues, 
qualities and skills in developing a new 
settled land. Adaptability, resourcefulness, 
endurance and doggedness ... he was a big 
rawboned individual, the epitome of the 
pioneer type... a self-made man who had 
eschewed the easy road to success and pushed 
himself to the top largely by his own efforts 
(Fisher, 1979: 150). 
This is a version of white masculinity which 
continues to have important resonances in New 
Zealand's literary, cinematic and sporting 
culture. The 'Man Alone', exemplifies the powerful 
trope of individualism in national narratives, 
figuring as a cultural archetype, reproduced 
across all forms of popular culture 
(Phillips, 1987). 
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As 'whiteness' became coterminous with dominant 
versions of 'national identity' the settler 
majority was also represented as a collectivity in 
terms of their difference from the metropolitan 
centre. The 'special' relationship with the land 
and nature was central to these constructions. 
However, the attributes required to transform the 
colonial landscape into a Isimulacruml of Home 
were, f rom a metropolitan perspective, the very 
factors which prevented the colony attaining 
levels of greatness in terms of cultural 
achievement: 
The sons of pioneers do honourable and useful 
work ... but of artistic, poetic or scientific 
talent, of wit, originality or inventiveness 
there is yet but little sign. On the whole 
young New Zealand is better known by 
collective usefulness than by individual 
distinction. Brilliant talkers there are none 
(Hursthouse, 1857: 174). 
During the nineteenth century 'race' had become 
the organising grammar for an imperial order in 
which modernity and the 'civilising mission' were 
framed through discourses legitimating colonial 
interventions. As a racial category 'whiteness' 
has been largely invisible, submerged within the 
imagined geographies of modernity through which 
the West and Europe came to be defined. In other 
words, the category 'European' naturalised an 
identity saturated with 'whiteness' in terms of 
culture within the globalised geographies of 
capitalism which were gathered under the sign of 
the 'West', as the international space of 
progress, development, democracy and 'freedom'. 
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By the latter part of the nineteenth century, the 
discourses of 'scientific racism' provided the 
dominant paradigm for racial categorisations 
(Goldberg: 1993). The romanticism of the 'noble 
savage', which characterised Cook's descriptions 
of the Maori, had been replaced by discourses 
which drew on the natural sciences to mark out 
racial difference in terms of hierarchies of 
Icivilisation'. 
Lady Martin's tract, Our Maoris, published by the 
London Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 
suggests that the romanticism of Cook's 'noble 
savage' had been shattered by the reality of the 
colonial encounter. She writes: 
The New Zealanders were just emerging from 
barbarism and in our part of the country only 
ten years before had been wild, impulsive 
heathens. The old picturesque dress we had 
seen and admired in Cook's 'Voyages' had 
given way to slop trousers and a blanket 
(Martin, 1884: 8). 
Here the reference to 'slop trousers and blanket' 
suggests degeneracy and filth attributable to the 
character of the Maori; rather than to the poverty 
induced by colonialism. 
In another travel account, the British military 
surgeon Thomson draws on what appears to be the 
crude empiricism of phrenology to pronounce on the 
inability of the Maori to 'estimate high numbers': 
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It was ascertained by weighing the quantity 
of millet seed skulls contained that New 
Zealanders' heads are smaller than the heads 
of Englishmen, consequently the New 
Zealanders are inferior to the English in 
mental capacity (Thomson, 1859: 81) 5. 
As has been well-documented in relation to other 
colonial contexts (see for example Stoler, 1995), 
cultural identities in New Zealand were 
constructed within a hierarchised grid of 'high' 
and 'low' elements which defined the boundaries of 
"whiteness' through a delineation of the 
denigrated social practices of the Maori and the 
lower orders, in particular Irish Catholics. 
In their analysis of the way 'disgust' energises 
the demarcating imperatives between 'high' and 
'low' domains, Stallybrass and White have shown 
how these hierarchies connect across four inter- 
related domains: the human body, psychic forms, 
geographical space and the social order. They 
suggest that divisions and discriminations in one 
area are 'structured, legitimated and dissolved' 
by reference to the vertical symbolic hierarchy 
which operates in the other three domains: 
The division of the social into high and low, the 
polite and the vulgar, simultaneously maps out 
divisions between the civilised and the grotesque 
body, between social purity and social 
hybridization. These divisions cut across the 
social formation, typography and the body in such 
5 Theories of race based on approaches such as phrenology 
have tended to be labelled 'pseudo-scientific' but this 
textual strategy delegitimates racial theories and leaves 
the discourses of the biological and human sciences 'pure', 
ahistorical, neutral, empiricist and 'value-free'. (LaCapra 
1991: 72) 
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a way that subject identity cannot be considered 
independently of these domains. The bourgeois 
subject has continuously defined and re-defined 
itself through the exclusion of what is marked out 
as 'low' - as dirty, repulsive, noisy, 
contaminating (Stallybrass, 1986: 191). 
I 
These 'domains' provide a means to examine t. he 
complex ways in which identities - racialised, 
gendered and class-based -are remade and redefined 
as boundaries between categories are 
'transgressed' through discourses which are 
overlapping and inter-changeable. For example 
European fears of degeneracy in the mid-nineteenth 
century located progress in the physical health of 
'races'. The body had become the site where 
anxieties about urban poverty, degeneracy and 
national decline were played out 
(Butler, 1995: 229). In the colonies these fears 
were projected onto 'racialised' others 
(Brantlinger, 1988; Bristow, 1991). 
One of the most striking generic characteristic of 
nineteenth century travel writing about New 
Zealand was the preoccupation with intimate 
details of Maori personal appearance and hygiene, 
eating habits, sanitation (in particular 
'drainage') and sexual relations. In his guide for 
would-be settlers Hursthouse writes: 
Their habits of life are destructive... their 
huts are too close and ill-ventilated. They 
require advice on cleanliness, the use of 
soap, eating three meals a day instead of the 
customary two. They need to be told of the 
fearful revelations of old-world cities 
proving that promiscuous intercourse results 
in barrenness and sterility; that the woman 
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is the 'weaker vessel' and should only do 
indoor work and that the sight of a girl 
staggering a dozen miles with a 601b potato 
kit would be disgusting among the wretched 
black fellows of Australia but is both 
disgusting and disgraceful among the 
Christian Maoris of New Zealand (Hursthouse, 
1857: 183). 
Hursthouse's description is typical of a white' 
European preoccupation with purity and 
cleanliness. 'Civilised' behaviour is codified 
within the*normative values of heterosexuality and 
family. Gender has therefore been central to the 
ranking of racial difference. The decadent 
communality of tribal life is set against the 
health and cleanliness of the European 'family', 
with the white woman, as wife and mother, a 
central figure in the reproduction of the ordered 
and Icivilised' domestic space. 
Given, as Appardurai argues, the project of 
modernity has been in part about the social 
regulation of consumption practices centred on the 
body, we see here how daily eating and cleaning 
rituals become important spheres for repetitive 
forms of consumption underpinned by gendered and 
racialised moral discourses (Appardurai, 
1996: 67)6. 
In May, 1904 the New Zealand Illustrated News 
proclaimed: 
6 McClintock provides an example of early imperial commodifications in her case study of 
soap: 
By the late nineteenth century soap advertising took its place at the vanguard of Britains 
new commodity culture and its civilising mission ..... as the fundamental form of a new 
cultural system representing social value. (McClintock, 1995: 208) 
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The pioneer women... who took pride in clean 
homes and clean, healthy children, these are 
the women who established a race... 7 
And of course these discourses centred on the body 
included regulation of sexuality with white women 
represented as the custodians of a bourgeois 
morality, the exemplars of 'purity' and virtue: 
A Maori will never marry a white women 
because he feels her superiority and he 
cannot make a slave of her as a native woman. 
A white woman, not even the most degraded, 
could be induced to unite herself with a 
Maori - to herd native-fashion in a pa, amid 
dirt, vermin and discomfort ... and to perform 
other laborious work exacted from their women 
by barbarous races (Reeves, 1898: 175). 
While bourgeois white women exemplified civility, 
the perceived degradation of Maori women, measured 
against white femininity (as in the quotation 
above), was symbolic of the general degradation 
within Maori society. For example the alleged 
physical degeneracy of native women in old age was 
attributed to sexual promiscuity and inappropriate 
forms of work: 
The ladies are by no means so good-looking as 
the men. Highly precocious, often leading a 
sexually dissolute life from childhood, 
marrying early and then performing a large 
share of field labour, are old at forty and 
repulsively weird and witch-like at sixty 
(Hursthouse, 1857: 169). 
These classifications of the Maori made European 
interventions both credible and necessary. The 
legislation introduced by the colonial 
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administration during the nineteenth century in 
order to regulate and control Maori 'communalism' 
- taxes on waste land, legislation regulating 
marriages, child care, health, town planning and 
so on - were interventions legitimated by these 
Icivilising' discourses. At the same time white 
settlers were called upon to unite in their 
colonial mission to improve the Maori race through 
example: 
It seems impossible to persuade the natives 
to live in separate families after European 
fashion. They like to herd together at night 
to talk. They like the stifling heat of their 
huts where they squat on their haunches and 
smoke and prate about land, their eternal 
topic. How to describe the figures of dirty 
unwashed men, women and children of all ages 
lying about accompanied by pigs and dogs; 
some wrapped in dirty blankets, suggesting 
the unwholesome effluvia of the place 
(Hursthouse, 1857: 176). 
Thus 'whiteness' was represented as the repository 
of sexual virtue and forms of 'civility' within 
which the 'Other' was marginalised and excluded 
through a grid of classifications which defined 
them as primitive, savage, childlike and inferior. 
The typification of the Maori in early travel 
narratives drew on many of these themes, as in 
this extract from Thomson: 
Reason and judgement, the noblest of all the 
intellectual faculties was little cultivated 
by the New Zealanders previously to the 
advent of the pioneers of civilisation. It 
was from totally neglecting these faculties 
that they were frequently embroiled in war, 
ate each other, killed female children, were 
unable to estimate high numbers, devoured at 
a summer feast all their winter food.... They 
eat food civilised men abhor from the 
disgusting associations its smell suggests to 
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the imagination and few of the impressions 
transmitted in their brains are ever 
fructified into beautiful ideas. The New 
Zealanders have the minds of children. Tried 
by the European standard, their 
conversations are sensual and their ideas 
unclean. They are dirty and indolent. When 
mastered, either physically or mentally they 
become as manageable as children (Thomson, 
1859: 84). 
In the-colonial context, civilised white 
identities were conceptualised through a 
repertoire of practices based on domestic and 
corporeal rituals which 'repressed nature' and 
naturalised whiteness as the repository of 
'civility'. The transgression of boundaries, in 
terms of the domestic arrangement of space and the 
perceived lack of control in relation to 
sexuality, eating rituals and gendered divisions 
of labour, marked out 'difference' with the Maori 
positioned as the antithesis of 'whiteness'. 
Thus bourgeois white 'sensibilities' were 
redefined in the colonial context. The 
hierarchisation of racial difference, reproduced 
through discourses of 'purity', was defined 
biologically (in terms of 'blood'), hygienically 
(in terms of 'cleanliness'), intellectually (in 
terms of 'rationality') and aesthetically (in 
terms of 'beauty'). Bourgeois white women were 
constructed as the 'gold standard' of civility in 
terms of reproduction, domesticity and physical 
appearance. Historically they played a pivotal 
role in the articulation of 'race', class and 
sexuality in an imperial zone where white subjects 
were encouraged to see themselves as agents of 
Empire. 
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Indigenising Whiteness: The 'new' Pakeha 
As Chapter 3 details, in recent decades the 
Waitangi Treaty negotiations have resulted in a 
form of Maori nationalism which has essentialised 
the indigenous relationship to the land and 
nature. In response white New Zealanders who 
identify as 'pakehal have reformulated nineteenth 
century settler identifications with the landscape 
to reinvent themselves in terms of their 
'spiritual' links with nature. 'Belonging' is no 
longer so much about belonging in the country - 
where 'country' signifies nation - as it is about 
belonging to 'country' where 'country' signifies a 
land-based spirituality based on claims to a non- 
indigenous metaphysics rather than geopolitics. 
This has been a strategy which not only 
perpetuates the erasure of colonial violence; it 
has also been a means of dealing with the 
perceived cultural 'lack' which continues to haunt 
white New Zealand. 
The re-appropriation of the Maori word for white 
New Zealanders - 'pakehal - to designate an 
indigenous form of white identity has been an 
important aspect of a contemporary 'primitivist 
turn' which seeks to avoid the connotations of 
supremacy 'white' has acquired. Recent attempts 
to refashion 'whiteness' have involved the 
construction of a 'pakehal identity which claims 
indigenisation through attachments to the land and 
nature which have close associations to New Age 
pronouncements on personal transformation (Ross, 
1991). 
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Chapter 3 outlined ways in which versions of 
Maoriness have also drawn on primitivist 
constructions in order to valorise cultural 
tradition and authority. This has been an 
important and empowering aspect of the broader 
political struggle against white domination in the 
colony. On the basis of the historical context 
presented in the previous chapter it is now 
possible to examine constructions of a 
'renovated' white identity - the 'pakehal - which 
have drawn on a similar repertoire to transform 
'whiteness' in the face of the contemporary crisis 
of identity in New Zealand. 
The 'pakehal response to the Maori Renaissance can 
be seen as a strategy which reworks earlier 
appropriations through a narratives of personal 
transformation, a process of therapeutic self- 
actualisation, which perpetuates the amnesia 
relating to the material conditions underpinning 
white privilege, whilst drawing on the myth of the 
New Jerusalem to lay claim to a special 
relationship with the land thus disavowing links 
with the imperial past. 
The refashioning of the 'whiteness' is exemplified 
by the publication, in 1991, of the Penguin best- 
seller Pakeha: The Quest for Identity in New 
Zealand, edited by historian Michael King. King 
collected fifteen essays which he describes in the 
introduction as 'personal explorations of the 
origins, metamorphoses and current state of an 
evolving Pakeha culture in New 
Zealandl(King, 1991: 6). 
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The text was aimed at a non-academic readership 
and followed in the wake of King's hugely 
successful autobiography Being Pakeha (King, 1985), 
forming part of a stream of articles and books 
published during the 1980s which dealt with the 
identity crisis afflicting white New Zealanders. 
The shared characteristics of this genre were 
defined by one commentator as the search for 'the 
Holy Grail of pakeha uniqueness' 8. 
In the collection of essays edited by King, each 
of the writers recounts a narrative of personal 
growth which leads to their self-awareness as 
'born-again pakehal. This 'psychologising' of 
identity is commensurate with King's implausible 
claim that the white identity crisis has its roots 
in the experience of Idiasporic' alienation which 
is implicitly linked to modernity's depradations: 
Pakeha people will cease to feel threatened 
by the enlarging Maori presence... when they 
have begun to feel whole and secure again 
(ibid: 10). 
The themes running through the essays are 
reformulations-of tropes identified earlier in the 
chapter based around gendered constructions of New 
Zealand as the New Jerusalem; a place where 
Europeans could enjoy equality of opportunity and 
egalitarianism. This new version of 'whiteness' 
can be characterised as a New Age form of 
primitivism which idea*lises nature and pre-modern 
8A New Zealand critic reviewing King's Being Pakeha 
suggested 'pakeha-ism' was in danger of becoming an 
lindustryl. Gordon McLauchlan, New Zealand Herald 23 
November, 1991. 
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forms of community and effaces 'difference'. The 
writers share a defensive position which 
challenges Maori status as tangata whenua (people 
of the land) and is in a sense a 'writing back', 
particularly to Donna Awatere's tract, Maori 
Sovereignty. Christine Cole Catley makes this 
explicit in her piece: 
I don't think any Maori could love his or her 
tribal lands more, passionately than I love 
the hills of my childhood... I dream about 
them (ibid: 40) . 
Catley appears to acknowledge Maori claims to the 
land whilst universalising these claims by 
emphasising that Maori do not enjoy such 
connections exclusively. 
In his introduction to the collection, King begins 
by questioning Maori claims to indigeneity through 
a reinterpretation of the country's foundational 
narratives: 
In the beginning we were all immigrants to 
these islands, our ancestors boat people who 
arrived by waka (canoe), ship or aeroplane. 
The ingredients of our indigenous cultures, 
too were imported: the Polynesian language 
that became Maori and English; Paptuanuku 
(Maori myths) and the Bible; Maui and the 
cultural heroes of western Europe and North 
America; the kumara (sweet potato) and the 
kiwifruit. All these things - and many more 
had their origins elsewhere (ibid: 9). 
King's pairing of aspects of Maori and European 
culture (Maori myths with the Bible, the kumara 
with the kiwifruit) is a rhetorical device which 
appears to collapse features of 'difference' by 
means of a parallelism which decentres whiteness 
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by constructing symmetrical relationships between 
all the inhabitants of New Zealand as migrants: 
'we are all migrants and we are therefore all the 
same'. And yet King's choice of representative 
examples from each 'culture': Maori myths, Maori 
language and the kumara versus the Bible, English 
and the Ikiwifruit' simply reiterates the power 
imbalances between Maori and Pakeha. For example, 
in what could be characterised as a typically 
'white' act of appropriation, King claims the 
Ikiwifruit' as a 'pakehal fruit, comparing it with 
the humble kumara, a sweet potato which - like the 
taro - only grows in the South Pacific. Previously 
known as the Chinese Gooseberry, this fruit has 
itself been subject to a 'nationalist' renovation 
when it was renamed the Ikiwifruit' and launched 
as the export item which would replace the 
collapsing market for wool and lamb. 
At the same time King adroitly repositions myths 
of Maui's exploits (fishing the islands from the 
sea) as a 'discovery' story as important as 
European arrival in order to erase 'difference', a 
textual strategy which constructs all New 
Zealanders as 'settlers' who therefore have equal 
claim to indigeneity although in this case the 
'pakehal have become the victims: 
The fact that one of these peoples has been 
here longer than the others does not make 
them more 'New Zealand' than later arrivals, 
nor does it give them the right to exclude 
the others from full participation in 
national life (ibid: 9). 
Throughout King's essay this device is repeated as 
he sets up homologous links between himself, his 
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ancestors, the Maori people and the collective 
love of the land. King's 'genealogies' stress 
continuity and tradition and can be read as 
mimicry of Maori 'whakapapal in which tribal 
groups construct their history generationally. 
Describing the childhood of his great-grand- 
parents King presents a nostalgic reconstruction 
of a past in which Pakeha and Maori lived in 
harmony with nature - outdoor cooking, the ability 
to name all flora and fauna and call wild birds 
are motifs for 'closeness to nature': 
They spent weekends fishing for flounder in 
the estuary in the company of their Maori 
neighbours from the Ngati Toarangatira pa and 
cooking cockles and pipi on corrugated iron 
sheets laid over open fires. My 
father ... played and rode horses with Maori 
children from the communities alongside the 
railway route. And he explored neighbouring 
farms and bush in the hinterland. After his 
family moved o Wellington he retained his 
relationship with the land ..... he came to know the name of every New Zealand plant, 
tree and bird and he relished being in lonely 
places that had not been ravaged by humankind 
(ibid: 10). 
Here again King glosses direct 'pakeha' 
involvement in colonisation by attributing the 
'ravage sl of the landscape to a generic 
'humankind', a universal category which implicates 
the Maori to the same degree as everyone else. 
The narration of King's own childhood is a 
manifesto for his claims to indigeneity : 
I was imbued, like my mother and father, with 
a feeling of deep attachment to the land and 
its flora and fauna. We planted ngaios and 
kowhais around the house and called to 
fantails and warblers ... we tramped the 
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coast.. boiling the billy and cooking sausages 
on driftwood fires as we went. I too came to 
know the names of trees and birds and 
regarded them as companionable 
presences .... (ibid: 12) 
He sentimentally conjures up the image of white 
New Zealanders living as a community of hunter 
gatherers. This is mere New Age Primitivism: 
'foraging for food' and the use of native timber 
for furnishings signify a return to 'nature' which 
glosses not only the colonial, capitalist 
foundations of the nation but also the material 
wealth of the white majority. The 'simple way of 
life', the return to nature is, in the context of 
white privilege, almost always a matter of choice 
rather than necessity: 
In the houses of the people among whom I 
moved as I grew up could be seen natural wood 
shelves, the wood sculptures of Russell 
Clark... and the kinds of food for which one 
foraged at the weekend with family friends - 
mussels, paua, crayfish (ibid: 14). 
Compare this to Mulgan's unsentimental 
account, written at a time when white New 
Zealanders were confidently 'European', about life 
at beginning of the century in Katikati, where 
once again the naming of birds and trees suggests 
a form of 'belonging' which Mulgan never 
experiences: 
I hardly knew any New Zealand history and 
could name few New Zealand trees or birds. In 
the long summer days a bird often sang... I 
heard it so often I came to associate it with 
the happiness of those summer days ... The 
point I want to emphasise is this, no-one in 
Katikati told me the bird's name, I do not 
think anyone was interested (Mulgan, 1958: 32). 
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In Michael King's collection Pakeha, themes of 
continuity and closeness to nature are reproduced 
in essays by women who articulate their oneness 
with the land'and nature through their bodies. 
This is a re-working of the gendered discourses of 
nation; here the atavistic body of the white woman 
stands for an authentic 'belonging' in which 
'nation' and 'nature' are one. Christine Dann 
writes: 
From my study window I look across the water 
to the little port where my great-great uncle 
was born and I reflect on what became of my 
ancestors ..... I know the tracks on the flanks of Sugarloaf so well that I could walk 
them at night without stumbling. I know many 
other things besides ... the little blue and 
copper tussock butterflies, the white and 
blue native bluebells, the porous red 
volcanic rock, the pale yellow soils ..... (King, 1991: 46) 
Dann links the nocturnal explorations of the 
'flanks of Sugarloaf' with the sensual contours of 
her own femininity. She is Isugarloafl and here, 
her body, with its capacity to reproduce, 
signifies the 'nation'. Significantly Dann does 
not claim to know the names of plants and insects, 
she 'knows' them in an almost metaphysical sense, 
she and the 'butterflies', Ibluebells' and so on 
are lonel. 
In many of the essays the motif of 'homecoming' 
marks an epiphanic moment in the discovery of 
'pakehal identity not least because it provides a 
moment for re-inventing 'white' origins, inverting 
the usual use of 'Home' by white New Zealanders to 
signify 'Europe'. Dann writes of her homecoming 
as a return to 'nature' in which she stages a 
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baptism of belonging, a union between her body and 
the land: 
That summer I came back to Canterbury, bashed 
through half a mile of scratchy scrub to get 
to the riverbed, stripped off, waded into the 
river, knelt down, splashed the water over my 
body and gazed with longing at the mountains 
upstream (ibid: 50). 
Another of the essays, written by Lyndsay Head, 
reiterates the tropes of 'belonging' which have 
their roots in nineteenth century constructions of 
an empty landscape: 
My landscape of the heart was always in those 
mountains ... Central Otago, the beating heart 
of the world. The water's clear as glass. 
The waves blow down the lake from the 
mountains chattering of creation, 
aliveness. New Zealanders like the silence, 
the absence of the gabble of old ideas. The 
land isn't an abstraction and it isn't 
scenery. It's the experience of 
freedom.... and it explains why social 
category doesn't dominate identity the way it 
does in England (ibid: 23). 
Here the 'call of the land' is set against the 
deprivations of modernity found in Europe. The 
country/city binary which has come to represent 
the alienation of modernity in opposition to a 
nostalgic rural idyll is, in the colonial context, 
translated into a binary opposition between New 
Zealand and Europe which simultaneously inverts 
the centre/periphery hierarchy. For Dann, a visit 
to London leads to personal revelation: 
London I found crammed, dirty, ugly... I felt 
prickling hostility to the place .... I 
realised that my New Zealand is a landscape 
of intense light and colour, an almost 
uninhabited place where the presence and 
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nature of people is deduced from the 
structures they impose on the land-I felt 
desperately homesick for this place, so 
unlike the crowded cities of Europe with 
their life of noise and bustle and 
distraction. Home seemed to be a place where 
I was free to be ... (ibid: 50) 
Similarly, Michael King mythologises his family's 
migration from Europe, drawing on the tropes of 
the New Jerusalem myth to construct a narrative of 
forganised forgetting' from which colonial 
violence has been erased: 
I was reminded by both grandmothers why they 
had abandoned the UK; to raise healthy 
families in a land of open options and to 
achieve identity and status on the basis of 
what they did rather than the circumstances 
of their birth My mother's parents ... when 
they arrived in New Zealand rejoiced 
immediately in the clean air, open spaces 
.... the absence of a class system, which 
would permit their children to succeed on the 
basis of their own efforts rather than their 
rank, even to the point of owning their own 
property -a prospect that seemed 
unattainable back Home (ibid: ll). 
Here King here is reworking the myth of 
'systematic colonisation', attributing a 
particular kind of 'character' to his ancestors at 
the same time disavowing their role in New 
Zealand's colonial past. The notion of 'false 
consciousness' seems a particularly apposite 
metaphor for the process through which the 
material foundations of white settler prosperity 
have been naturalised by the myths of 
individualism. The 'real' history of colonial 
appropriation continues to be denied as the re- 
fashioning of whiteness by means of an indigenised 
pakeha identity, enables white New Zealanders to 
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articulate a form of hybridity through which their 
peripheral status within 'the West' leaves them 
the victims of modernity. The following passage 
by King exemplifies this 'victimhood' and 
demonstrates the way in which a environmental 
issues in New Zealand tend to be bound with up 
with white preoccupations with 'belonging' through 
a special relationship with the land: 
We have moved from the belief that the land 
belongs to us to the feeling that we belong 
to the land. And we fear betrayal of that 
relationship if this same land is strip 
mined, denuded of trees, or sealed off in 
asphalt, concrete and high density 
housing.... 'All is seared with trade, bleared 
smeared with toil'. Gerald Manley Hopkins 
wrote ... That is an expression of the loss 
that I fear if the march of 
development/corporatisation/industrialisation 
is allowed to proceed unchecked. It is not 
simply the loss of an aesthetic outlook, it 
is the loss of relationship with the planet 
that has spawned us. For me, as much as for 
any Maori person the songs of this land are 
still to be heard... I hear them because they 
vibrate from the ethos of the land and I am 
open to them-they heal me, they uplift me, 
they nourish me ... they are an integral part 
of my being a New Zealander, of being pakeha 
(ibid: 21). 
It is as if by assuming a pakeha identity, white 
New Zealanders may be able to effect a 'de- 
centring' of their identity through a disavowal of 
privilege. This strategy becomes almost credible 
in the context of the nation's peripheral role in 
global culture and politics, enabling the pakeha 
to claim 'minority' status alongside the Maori; in 
a sense they position themselves as 'victims' of 
modernity. Thus the 'primitive idealisations' of 
pakehaness provide the means to refashion 
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whiteness through a return to 'nature'. I would 
argue this is a move which is reproduced in Jane 
Campion's film The Piano. 
Representing 'whiteness' 
The Piano (Jane Campion, 1993) re-presents the 
story of colonisation in New Zealand as a 
narrative of reconciliation; in doing so it 
addresses the concerns of the white majority. It 
is, in a sense, a textual palliative for 
postcolonial anxieties. The critical 
international acclaim surrounding the film 
constructed 
, 
The Piano as a feminist exploration of 
nineteenth century sexuality and tended to ignore 
the way in which 'race' was problematically 
embedded in the film. My analysis below 
supplements the existing range of critical 
commentaries by focusing on the way in which the 
film reproduces a familiar repertoire of colonial 
tropes to construct a version of 'whiteness' 
through a matrix of 'race', class and gender 
differences. 
In the film, Ada McGrath (Holly Hunter) travels to 
New Zealand for an arranged marriage with the 
white settler landowner Stewart (Sam Neill). Ada 
arrives on the coast of New Zealand accompanied by 
her daughter Flora (Anna Paquin), a grand piano 
and a clutch of possessions. She is an elective 
mute and communicates with the world using sign 
language which her daughter verbalises. The 
colonial landscape provides the setting for Ada's 
sexual awakening. Stewart agrees to trade Ada's 
piano for a block of land belonging to Baines 
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(Harvey Keitel), a white man who speaks Maori and 
has moko (tattoos) on his face. Ada is forced to 
give Baines piano lessons, but when it transpires 
that the transaction is an attempt by Baines to 
get closer to Ada they strike a deal in which the 
keys of the piano are traded for caresses. An 
intimate relationship develops which Stewart 
eventually discovers. In an act of brutal 
retribution he severs Ada's index finger with an 
axe. Soon after, he agrees to let her leave to 
start a new life with Baines and Flora. 
The fantasy of colonial reconciliation is played 
out through the developing sexual relationship 
between Ada and Baines. At the end of the film 
Ada chooses 'life' after jumping overboard with 
her piano. She leaves the instrument (the symbol 
of bourgeois European culture) at the bottom of 
the ocean, thus severing her connection with the 
imperial centre and begins her life anew with her 
man who has already 'gone native'. They become 
"born-again' New Zealanders living in a gleaming 
white house where the mute Ada moves into the 
world of language, finding a new voice as she 
takes up her position as an encultured 'post- 
colonial'. 
This romantic melodrama is set in a landscape 
where 'natives' provide the backdrop for the 
emotional drama of the principal white characters. 
The Maori are located on the margins of the film 
as the repositories of an authentic, unchanging 
and simple way of life; they play 'nature' to the 
white characters 'culture'. If we read The Piano 
as Ada McGrath's rite of passage from the twilight 
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gloom of Scotland to the bright, white place in 
Nelson, New Zealand, then the white settler 
fantasy of creating a 'New Jerusalem' is 
represented through the negotiation of the 
nature/culture divide. Ada McGrath and George 
Baines negotiate in different ways the 
nature/culture split in order to assume an 
indigenised pakeha identity. With her piano at 
the bottom of the sea and her severed finger 
sheathed in metal -a symbol perhaps of colonial 
lack - the film ends with Ada speaking of 'the 
silence where no sound hath been'. She has 
sacrificed her silence in order to take up her 
place in the new land. The ending suggests an 
attempt to articulate the perceived cultural 
emptiness which continues to haunt white New 
Zealand. 
In The Piano Ada, as a symbol of white bourgeois 
femininity, has access to a spiritual world denied 
the other female characters in the film. Her 
emotions are expressed through a powerful fusion 
between the musical score and the movement of the 
camera. A recurrent motif in the film is the 
close-up of Ada's shimmering face, skin bleached 
out, eyes closed in rapture as she plays her 
piano. As she plays the camera circles her, 
caressing the bared shoulders and delicate stem of 
neck; her vulnerable spine ('good bones') is 
exposed and elided with the whiteness of her 
bodice. While the eroticised image of Ada appears 
translucent, fragile and free from blemish, the 
Maori women are desexualised through their 
representation as lank-haired, toothless and 
devoid of the conventional markers of femininity; 
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they are represented almost as 'anthropological' 
objects. 
In this film, hair is an important signifier of 
the nature/culture opposition. Hair which has 
been 'worked on', aetheticised and femininised 
signifies culture; it is also used to symbolise 
Ada's sexual awakening. The camera continually 
fetishizes her elaborate coils - at one point the 
camera literally draws us into the coil at the 
back of Ada's head, as if giving us access to her 
emotional world. She finally 'lets her hair down' 
after her first sexual liaison with Baines. We 
see her and Flora, with their gleaming hair 
swirling around them as they tumble on the bed, 
bathed in a golden glow. 
Ada's cultural and racial 'purity' - exemplified 
by her shimmering whiteness and her sublime 
relationship to her music -is reinforced by the 
class differences represented in the film. The two 
plump, white female servants are accorded the 
status of characters but like the Maori women they 
are desexualised. Morag with her prominent 
facial mole and carefully positioned kiss curl - 
and Nessie with her high pitched mimicry, provide 
comic relief from the emotional preoccupations of 
Ada and her men. These women represent the lower 
orders and as such, exhibit a lack of 
'refinement'. In one scene Morag urinates amongst 
the trees, her bodily functions serving to 
reinforce the high/low oppositions which mark out 
Ada's bourgeois femininity. 
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Throughout the film the primitivist discourses 
which construct this opposition are expressed 
through the juxtaposition of the repression of the 
white characters against the 'authenticity' of the 
Maori. With their bold, sexualised chat the Maori 
provide a textual echo for all that has been lost 
through Icivilisation'. This is an inversion of 
colonial constructions of the 'noble savage' with 
native peoples now privileged as the keepers of 
pre-modern values. 
Baines bridges this nature/culture divide. His 
facial tattoos and his ability to speak Maori 
signify that he has 'gone native', while his 
'self-fashioning' and attachments to the land 
construct him as a pakeha: a 'real New Zealander'. 
While never relinquishing his whiteness, he is 
able to arouse Ada's passion because he is closer 
to nature than Stewart. He too is a member of the 
lower orders; in an early scene Ada describes him 
as an loaf' because he is illiterate. She insists 
that he wash his hands before touching her piano. 
However, his baseness is constructed through the 
eroticisation of his body. In one scene we see 
him washing himself in the river while a group of 
Maori women discuss his sexual needs. Later he 
strips naked and wipes Ada's piano with his shirt. 
Baines's affinity with the land and his easy 
relationship with the Maori stand in contrast to 
Stewart. While Baines's hut is surrounded by 
trees, Stewart's is set in a muddy clearing 
amongst burnt stumps. He complains to Baines: 
'What do they (the Maoris) want the land for? 
They don't cultivate it or burn it back. How do 
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they even know it's theirs? ' Through the 
primitivist inversion Stewart is increasingly 
shown to represent the 'bad' colonial Other and 
stands for all that is negative in the white 
coloniser. He is greedy for land, sexually 
repressed -the Maori continually refer to him as 
'old Dry Balls' - and violent. His relationship 
to the land is one of brutality and exploitation 
and this is mirrored in his treatment of Ada. 
As Sue Gillett usefully argues, The Piano links 
sexual and racial structures of domination, 
exploitation and dispossession: 
Stewart's defensive negotiation of his 
sexuality parallels his efforts to keep 
himself aloof from the Maori, untouched by 
and ignorant of their culture. He rigidly 
erects boundaries between himself and others 
along the lines of race and sex. Unlike 
Baines he is unwilling or unable to play with 
identity, to risk being unfixed, to leave his 
boundaries unprotected. (Gillett, 1995: 284). 
While Stewart exploits the bush, Ada and Flora 
work on and aestheticise the liminal space of the 
beach. Early on in the film, Ada's hoops are used 
as a shelter which is surrounded by a wall of 
gleaming shells, and in another scene they 
construct an enormous sea-horse from shells while 
the camera swirls overhead, erasing all traces of 
labour. It as if their femininity - played out 
through their emotions and aestheticised in the 
realm of culture - separates them from the 
degradations of colonialism; in this sense they 
are closer to nature. 
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Whiteness as purity is a recurring motif in the 
film. While the Maori are at one with the bush 
(to the extent that they are even visible) the 
film continually privileges whiteness through the 
play of light against dark, emphasising the binary 
oppositions at work in the text. This whiteness 
is enhanced by the use of filters, which means 
that while the darker skin tones of the Maori are 
barely discernible in the brooding shadows of the 
bush, the faces of Ada and Flora, framed by their 
bonnets, take on a luminous quality. The film's 
photographic director Stuart Dryburgh has 
described the use of 'naturalistic' lighting as an 
attempt to capture the 'authenticity' of the 
landscape: 
We've tended to use strong colour ac 
- 
cents in 
different parts of the film. We tried not to 
light the bush ourselves but to use natural 
light wherever possible. So we played it murky 
green and let the skin tones sit down amongst 
it. We tried to represent it honestly and 
let it be a dark place. (Campion, 1993: 141) 
Dryburgh's technicist discourse naturalises the 
use of photographic technologies and codes which 
mediate visibility, desire and endow 'whiteness' 
with what Dyer, in a discussion of representations 
of 'white', has described as 'a glow and radiance 
that has correspondence with the transcendant 
rhetoric of popular Christianity. ' (Dyer, 
1988: 63). This 'glow' of whiteness and its 
associations with light, purity and cleanliness 
recurs throughout the film, for example in an 
early scene when the Maori approach Ada and Flora 
on the beach exclaiming, 'They look like angels'. 
Later on in the film, Flora, caught rubbing 
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herself in a sexually explicit way against the 
trunks of trees with a group of Maori children, is 
forced by the repressed Stewart to scrub gleaming 
white suds into the treetrunks in the sombre 
twilight - an act of ritualised cleansing. 
The primitivist discourses which construct the 
Maori as outside 'culture' are exemplified by the 
way in which the Maori are seemingly unable to 
distinguish between representations and the 
'real'. When the Bluebeard shadow play is 
performed a group of Maori leap onto the stage to 
rescue the female performers. In fact, this 
staged performance foreshadows the moment when 
Stewart grabs his axe and sets off to sever Ada's 
finger. But in this scene the Maori, relegated to 
the narratival margins, remain mere witnesses to. 
his actions - once more misreading the signs. This 
scene registers that a suspension of disbelief 
depends on a set of assumptions or white cultural 
codes that allow representations to be read as 
real without violating any anterior reality 
(Gordon, 1996: 200). 
The cultural layering described within the film is 
not confined to its own codes however. The 
critical acclaim which surrounded the release of 
the film in Britain not only ignored the film's 
colonial setting but by focusing on links between 
The Piano and the English literary canon, Campion 
and her work were appropriated as distinctly 
'European'. While this appropriation can be 
understood within the context of the relationship 
between the metropolitan centre and the periphery, 
historically the 'privileging norms' of the 
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European cultural canon have defined 'cultural 
value' in the colonial context, it also seemed to 
consolidate the 'whiteness, of the text. In a 
sense, the critical reception reinforced the way 
in which 'whiteness' is universalised in the 
film.. As Dyer argues: 
This property of whiteness to be everything 
and nothing is the source of its 
representational power. (Dyer, 1988: 45). 
The invisibility of white settler colonialism, was 
exemplified by the way in which The Piano was 
marketed in Britain. Publicity material and media 
coverage constructed the film for its viewing 
public as an art-house movie about nineteenth 
century sexual repression9. The focus on gender 
was heightened by media interest in Jane Campion 
as author. 
9 In other words while the critical reception does not 
determine the way in which a film is read by audiences it 
certainly contributes to the context within which audiences 
respond. 
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The film's accolades were those conventionally 
reserved for high cultural texts: Campions work 
was described in various broadsheet reviews as 
, lyrical', 'sensitive', 'original' and 
Ispirituall. 10 Her 'romantic vision' was compared 
to that of nineteenth century writers such as the 
Bronte sisters and Emily Dickinson. The hyperbole 
surrounding the film's release reached its peak in 
the Independent on Sunday which ran an extensive 
feature on Campion's life and work. having 
described her looks as pre-Raphaelite (an 
unthreatening and fragile vision of white European 
femininity), it went on: 
The Piano feels steeped in literary 
tradition, entirely original but rich in 
reverberations. It is Wuthering Heights, a 
romance of the soul with the wild New 
Zealandbeaches standing in for the stark 
moors. It's Emily Dickinson, a romance of 
the soul with its wavering between ecstasy 
and terror, eroticism and renunciation. 
(Independent on Sunday, 17 October, 1993). 
The credits at the end of The Piano acknowledge 
the assistance of Maori 'cultural advisers'. The 
use of 'cultural advisers' to guarantee the 
'authenticity' of the Maori reinforces the 
discourses of primitivism in the film which 
construct the 'indigenous' people as theý 
repository of unchanging traditional values, in 
harmony with nature, childlike, the textual echo 
of all that has been lost. (And importantly, the 
use of 'cultural advisers' also signals the way in 
which the politics of race in contemporary New 
Zealand inflects and problematises all areas of 
10 The Independent 17 October, 1993, The Guardian 22 and 29 
October 1993; Sunday Times 31 October, 1993 and Si2ht an 
Sound November, 1993. 
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cultural production). This particular version of 
Maoriness is reiterated in other texts connected 
with the film, for example in the production notes 
published along with the script where the 
'authenticity' of the Maori on and off the screen 
is discussed: 
In common with his character Baines, Harvey Keitel 
was struck by the way in which the Maori cast, in 
role and out of role, tended to have a more 
profound relationship to the earth and the spirits 
than the pakeha do. Keitel is quoted as saying: 'I 
was very affected by Tungia, the woman playing 
Hira in the film. She came down to the beach and 
the first thing she did was cross to the sea, bend 
over and sprinkle herself with water. And I said 
'What are you doing' ... and she said: 'I'm asking 
the sea to welcome me'. (Campion, 1993: 143). 
The Maori are attributed with a timeless essence 
in The Piano; they are positioned as a 
collectivity outside of history. This primitive 
idealisation provides the back-drop for the 'self- 
fashioning' of Ada McGrath and George Baines: Ada 
whose colonial rite of passage enables her to 
discover her true femininity and Baines, who has 
undergone 'partial indigenisation', reinvent 
themselves as born-again pakeha. By restaging the 
colonial encounter the film indirectly addresses 
white New Zealand's crisis of identity; its 
reworking of the nature/culture trope provides a 
means of representing and affirming an 
lindigenised' identity whilst at the same time 
providing for an international audience (at a time 
when the New Zealand economy was being renovated 
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for the penetration of international capital) a 
depoliticised version of nation untroubled by 
Maori claims to sovereignty. 
Exhibiting Everyday 'Kiwi' Life 
The mundane and repetitive practices of everyday 
life (from the preparation and consumption of food 
to leisure pursuits based around family and 
community) are important aspects of 'local' 
culture which construct a sense of place and 
belonging. Given these practices are organised 
through rituals of consumption it follows that 
sets of values and meanings cluster around 
material objects. 
Over and above their instrumental use, objects 
play an important part in constructing collective, 
shared memories. When the meaning of objects is 
reinscribed within collections, for example, they 
take on an 'aural which is imbued with a temporal 
and spatial identity (Appardurai, 1996; Hebdige, 
1988). As Radley argues 
In the very variability of objects, in the 
ordinariness of their consumption and in the 
sensory richness of relationships people 
enjoy through them, they are fitted to be 
later re-framed as material images for 
reflection and recall (Radley, 1990: 57). 
In 1990, a touring exhibition, funded by New 
Zealand's Queen Elizabeth Arts Council and 
entitled New Zealand, New Zealand: In Praise of 
Kiwiana, constructed a nostalgic version of 
'belonging' based on the re-presentation of 
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commodities from the post-war period of the 
fifties and sixties. 
The exhibition was aimed at 'Kiwis', a colloquial 
term which refers to all New Zealanders but which, 
in the context of this exhibition, uses the 
invocation, 'we, the ordinary New Zealanders' to 
denote a collectivity of unreconstructed white New 
Zealanders who are emphatically not 'new Pakehal. 
The collection recontextualises everyday objects 
for self-narrations of identity through the 
valorisisation of 'ordinariness' . The collection 
offers white New Zealanders the possibility of 
writing themselves individually into a narrative 
of belonging, through their relationship to 
everyday mass-produced objects, endowed with a 
national specificity, which function as souvenirs 
of an 'authentic', -albeit recent, past. 
The timing of the exhibition was significant; it 
coincided with the sequecentennial of the signing 
of the Treaty of Waitangi. As the nation 
celebrated its new 'biculturalism' the exhibition 
revealed a taxonomy of objects and social 
practices which valorised a particularly 
conservative form of populist modernity. It 
comprised an archive of domestic objects which 
shared a common characteristic; they carried the 
patina of a by-gone and more confident era when 
white New Zealanders were untroubled by issues of 
identity and belonging. 
The objects were reproduced as memorabilia 
commemorating an era of 'certainty'. In the 
introductory section, the exhibition's catalogue 
188 
makes this aim explicit, suggesting that for white 
New Zealanders the fifties and sixties were a 
period of continuity and innocence: 'ahead of us 
lay the cold winds of international economics 
(deregulation), social divisiveness 
(biculturalism), the realisation that Manila is 
closer than Manchester ('Asianisationl)"' 
(Barnett, 1990: 2). 
While the 'primitivist turn' of the new Pakeha 
valorises pre-modern ways of life based on a 
return to nature; this assemblage of 'Kiwianil 
constructed local versions of a tradition which 
transformed everyday commodities into folkloric 
objects: 
There is a growing concern for traditional 
folklore and imagery. It is to celebrate 
Kiwiana, the New Zealand "difference', that 
this exhibition has been compiled. In the 
case of Kiwiana, not all of it has survived 
the global-villagising of television, travel 
and urbanisation (Barnett, 1990: 9). 
In the catalogue the curators acknowledge their 
personal investment in the collection; it 'lingers 
over the 1950s and 1960s ... because this period 
spanned the authors' formative years, their 
earliest memories' (ibid). Thus the exhibition's 
celebration of the supposedly ordinary and 
everyday (the normative) is based on both a 
nostalgia for a period when the national economy 
was sheltered from foreign intervention by the 
highly protectionist policies of the National 
Party, (from the vantage point of the deregulated 
11 Italics mine. 
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nineties the period has been reinvented as a 
'Golden Era'), and for a time when white boys 
(i. e. the curators) inhabited a world of clearly 
defined gender roles and ethnic identities. The 
collection speaks to particular sections of the 
white population, addressing the unease that many 
have felt about deregulation - as Kelsey puts it 
'there has been a pervasive fear amongst whites 
that they're losing control of their country' 
(Kelsey, 1993: 114). But perhaps more importantly it 
seeks to counter the 'primitivist turn' of urban 
liberals (the new 'pakehas') by representing an 
era when a white 'kiwi lifestyle' was in the 
ascendant. 
The catalogue provides the context for the 
celebration and recuperation of a particular taste 
culture - lower middle class Ikitsch' - which is 
the focus of the exhibition. Featuring photographs 
of scantily clad marching girls, the walls of 
weatherboard houses displaying multi-coloured, 
fibreglass butterflies (emblematic of a formerly 
denigrated sixties suburban aesthetic), and Zephyr 
cars (associated with a particular kind of sixties 
machismo), the catalogue offers a 'sub-cultural' 
challenge to both the values and tastes of 
bourgeois 'pakehal culture and the new-found 
authority and cultural 'purity' of Maori 
collections. 
Objects in the exhibition serve as traces of 
'authentic', everyday experience - series of cards 
collected from packets of breakfast cereals, 
labels and containers bearing logos for 'local' 
brands of imported products such as soap, tea and 
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chicory. It is the design and marketing which 
inflects these commodities with a local identity. 
The transfer of individual consumer items (such as 
bars of soap and tins of nugget) away from the 
sphere of mass production and consumption into the 
collection imbues them with the 'folklorishl aura 
of traditional 'craft'. The branding insignias - 
old-fashioned typographies and non-plastic 
packaging - signify a form of commodified 
heritage. The extent to which this commodification 
was used to energise ideas of nation was 
exemplified by the release of a set of postage 
stamps in 1994 which used artifacts from the 
exhibition to illustrate aspects of national life. 
The stamps featured 'national' clothing and 
footwear in the form of swanndrai (heavy duty 
check shirts, jandals (plastic thongs), gumboots 
(wellingtons) and 'national' food: kiwifruit, 
pavlova, fish and chips, and hokey-pokey ice- 
cream. 
In the exhibition New Zealand, New Zealand: In 
Praise of Kiwiana tins of Edmonds' 'Sure to Rise' 
baking powder, Watties canned green peas, bars of 
Sunlight soap were accompanied by advertising 
logos and jingles illustrating the extent to which 
corporate discourses draw on nationalist tropes to 
'brand' products . The Watties display includes an 
aural presentation of a radio jingle from the 
1960s aimed at the housewife (that most potent 
symbol of gendered and domesticated certainty): 
If it's rich in flavour and it suits the 
innerman, 
If it saves you money in your household plan, 
If it's nourishing, flourishing, goodness in 
the can, Then it must be Watties! 
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It is worth noting the importance of Watties here. 
It was a New Zealand-owned company which was taken 
over during the 1980s by the international food 
conglomerate Heinz. In a small place like New 
Zealand (where there has always been limited range 
and therefore competition between brands) Watties 
products appear in contemporary culture as 
signifiers of a particular local experience. 
In the exhibition the domestic division of labour 
is celebrated through the rituals of cleaning, 
cooking and shopping with the emphasis on 'home- 
baking' as the essential aspect of 'home-making'. 
In the context of growing multinational control of 
the food industry, the corner grocery shop and the 
milk bar are romanticised as timeless places: 
In the 1950s the grocery store was an 
unhurried, dusty and aromatic place. The 
main physical features were the long worn 
Kaurifi- counter almost hidden behind stacks of 
biscuit tins ... on the counter were the Avery 
scales and hand-cranked National cash 
register, the bacon slicer and a simple wire 
device for cutting cheese. There were rolls 
of wrapping paper and a sleeping resident cat 
(ibid: 89). 
The exhibition re-works versions of dominant 
nationalist myths through the organisation of 
categories distinguishing various zones of 
everyday 'Kiwi' life. The farm, the beach and the 
suburb delineating separate (gendered) worlds of 
leisure and consumption: for men (drinking, sport, 
DIY), women (cleaning, cooking, child-rearing) and 
12 A native timber. 
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children (toys, confectionary, ice-cream). This is 
a representation of a 'simpler' time when clear 
divisions appeared to exist between work/leisure, 
public/private, outside/inside, and of course, men 
and women - divisions which have been disrupted by 
feminism, Ibi-culturalism' and globalisation. 
Underpinning the exhibition is the myth of (male) 
settler resilience and ingenuity. As the curator, 
Richard Wolfe, writes in the catalogue, the 
primary aim of the exhibition is to show there are 
'local solutions... local ways of doing things' 13 . 
To this end the catalogue begins with a paeon to 
the stripped-down life of the settlers: 
By and large the bits and pieces that go to 
make up New Zealand's popular life and 
customs are pretty robust - the sheer 
isolation of the country saw to that. The 
early settlers had only what they brought 
with them; anything else they had to make 
themselves (Barnett, 1995: 9). 
This mythologised positioning of white settlers 
existing in a utopian, space existing outside 
economic relations is a reiteration of the tropes 
analysed in King's 'being Pakehal; the disavowal 
of any links with colonialism through the myth-of 
the settler as the individuated 'Man Alone'. 
The myth of settler resilience continues to have 
contemporary resonances. 'Kiwi ingenuity' is 
celebrated in the exhibition by such artifacts as 
the 'Taranaki Gate' (the colloquial expression for 
any farm gate 'cobbled together' from scraps of 
wood and wire). The emphasis is on practical 
13 Quoted in a Reuters news agency report on 26 September, 1990. 
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solutions rather than aesthetics; as the catalogue 
details in a section entitled 'In the Sticks': 
Number 8 fencing wire has come to be 
synonymous with Kiwi versatility and 
innovation.... With a piece of number 8 and 
a kerosene tin there wasn't much you couldn't 
do. Rural recorder Jim Henderson once 
published a list of 30 applications of kero 
tin from the basic bucket (with number 8 
handle) to cake tins, roasting pans and 
nesting boxes to ash trays, chimneys and a 
portable toilet. (ibid: 155) 
Rural 'bricolagel now recuperated and celebrated 
as Kiwi 'folklore' exemplifies the exhibition's 
focus on objects and rituals which valorise 
('good, honest') manual labour over more 
sophisticated technologies. These artefacts embody 
an anti-intellectual conservatism which challenges 
bourgeois discourses of taste and cultural value 
linked to the new age primitivism of the 
indigenised 'Pakehal identity. In the exhibition, 
artefacts are recontextualised to challenge 
bourgeois discourses of taste and cultural value 
associated in New Zealand with the 'New Age' 
primitivism of liberal, urban 'pakeha' who, 
refashioning themselves in terms of a 
spiritualised relationship with nature and the 
land, participate in consumption practices which 
place considerable emphasis on 'natural' materials 
and practices such as the use of native timbers, 
non-synthetic textiles and design features 
incorporating lethnicised' aesthetics in the home. 
The collection of 'Kiwianal is imbued with a 
nostalgia for a brief period in the nation's 
history (the first two decades post-war) when 
white New Zealanders lived in place known 
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14 colloquially as 'Godzone Country'. The 
subsequent economic and political transformations 
brought about by globalisation and biculturalism 
have disrupted the certainties of this period - in 
a sense the 'Kiwi lifestyle' has been 'colonised'. 
But while the 'Kiwiana' exhibition looked to the 
past for succour the 1990s saw the emergence of 
texts which tackled the crisis of 'whiteness' 
without recourse to nostalgia. 
The Dialogics of 'Race' - Alison McClean's Crush 
Unlike Once Were Warriors and The Piano which, in 
very different ways, represent essentialised 
versions of 'local' ethnicities, Crush (Alison 
McClean, 1992) offers a more complex depiction of 
contemporary gendered and racial identities in New 
Zealand. 15 The film opens up a space for an 
ambivalent version of 'New Zealandness' which 
explores ethnicity in relation to themes already 
examined in this chapter, in particular landscape 
and nature and gender. 
"' New Zealand is referred to as'Godzone'a contraction of Thomas Brackeds nineteenth 
century poem'God's Own Country'. 
15 Ile film. was, according to British critics, flawed in terms of characterisation and 
'narrative drive'. As with The Piano critics tended to ignore the references to New 
Zealand! s troubled colonial setting. See for example the review in Sig-ht and Sound, BFI, 
April, 1993. 
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By exposing the tensions generated between three 
'local' characters (all white) and an American 
'femme fatale', the film comments on shibboleths 
of 'identity' in New Zealand, at the same time 
addressing wider issues relating to the flow of 
global culture in the context of a 'weak' national 
culture. In a sense it interrogates the way in 
which everyday life is lived out, in part, through 
representation. The film can be read as a comment 
on Meaghan Morris's claim that antipodean whites 
are both 'colonisers and colonised' 16 ; exploring 
the way in which white New Zealanders are 
simultaneously colonisers in relation to the Maori 
and 'colonised' by representations produced 
17 
elsewhere(Morris, 1992: 471) 
An instability of identity is embedded in the 
film's structure, particularly in the way it plays 
with genre. The film begins as a road movie; a 
local journalist Christina (Donagh Rees) is 
travelling with her American friend Lane (Marcia 
Gay Harden) to Rotorua to interview prize-winning 
author, Colin (William Zappa). They are on a 
quest initiated by Christina to discover the truth 
about her fantasy figure. The glove compartment of 
her car is stuffed with newspaper clippings about 
the author's life. 
16 Morris has described the 'antipodes' as places which are: 
Dubiously postcolonial, prematurely postmodern, constitutively multicultural but still 
predominantly white ..... we oscillate historically between identities as coloniser and 
colonised(Morris: 1992: 47 1) 
17 As Mark Williams writes: 
Living in and writing about New Zealand are activities governed by the rooted prejudice 
among New Zealanders that their experience exists inescapably on the peripheries, at a 
remove from the centre, away from reality itself (Williams, 1995: 44) 
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The 'road movie' ends abruptly when the car, 
driven recklessly by Lane, overturns on a corner. 
Christina is hospitalised with severe brain damage, 
while Lane escapes shocked but unhurt. At this 
point the road movie ends and 'horror' takes over, 
movement is replaced by stasis. 
After the crash the American woman retreats to a 
motel and then decides to keep the appointment 
with the author. Arriving at his house she meets 
his teenage daughter, Angela (Caitlin Bossley). 
The two strike up a friendship. Some time later 
Lane seduces Colin and moves into the house. 
Angela, who has a crush on Lane, begins to visit 
Christina regularly in hospital. 
The palsied Christina has completely lost control 
of her bodily functions; she can do no more than 
grunt and dribble as she emerges from the coma. 
Angela, jealous of Lane's relationship with her 
father, primes Christina with a hatred of Lane as 
the person responsible for her injuries. 
When Colin, Lane and Angela go to stay at a 
lakeside cottage Angela arranges for Christina to 
join them. Both Lane and Colin are shocked by the 
arrival of the wheelchair-bound woman. When they 
go on an outing to a waterfall they arrive at a 
look-out point where Christina staggers from her 
wheelchair to give Lane a fatal shove over the 
parapet into a ravine below. 
The film is set in one of New Zealand's key 
tourist resorts, Rotorua. This setting provides 
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an ironic comment on the incongruity between the 
way in which the place is represented for tourists 
through the packaging of 'traditional Maori 
culture' and 'nature', and the banality of 
everyday life in small-town New Zealand. 
My analysis of the film is predicated on the 
possibility of a reading of the cinematic text 
which requires 'local' knowledge. There is a sense 
in which referents embedded in the film's margins 
signify a subversive construction of received 
representations of 'New Zealand'. For example, 
throughout the film the viewer is offered 
snapshots which ironise these versions of New 
Zealand in relation to Maori 'traditions', nature 
and the landscape. A roadside display, featuring a 
mannequin dressed in a 'traditional' Maori piupiu 
(grass skirt), suggests the casual way in which 
'Maoriness' is commodified while a shot of tui 
(native birds) frosted into the glass pane of 
Colin's front door makes passing reference to the 
traffic between touristic constructions of nature 
and suburban kitsch. 
References to contemporary political struggles in 
New Zealand are almost subliminal. In a scene 
where Lane seduces a local in the 
discotheque, the exchange between 
place in front of a wall on which 
graffitied sign - 'Land of the Wri 
(a play on the translation of the 
New Zealand 'Aotearoal - Land of 
Cloud) . 
car park of a 
the two takes 
is painted a 
Dng White Crowd' 
Maori word for 
the Long White 
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As the credits roll the narrative begins with Lane 
and Christina in the car driving towards the town 
of Rotorua, through unremarkable farmland lit by a 
wintry sun. The first view of Rotorua is a long 
shot of the city with a large sewage treatment 
tank foregrounded beside a sign reading - Haere- 
mai - (Maori for 'welcome'). This downplaying of 
landscape (sumptuous landscapes are as ubiquitous 
to New Zealand films as heritage is to British 
productions), continues throughout the film. When 
the American woman remarks: 'It's so empty' (a 
comment on both the landscape and the lifestyle) 
Christina's reply hints at themes of spiritual 
emptiness and sexual poverty (the failure of New 
Jerusalem) which continues to haunt white New 
Zealanders: 
McCahonle said it was a landscape for too few 
lovers. It's not like Australia, no 
predators, no poisonous spiders; it's totally 
benign, paradisal. 
Rotorua is an area of extensive thermal activity 
where steam rises from cracks in the pavement; 
boiling mud pools and geysers dot the landscape. 
The opening credits are superimposed on a close-up 
shot of a boiling pool. In this shot, the surface 
of the ochre-coloured mud pool is punctured by the 
rhythmic and sinister bubbling of the liquid. This 
is a place where the skin of the earth is ruptured 
by the smouldering elements beneath; the terrain 
is unstable and in the film the volatility of 
these natural forces provides a metaphor for the 
way in which Lane's arrival disrupts life in 
Is A contemporary New Zealand painter. 
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small-town New Zealand. The presence of the 
white, American woman signifies wider issues 
relating to the dominance of American culture in 
New Zealand. Her power to seduce both Colin and 
his daughter Angela, is less a comment on her 
polymorphous sexuality than on her starring role 
as a Hollywood-style 'femme fatale'. Their desire 
for the sophisticated American suggests the way in 
which representations, (in Crush symbolised by 
Lane as female icon) offer a scopophilic escape 
from the stifling parochialism of small-town New 
Zealand. 19 For Colin, an inept and failing figure 
of white masculinity, and the adolescent Angela, 
awkward and plain, the tantalising figure of Lane 
wafts, like an apparition, into their suburban 
lives. 
Colin (whose failure as a writer is signalled by 
his day job in a fish factory) is mesmerised by 
her. His clumsy and gauche behaviour (in an early 
love-making scene with Lane he slides away from 
her down the hillside on his plastic raincoat; in 
another he trips over beside the bed, one leg 
trapped inside his trousers as he attempts to 
undress) parodies dominant constructions of white 
masculinity - virile, heroic and self-contained. 
At one point in the film Lane and Angela visit to 
a tourist site called 'Hell's Kitchen', a replica 
Maori village built around a boiling mud pool. The 
visit to Hell's Kitchen is juxtaposed with the 
drab and unaestheticised domestic space where 
" At another level this can be read also as a comment on the New Zealand film industry; in 
order for locally produced films to compete on the international market they invariably 
need to feature Toreign! actors. 
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Colin waits for the American woman in a 'kitchen 
hell' devoid of women. 
Commenting on the geysers at Hell's Kitchen, 
Angela tells Lane 'They're not nearly as big as 
they used to be', to which Lane replies 
ironically: 'This country's obsessed by size'. 
This is a moment of wonderful prescience in the 
film; a comment on the disillusionment of 
adolescence when the place known as 'Gods Own 
Country' reveals its insignificance; on the 
excruciating insecurities of a nation which 
perceives itself to be peripheral (and is 
therefore obsessed with its size) and obviously, 
on the masculine phallo-centrism. 
As in The Piano the Maori provide a backdrop for 
this film, but in this instance their marginality 
comments on both their political and economic 
exclusion and the appropriation of 'Maori 
traditions' in dominant versions of 'New 
Zealandness'. In a sense the liminality of the 
Maori people represented in the film creates a 
space for an interrogation of the way in which 
'whiteness' is centred within narratives of 
nation. For example stereotypical forms of Maori 
culture appear in the film refracted through the 
television screen. In the hospital, a set in the 
corner of the ward broadcasts a Maori concert 
party performing a 'poil dance; in another scene, 
set in a bar a pre-match 'hakal is glimpsed. The 
'constructedness' of Maori cultural traditions as 
seen on the screen, contrasts with the 
? ordinariness' of the Maori characters within the 
exegesis of the film itself. 
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Much of the film is set in a hospital where two 
patients lie in adjacent rooms but significantly, 
never meet. Their incarceration and their 
separation represents racialised 'dysfunction' in 
New Zealand. In one room, lies a Maori man called 
Horse, emasculated by a broken leg held in 
traction and in the other, the grotesquely 
disfigured white woman, Christina. 
Horse, is constantly surrounded by a family group 
who spend their time laughing and singing. This 
stereotypical image of Maori sociability and 
physicality is parodied in a number of ways. The 
adolescent Angela is drawn by the clamour 
emanating from Horse's room; she spends some time 
watching the group through a crack in the door. 
When she finally makes Horse's acquaintance a 
teasing intimacy quickly develops between them. 
However, instead of seducing Angela, Horse (with 
his leg encased in plaster) finally asks the girl 
to scratch his itching thigh with a knitting 
needle. His seemingly predatory overtures turn out 
to be nothing more than embarrassment over the 
need to deal with an itch. Here the film 
constructs a scenario (in this case, an apparent 
seduction scene) which is then parodied as Horse 
is revealed as a humorous and gentle character. 
The effect of this scene is magnified when shortly 
afterwards a white doctor appears wearing a carved 
Maori pendant around his neck. He informs the 
female nurse her that Christina's recovery will be 
a spiritual matter. As he and a nurse struggle to 
get Christina onto her feet he tells her: 
202 
We've got a lot to learn from the tangata 
whenua... they talk about wairua - the spirit- 
she needs spiritual sustenance and that's 
where the family comes in, the whanau... 
At this point Christina defecates on his shoes. 
The scene is both shocking (not least because the 
representation of defecation is cinematically 
taboo) and amusing, as the doctor's political 
correctness is subverted by the patient's 
uncontrolled bowel movement. The doctor's 
exhortation suggests that Christina's palsied body 
is a metaphor for the contemporary condition of 
white New Zealanders who have somehow lost 
control. However, unlike Baines in The Piano, the 
doctor's ethnic self-fashioning positions him 
within this film as a figure of ridicule. 
The film begins as a road movie; the characters 
embark on a journey of self-discovery which is 
quickly disrupted by the crash. For the white New 
Zealand women, Christina, movement turns to stasis 
at the hands of the American women driving the 
car. For the rest of the film the white woman's 
palsied body stands in for a contorted and 
moribund whiteness which can be read as the 
contemporary condition of pakeha New Zealanders. 
As Lane works her magic in the town Christina 
struggles to regain control of her body and to 
make herself understood. When she finally kills 
Lane by pushing her over the cliff the three local 
characters are left gazing over the precipice as 
the end credits roll. 
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While the film is flawed in terms of its uneven 
narrative drive, it is notable as an attempt to 
disrupt the way in which the 'burden of 
representation' falls automatically onto the Maori 
who function metonymically as 'ethnics' in 
dominant representations of New Zealand. In this 
film the American woman stands in for the power of 
Western culture while the white New Zealand 
characters in the film are unformed, tentative and 
awkward, their lack stands in powerful contrast to 
the Maori characters who appear profoundly at ease 
with themselves. 
This chapter has investigated the 'plasticity' of 
whiteness as a dominant racialised identity which 
has the capacity to remould and reinvent its 
parameters in reponse to different historical and 
cultural conjunctures. 
White settler culture in New Zealand has been 
marked by an ambivalent attitude towards itself, 
poised between the metropolitan centre ('Europe') 
from which it seeks differentiation and the 
indigenous peoples who serve as a reminder of 
colonial exploitation. While historically 
'whiteness' has been naturalised through hegemonic 
constructions of Empire and nation (with the the 
state drawing its power historically from the 
universalised 'Western' values of civilisation 
and democracy), in recent times the recognition of 
Maori claims to 'treaty justice' and the perceived 
betrayal of Britain has left the dominant group no 
longer able to seek succour as 'European' and 
forced instead to negotiate multiple versions of 
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'whiteness' which disavow the centre and any 
notions of supremacy whilst continuing to 
articulate settler entitlements to the land. As 
we shall see in the next chapter these 
Ilocalised' constructions are in constant dialogue 
with transnational, globalising forms of identity 
circulating in a variety of cultural forms. 
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Chapter 5 
Narrations of Nation 
Haere Mai, God Defend, silver fern, 
Kowhai, Southern Cross, 
Sheep and mates, 
Plunket, ANZACS, corrugated iron, 
Swanndris, gumboots, marching girls, 
meat pies, Sure to Rise and beer 
Mt Cook, Tip Top, hokey pokey, 
she'll be right, All Blacks, baches 
and beaut. 1 
Cultural identities are not obvious or 'natural' 
propensities of populations living in territory 
delineated as a national space. In the preceding 
chapters we have seen how Maori and Pakeha 
identities, 'invented' as distinct groupings 
through the processes of modernity, have been made 
and remade in response to economic, political and 
cultural shifts. 
In recent years, Ibiculturalism' has transformed 
the unifying myth of 'one nation, one people' into 
the binary 'two peoples one nation'. This shift 
to Ibiculturalism' has also challenged the 
historic formation which centred the white 
majority within narratives of nation. Fuelled by 
'indigenous' claims to a powerful cultural 
New Zealand 'traditions, images and customs, listed in 
the catalogue of an exhibition of local popular culture 
(Barnett, 1990: 11). 
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tradition, the 'Maori Renaissance' has brought 
about an anxious debate about white identity in 
New Zealand focused on the question 'What is 
Pakeha culture? ' (King, 1991; Novitz, 1989) 
This chapter examines the difficulties involved in 
attempting to define 'Pakeha culture', arguing 
that constructions of 'whiteness' in New Zealand 
are in a sense Ijanus-faced'; looking outwards 
from a peripheral position (in terms of global 
circuits of culture goods) for legitimation 
through cross-border flows of images and 
narratives, and inwards for 'indigenising' symbols 
which can be appropriated for local forms of 
ethnic self-fashioning. 
Benedict Anderson has described national. identity 
as a particular way of 'imagining' made possible 
through the mass consumption of forms (such as the 
novel and the newspaper) through which the nation 
may be experienced as a 'deep horizontal 
comradeship' existing in 'homogenous empty time' 
(Anderson: 1996: 6). Anderson's formulation is 
useful in detailing the complex ways in which 
modernity (defined by secular rationalism, a 
calendrical perception of time, mass literacy and 
mass communications) has given rise to collective 
forms of identification through the consumption of 
hegemonic cultural forms, enabling the nation to 
be imagined as a bounded, unified space. 
In New Zealand, however, the predominantly one-way 
flow of cultural products from other places, 
together with local struggles over ethnicity, have 
meant that the 'imagined community, of nation has 
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always been fragmented and discontinuous. There 
the Iconstructedness' of nation is all too 
apparent, (the place has a short and uncomfortable 
history), and local versions of 'whiteness' have 
been historically based on the maintenance of 
racialised boundaries and myths of common descent 
extending beyond the territory of nation back to 
the imperial heartland. 
As we have seen in previous chapters, the 
civilising mission in the colony valorised 
'whiteness' as a repertoire of behaviour, rules 
and ideas organised around the notion of 
autonomous individuals regulated by codes 
operating in both public and private spheres of 
national life. In other words notions of 
'twhiteness' underpinned the rational organisation 
of everyday colonial life, administered through 
independent spheres of social and cultural 
activity designed to 'safeguard' the moral and 
spiritual fibre of the nation with the Maori 
labjected' as inferior. As Said suggests, national 
culture operates as a system of exclusions which 
define the limits of the national Aimaginary'. He 
describes it as a process legislated from above 
but enacted through the polity in order that: 
such things as anarchy, disorder, 
irrationality, inferiority, bad taste and 
immorality are identified and then 
deposited outside the culture.... kept 
there by the power of the state and its 
institutions (Said, 1983: 94). 
Historically nation-building in New Zealand 
involved the centring of white settlers within 
narratives which interpellated them as both 
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'citizens' and imperial subjects through the 
production of Icreolised' forms of Europeaness. 
Narratives of '(white) nation' have been 
reproduced within the educational system (in 
particular through standardised curricula in 
English and History) while in the domain of 'high' 
culture, local cultural production (particularly 
in the spheres of literature, art and cinema) has 
always bound up with imported canons of taste and 
value. Although, in the colonial context, 
cultural forms have addressed distinctive national 
preoccupations (most notably a concern with the 
specificities of 'place') the forms themselves are 
institutionalised by repertoires of taste and 
value measured against norms defined elsewhere 
(Ashcroft, 1989). 
For example, the national 'structure of feeling' 
expressed in literary form, is bound up with the 
way in which the canonical texts of English 
literature have been taught in schools; while the 
local literary establishment (supported by systems 
of patronage in the form of grants and prizes to 
authors) has institutionalised the reproduction of 
these forms (Williams, 1995). Similarly the 
cultural competencies required by producers and 
critics working in broadcasting and film are based 
on dominant practices which have been imported but 
local funding policies have inflected with a 
specifically 'national' content. 
While national imaginings are always 
geographically delimited, or as Anderson puts it, 
'no nation imagines itself coterminous with 
mankind' (Anderson, 1996: 7), in New Zealand, the 
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creolised culture of the white settler majority 
has historically been based on a shared language 
(English) and a shared myth of descent (European) 
which has resulted in constructions which have 
been energised more by a 'global imaginary' (based 
on versions of 'whiteness') than a local 'imagined 
community'. 
Thus when applied to a marginalised locality such 
as New Zealand, the notion of an 'imagined 
community' needs to be considered in relation to 
the peripheral context within which cultural 
production and consumption takes place. Local 
cultural production competes unevenly with a flow 
of artefacts from elsewhere. As a result, forms of 
national culture are relatively weak, suggesting a 
more complex formulation of 'imagined community' 
is necessary - one which addresses the extent to 
which the 'local' is produced through the 
lindigenisation' of globally circulating 
narratives and taste cultures (Morley 1996a). 
Although forms of pageantry and Ipseudo- 
tradition', (exemplified by a repertoire of 
symbols and rituals such the flag and anthem, 
public holidays, and the rituals surrounding 
sporting events), provide a focus for collective 
national identifications, the country's colonial 
legacy has meant that the even the most 
fundamental signifiers of nation (such as the 
currency, the flag and postage stamps) have been 
inscribed with imperial iconography. New Zealand's 
currency, symbol of the 'national economy', bore 
the British Queen's head on one side until 1990 
while the national flag connotes 'New Zealand of 
210 
the South' with a Union Jack nuzzling the top left 
corner in a sea of blue overlaid with a five-star 
Southern Cross. 
At the same time, the process of nation-building 
in the colony required a means to delineate the 
'uniqueness' of the national collectivity within 
the context of strong imperial links with Britain. 
Discourses of national unity have been constructed 
through particular forms of a 'national popular', 
disseminated through the media, the educational 
system and the invented traditions of the state, 
which is based on a 'New Zealandness' defined as 
something more distinctive than an impoverished 
version of 'Britishness'. 
In order to achieve this distinctiveness, Maori 
cultural forms have been appropriated in various 
ways. Maori kowhaiwhai (scrolls) have been used 
on banknotes and stamps, albeit as the border 
design for framing representations of enduring 
colonial icons such as the British monarch and the 
explorer, Captain James Cook (Thomas, 1995: 91) 
while 'indigenous' songs and dances furnish the 
symbolic regalia of nation while the tourist 
industry reproduces an internationally recognised 
repertoire of Iminiaturised' Maori artefacts - 
greenstone and bone pendants, flax bags, and 
wooden carvings - as souvenirs of the nation 
(Stewart, 1984) . 
Clearly the impact of uneven global cultural flows 
on a small place like New Zealand, means that 
white identities have been reconstituted at the 
'local' level by universalised versions of 
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'whiteness'. This chapter examines the interplay 
between global structures, such as multinational 
communication industries, and national 
institutional formations in producing culturally 
meaningful 'local' narratives. 
A tension, which has existed between state 
regulation of the public sphere (limited by the 
weak tax-base of a small population) and the 
trans-national commodification of culture, has 
been exacerbated in recent years by a radical 
programme of deregulation in New Zealand. Control 
of all forms of media has been transferred to 
foreign-owned companies suggesting new and 
different issues in relation to identity 
construction, namely the extent to which the 
Ideterritorialisation' of culture has given rise 
to the fragmented and shifting constructions of 
'postmodern identities'. 
The instability of national culture in New Zealand 
highlights the way in which any notion of an 
interpretative community based around the nation 
is too homogenising. Anderson's concept of an 
'imagined community' fails to deal with the 
centrality of dominant and Inormalising' 
representations (in circulation globally) which 
provide a repertoire of images and narratives 
valorising the bourgeois lifestyle enjoyed by 
privileged clusters of consumers. In the context 
of New Zealand's economic and social demogr aphies, 
such a repertoire privileges 'whiteness'. How do 
such constructions feed into, and reflect, what 
Bhabha has described as 'the complex strategies of 
cultural identification and discursive address 
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that function in the name of 'the people' or 'the 
nation''? (Bhabha, 1991: 291) 
Focusing on the slippery concept of 'national 
culture', this chapter draws on examples from key 
cultural institutions - museums, film and 
broadcasting - to show how, despite attempts to 
define a 'common culture', any sense of 'nation' 
based on collective memories and an idea of common 
destiny, continues to be fractured and 
discontinuous. 
The first section examines the way in which 
'collecting' - the gathering up of possessions in 
arbitrary systems of value and meaning - 
continues to be a crucial aspect of identity 
formation in New Zealand (Clifford, 1988: 217). 
Museums have played a central role in defining 
hegemonic versions of nation and have therefore 
been sites of struggle over competing definitions 
of national culture. Historically museum 
collections, constructed within the rule-governed 
systems of anthropology and art, have been 
organised through hierarchies of difference which, 
in New Zealand, have marked out the shifting 
parameters of 'Maori' and 'European' culture. In 
ethnological collections Maori artefacts have been 
used metonymically to fix 'tribal' forms as 
specimens of an authentic, pre-modern culture 
existing, outside the time of the nation, while 
European/Western art has been classified within a 
canon defined by the teleological narrative of art 
historical discourses (Clifford, 1988: 192). 
213 
In ethnological terms the 'modern' culture of the 
white settler majority has been unrepresentable 
but with the nation's recent 'bicultural turn', 
museums have become sites where the contemporary 
struggle over definitions of national culture have 
been played out. This section examines the 
complex tensions underpinning the representation 
of biculturalism in New Zealand's new national 
museum - Te Papa Tongarewa. 2 The museum, which 
opened in February, 1998 on a prime waterfront 
location in Wellington, represents a substantial 
state investment in a new version of nation. In 
order to construct a monument to the nation's 
bicultural 'settlement', a version of 'whiteness' 
has been presented alongside Maori culture in the 
museum - in a sense Maori and Pakeha have been 
lindigenised' by the rhetoric of 'two peoples, one 
nation' 3 
The second section explores the institutional 
structures of film and broadcasting, analysing the 
ways in which the texts of cinema, television and 
advertising are produced and circulate at the 
local, national and global levels. The one-way 
flow of information, images and professional 
cultures (all supported by international capital 
flows) tends to deterritorialise cultural 
production (Hannerz, 1991: 117; King, 1993: 10). This 
section argues that the cultural forms of 
modernity have to a certain extent been 
lindigenised' through regulation, subsidy and 
quota systems. with the New Zealand state acting 
2 Translated as 'the repository of things precious'. 
3 The museum's website can be found at: 
http: //www. tepapa. govt. nz. 
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as a 'broker', rather than a 'player', between the 
trans-national and the local. 
In the spheres of broadcasting and film, the 
protection of 'national culture' has been 
justified through a rhetoric which variously 
emphasises notions of originality, authenticity 
and independence in order to safeguard a cultural 
formation perceived to be under siege. Recently, 
deregulation has transformed the media in New 
Zealand with free-market nostrums of 'choice' and 
consumer freedom being deployed to legitimate the 
dramatic decoupling of links between media 
ownership in all spheres - newspapers, publishing, 
television and radio - from the regulatory power 
of the state. 
The concept of 'national cinema' is examined to 
show how globalised systems of cultural 
production, distribution and consumption are 
1creolised' at the national level. This section 
analyses the documentary Cinema of Unease 
(Neill, 1994) funded and produced by the British 
Film Institute to highlight the complex 
interplay of global/local within cinema defined as 
a national institution. 
The ubiquity of television in everyday life means 
that the medium provides a powerful means for 
symbolic modes of participation in the national 
community, not least because the routines of 
broadcasting (the way in which programme schedules 
have shaped and reflected the patterns of everyday 
life) play an important role in constructing 
national communities of viewers and listeners 
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(Scannell, 1988). However, in terms of content, 
New Zealand television broadcasters rely on 
imported products - mainly British and American - 
to fill the schedules. 
While the state has historically attempted to 
protect local cultural production through funding, 
regulation and quota systems, there is evidence 
that New Zealand audiences, used to a diet of 
imported film and televisual material, have been 
resistant to locally produced artefacts which 
mimic 'foreign' genres. Within this context the 
analysis of the complex notion of a 'national' 
audience is crucial; to what extent does the 
lindigenisation' of forms rely on the meaning- 
making of 'interpretative communities' whose 
consumption of cultural texts is determined by 
their position within 'a social and spatial 
formation? 
Historically New Zealand broadcasting has tended 
to address the nation as a collectivity 
predominantly in the 'interstitial' spaces of 
television flow; through station/channel branding, 
advertising and sub-genre such as local news and 
weather. Following deregulation there has been a 
renewed emphasis on uniting dispersed communities 
of viewers through 'live' events, such as sporting 
contests and charity fundraising Itelethons', 
which construct 'moments' inviting particular 
forms of national identification. 
This chapter will show how the global/local nexus 
is mediated within cultural industries - each of 
which is operating in a specific political and 
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economic context. It will argue that with the 
reconfiguration of New Zealand as a bicultural, 
nation, the production and circulation of cultural 
artefacts addressing 'the people, or 'the nation', 
operate through a complex matrix of racialised, 
gendered and class-based distinctions which 
continue to privilege hegemonic versions of 
'whiteness' while incorporating the new 
commitment to Ibiculturalism'. 
Exhibiting Ethnicity at Te Papa Tongarewa 
Museums have been described as 'secular temples to 
the nation' providing the means by which a nation 
represents its relationship to its own history and 
to that of 'other' cultures (Hutcheon, 1994: 209). 
As authoritative public spaces (institutionalised 
as apolitical, objective and empirical), museums 
function as monuments to the nation and as such 
they have played a pivotal role in the formation 
of the modern state. Their imposing architecture 
and prime metropolitan siting, together with an 
interior space designed to regulate forms of 
behaviour for visitors, variously positioned as 
'citizens' or 'tourists' have endowed them with an 
authority and historic role unlike any other 
public institution (Karp, 1991). 
Historically, national collections (organised 
within the disciplinary distinctions of art, 
ethnology and natural history) represent 
power/knowledge relations through the generic 
delineation of familiar hierarchies and 
exclusions: men over women, European over non- 
European, modern over pre-modern, high art over 
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traditional crafts. Thus the collections 
themselves, in terms of both content and 
presentation, invest artefacts with particular 
meanings which are, more often than not, legacies 
of a colonial history, while the history of the 
acquisition of artefacts themselves tends to be 
erased. Tribal grievances considered by the 
Waitangi Tribunal have included claims for the 
return of artefacts confiscated by the colonisers, 
often as trophies of war during the nineteenth 
century. Many of these - including a meeting house 
displayed in London's Victoria and Albert Museum 
4- have been returned to the tribes as 
museological practice has been forced to consider 
the politics and ethics of collecting (Allen, 
1998: 144). 
National museums in New Zealand have been 
established at key historical moments., For 
example, during the decade prior to the centenary 
of the Treaty of Waitangi there was an intense 
period of cultural nationalism in New Zealand. In 
1936 the Centennial Branch of the Department of 
Internal Affairs was established in order to 
develop a sense of nationhood. The setting up of 
the Centennial Branch which, within a decade, had 
produced the 11-volume series Making New Zealand, 
a centennial atlas and founded the national 
archives and a Dictionary of New Zealand 
Biography, coincided with the development a 
national museum and gallery in Wellington 
4 Mataatua was installed in the courtyard of Victoria and 
Albert Museum in 1882. Following the recommendations of the 
Waitangi Tribunal in 1992 the house was returned to its 
tribal owners in Whakatane who have subsequently allowed it 
to be exhibited in Te Papa Tongarewa(Allen, 1998: 152). 
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(Oliver, 1984; Phillips, 1996). The National Art 
Gallery and Museum opened in the capital in 1936. 
The building's architecture and the collections 
housed within, were shaped by the way in which the 
colonial state imagined its dominion at that time. 
The architecture drew on neo-classical motifs - 
the front colonnade was modelled on the portico of 
a Greek temple - signifying the nation state's 
Icivilisation' and power. On the front facade of 
the building, an inscription dedicating the 
building 'to the services of Art and Science' was 
embellished with icons relating to the various 
'fields' represented within the museum and 
gallery; painting was depicted by a palette; 
sculpture by a 'roman' bust (toga-clad and 
bearded); architecture by a building; and 
ethnology with a tattooed Maori head. 
This depiction of a Maori head highlights the way 
in which New Zealand's museum collections have 
represented 'Maori culture'. The heterogeneity of 
'European' culture (exemplified in this case, by 
the references to painting, sculpture, 
architecture) stands in contrast to ethnology's 
construction of 'the Maori', essentialised as an 
homogenous object of study with the tattooed head 
displayed as an icon of a knowable entity - the 
nation's 'Others'. 
In the past, the selection and presentation of 
Maori objects displayed in New Zealand's museums 
of ethnology, have been based on the perceived 
'cultural purity' of the artefacts. In 
ethnographic collections dissimilar groups of 
objects have been invested with meanings relating 
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to notions of 'tradition' and 'authenticity' and 
displayed within interpretative contexts 
emphasising a pristine pre-modern stasis 
untarnished by European contact. Examples of Maori 
'sculpture' have been exhibited alongside 
utilitarian objects - such as spoons, bowls or 
spears - as representative of an atemporal, pre- 
modern culture. Defined within such a taxonomy, 
carving has been collected and displayed as an 
instrumental tribal practice, its status within 
collections signalled by the absence of the 
sculptor's name. Conversely, in art museums, 
'works of art' are displayed for their aesthetic 
qualities; selected on the basis of 'beauty' or 
'originality' or because they represent a defining 
moment in the teleology of the 'Western' art 
historical discourses (Clifford, 1988: 226). Such 
works are identified as the creations of named 
individuals; their place in everyday cultural 
practices (including the art market) is irrelevant 
in a context where categorisation is based on 
Itranscendant' aesthetic attributes defined by a 
canon. Therefore in the case of New Zealand, 
distinctions employed in the selection and display 
of collections ethnological museums have developed 
taxonomies which (by omission) furnish dominant 
constructions of 'whiteness'. To parody Wolf, 
whites have been represented in New Zealand 
national collections as 'the people with 
History I (Wol f, 19 8 2) . 
As Chapter 3 has discussed, the Metropolitan 
Museum's Te Maori exhibition (New York, 1984) 
transformed the way in which Maori culture was 
perceived in New Zealand and has informed the 
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development of the Maori section in Te Papa 
Tongarewa. While curatorial direction of the New 
York exhibition remained in the hands of white 
ethnologists and museum professionals, Te Maori 
marked a shift in the way Maori people were 
involved in various aspects of the exhibition. 
This shift inaugurated a wider debate about the 
management and exhibition of material culture and 
has been crucial to the development of the Maori 
section of Te Papa Tongarewa which is curated and 
managed by ethnologists, archaeologists and 
technicians appointed by an advisory group 
(Tamarapa, 1996: 160). 
Described by publicity material as 'a place to 
stand for all New Zealanders', Te Papa Tongarewa 
is officially designated as 'a museum of art, 
history, Maori art and history and the natural 
environment's. The need to specify the inclusion 
of 'Maori art and history' signals the 
difficulties of representing the duality demanded 
by the discourses of biculturalism, in a place 
where white dominance is structured into the 
cultural formation and lexicon. The generic 
categories 'art and history' continue to 
naturalise 'whiteness' while the emphasis on 
'Maori art and history' makes visible categories 
submerged within discursive practices of 
ethnology. 
The display of artefacts in the new museum makes a 
powerful statement about the place of the tangata 
whenua within the reconfigured nation and also 
5 Annual Report of Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa 
1995-96. 
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demonstrates the museum's commitment to 
museological practice informed by a 
Imulticulturalist' approach to collecting and 
exhibition. 
The museum can be read both as a public space 
representing a collective imaginary based around a 
new legitimating myth - Ibiculturalism' and also 
as a national institution geared to consumerist 
culture. In line with the market-driven approach 
of New Zealand's public sector, the museum's 
mission statement included, from the outset, a 
commitment to be 'customer-focused and 
commercially positive' in its 'celebration of the 
mana of the two mainstream heritages -Maori and 
Pakeha'. 6 In a private interview, an historian 
involved in the design of the Pakeha exhibits 
expressed disquiet at the way the 'politics had 
been sucked out of the exhibits'. 7 His inability 
to speak publically about behind-the-scenes 
disputes which dogged the development of Te Papa, 
demonstrate the difficulties involved in a 
semiotic reading-off of the museum as 'text'. 
While the minutes of committee meetings and 
related policy documents reveal, to a certain 
extent, the institutional tensions steering the 
development of the museum, the gradual 
Ineutralising' of the museum's approach to 
Ibiculturalism' is only evident in the absences 
and shifts which can be gleaned by examining 
changes evident in development plans for the 
museum. 
6 Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa Statement of 
Intent for the Financial Year Ending 30 June, 1997. 
7 Interview with Government Historian Jock Phillips, 
Wellington, May 1998. 
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Revealed in these documents are the contradictions 
involved in working to an explicit state-funded 
brief to showcase the commitment to 
Ibiculturalism' whilst attempting to reflect 
current museological debates in relation to the 
politics of collecting and exhibition. This 
tension has resulted in a disjuncture between the 
way in which the two 'mainstream' cultures are 
exhibited. The requirement to be commercially 
viable in terms of attracting corporate 
sponsorship, maintaining a balance between 
populist entertainment forms geared to income 
generation (such as themed rides, cafes and 
souvenir shops) and the role of preserving and 
presenting national collections in a new context, 
have heightened the institutional tensions 
underlying the museum's development. 
In order to accommodate these conflicting 
interests, the nation's history has been sanitised 
by exhibits which downplay the inequalities and 
injustices underpinning the colony's history in 
order to construct, yet again, a unified version 
of national identity. Instead of acknowledging the 
significant political and social changes which 
have come about as a result of the contemporary 
renegotiations, particularly in relation to tribal 
claims for reparations under the Treaty of 
Waitangi, the museum indigenises the 'treaty 
partners'. 
In a space publicised as 'Our Place' the museum 
performs a 'bicultural' balancing act -presenting 
an empowering and unified 'Maoriness' alongside a 
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hybrid and potentially de-centred version of 
whiteness. Te Papa Tongarewa invites visitors to 
participate in and celebrate the shared cultures 
of New Zealand's 'treaty partners'. 
The discourses of 'biculturalism' sever the time- 
space co-ordinates of the nation from connections 
with Europe. In the museum, Maori and Pakeha are 
joined together in the deeper history of land and 
nature producing a back-projection of the nation's 
history which 'skips' the colonial phase, 
representing a version of nation acceptable to a 
neo-liberal globalised economy. This is evident in 
conceptual plans used in the development of the 
museum. The design of the space was based on a 
tripartite axis with the tangata whenua (those 
belonging to the land by right of first 
discovery), and the tangata tiritiri (those 
belonging to land by right of treaty) were 
entwined with papatuanuku (the common land). In 
planning documents the connections between these 
areas were depicted figuratively in the form of a 
venn diagram; intersecting circles showing each 
aspect separate conjoined. The museum's architects 
have explicitly stated that the building was 
designed to represent the anchoring of the nation 
in 'deep time' through the connections of both 
Maori and Pakeha to 'nature' 8. Architect Pete 
Bossley draws on the discourses of biculturalism 
to naturalise 'shared' connections to the land, 
describing the relationships between 'sub- 
cultures' as expressed in the museum's 
architecture: 
'The Designing of Te Papal, Architecture New Zealand, 
Special Edition, February, 1998. 
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Common to both sub-cultures were attitudes 
to openess relationships with sea and sky, 
the transitional nature of the occupied 
space between land and ocean. 9 
In Te Papa, the positioning of the Treaty of 
Waitangi display and the natural history section, 
play, an important part in making explicit these 
connections for visitors as they move through the 
space of the museum 10. The Maori and Pakeha 
exhibits sit alongside one another on Level 4, 
connected by a central atrium area dedicated to 
the Treaty of Waitangi. This 'treaty space' is 
designed to resemble a chapel. A facsimile of the 
original treaty document, meshed between blue 
glass and embellished with gold leaf, hangs high 
in the ceiling like an enormous stained glass 
window. Visitors walking beneath this structure 
are dwarfed by the scale of the object and need to 
look up in order see it. The movement of visitors 
passing through the space triggers recordings 
housed in pipes embedded in the floor (resembling 
the pipes of a church organ) which comprise loop- 
tapes of positive and negative opinions about the 
role of the Treaty in contemporary New Zealand. 
This device, apparently giving 'voice' to a range 
of ordinary opinions signifies the nation's 
capacity for 'democracy', 'egalitarianism' and 
lopeness' thus silencing any contentious claims to 
different forms of sovereignty. Significantly, it 
does not provide any context for the treaty's 
turbulent history. Instead, the religious 
ibid 
10 The museum's web site uses hypertext links to connect 
these sections. 
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iconography of the space elevates the Treaty to 
spiritual status thus avoiding materialist issues 
connecting the treaty to a political and legal 
struggle over land rights. 
The Pakeha exhibits at Te Papa, which represent 
white identities as contingent, heterogeneous and 
unstable, occupy the museum space alongside a 
version of 'Maoridoml which appears timeless and 
pure. Yet,. however powerful the 'Maori' space in 
the museum is - artefacts presented in a 
beautifully lit space; with the meeting house, 
works of sculpture, painting, clothing and the use 
of photographs and video to anchor the collection 
in relation to specific tribal connections -, the 
exhibit appears to have been designed primarily to 
connect the history of European settlement to the 
'deep' history of the land. 
The Pakeha exhibits were developed by a government 
department (it appears the Icentre' continues to 
speak for the 'dominant'). In New Zealand's 
deregulated environment the contract for 
'conceptual input' into the section was awarded to 
the Department of Internal Affairs. Jock Phillips, 
head of the Department's Historical Branch, has 
described the department's function as 'a business 
with a public mandate to strengthen national 
identity' . 
11 According to Phillips, the' 
department's task in designing exhibits for'the 
museum, was to tell 'the story of the tangata'- 
tiriti - the Pakeha who were there by virtue of 
the Treaty of Waitangi' (Phillips, 1996: 115). 
(Comment made in a private interview in. wellington, May, 
1998) 
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Defining Pakeha history continues to be a major 
conceptual issue for New Zealand historians but as 
Phillips puts it 'we solved the matter quickly and 
argued there was no Pakeha identity as such' 
(Phillips, 1996: 115). As a result the three 
exhibits representing the majority group have been 
designed within a contingent, non-linear 
interpretative framework. It remains to be seen 
the extent to which such a context enables 
visitors to 'read in' the nation's troubled 
colonial history, particularly given the museum's 
showcase status as a tourist-oriented 'gateway to 
New Zealand' 12 . Phillip's account states that the 
colonial encounter will subsumed by what he calls 
a 'universal truth' of Pakeha 'non-identity'; that 
the core of 'Pakehaness' is based on 'a founding 
trauma': 
the fact that we are migrant people, 
attempting to make a new home... is the 
central truth to our identity (Phillips, 
1996: 119). 
In a reversal of the way settler differences 
(regional, religious and so on) were collapsed in 
the nineteenth century in order to construct white 
settlers as a collectivity of New Zealand 
'citizens', the museum's interpretation of 
'biculturalism' recuperates diversity and 
pluralism, presenting migration stories based on 
the travelling experiences of 'ordinary folk', in 
an attempt to deconstruct the discredited settler 
narratives of dominant white identity. 
12 Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa Statement'of 
Intent for the Financial Year Ending 30 June, 1997. 
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Development documents stress the way each 
component of the 'Pakeha' section avoids an 
overarching 'master narrative'. 13 This 'Post- 
modern' approach draws instead on anecdotal 
material to present an account which is intended 
to signify a de-centred whiteness in keeping with 
the museum's Ibi-culturalism' (ibid: 117). 
In Passports visitors are able to open drawers 
containing details of individual settler stories 
and miscellaneous artefacts, most of which are 
related to the journey from Europe to New Zealand: 
visitors will be able to play off 
generalisations about New Zealand identity 
against particular lives '(Phillips, 
1996: 119). 
This exhibition is sponsored by Air New Zealand 
and the trope of 'travel', used to describe 
settler migrations, represents colonial settlement 
as mere 'event'. This is reinforced by the use of 
Air New Zealand's corporate logo (the koru scroll) 
on exhibition signs suggesting a teleology of 
travel in which ships have simply been replaced by 
planes. More broadly, the presentation of these 
'stories' exemplifies the tensions, which exist in 
a public institution burdened with the task'of re- 
defining national identity for a society 'hungry 
for a vision of itself' (ibid: 108). 
Historians designing the exhibits were battling 
against public pressure to establish a Pakeha 
13 'The Peopling of New Zealand' - Concept Development 
Report, History Exhibition Team, February, 1994. 
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'gallery of heroes', despite the fact that, as 
Phillips puts it: 
the clamour for such a solution came from 
Pakeha who sensed the Maori exhibitions 
would be affirming of identity and 
therefore hagiographic in tone (ibid: 115) 
One of the sections - Exhibiting Ourselves - is 
described as 'potentially the most subversive' 
because of its interpretation of the way in which 
versions of national identity have changed 
historically (ibid: 116). The interpretative 
device for the exhibit is a re-creation of New 
Zealand's displays at four international 
exhibitions spaced 50 years apart: the 1851 Great 
Exhibition in London, the 1906 Christchurch 
International Exhibition, the 1940 Centennial 
Exhibition in Wellington and the 1992 Seville 
Exposition in Spain. At each of these events, it 
is suggested, a different version of a 
mythologised 'New Zealand' was exhibited: the 1940 
exhibition in Wellington represented the nation as 
an economically progressive welfare state while 
the 1992 version, at Seville's Expo, projected New 
Zealand as a 'go-getting nation of entrepreneurs' 
(ibid). Phillips suggests Te Papa's visitors may 
be able to read these constructions as 'puffery 
and propaganda designed to sell goods and to 
attract immigrants and foreign investment' (ibid). 
For the curators, Exhibiting Ourselves may well 
demonstrate how different versions of national' 
identity have been 'self-serving, projections, 
linked to specific temporal conjunctures, but it 
is questionable whether the interpretative 
.. 
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capabilities of museum visitors will lead to 
similar readings. To what extent will visitors 
share the values and assumptions that have 
informed the re-presentation of these exhibitions 
in the new museum? And if these versions of 
identity are interpreted by visitors as 
'constructions', will this lead in turn, to a 
deconstruction of Te Papa's Ibi-culturall 
projection of national identity? 14 
In the latter phase of the museum's development, a 
media campaign was fought over plans to use a 
collection of eighteenth century British antiques 
to produce an exhibition about class relations in 
the early days of settlement. Donated to the 
nation by a descendant of a wealthy hill-farming 
family, the Elgars, the collection was planned to 
be integrated into an exhibit which used wool 
production in order to make connections between 
class, labour and the generation of wealth in the 
colony. According to Phillips: 
We decided to look at the wool barons by 
focusing on Mrs Elgar. We planned to 
reconstruct her drawing room using the 
furniture and around the walls tellýhow her 
family had acquired the wealth which 
purchased the collection. Well of course, 
this was not quite what the Elgar lobby 15 
wanted... 
14 This interpretation of the representation of New Zealand 
in the context of the Empire also glosses broader issues 
about way the settler colonies were hierarchised'in relation 
to other territories in the Empire. Annie Coombes argues' 
the Empire exhibitions represented the white dominions at 
the 'top of a racially hierarchised ladder' 
(Coombes, 1994: 192) 
Interview Wellington, March 1998. 
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After a public campaign the artefacts were housed 
instead, in a glass compartment and anchored by a 
large sign entitled Grassy Empires. In two short 
sentences, the text trumpets the achievements of 
nineteenth century capitalists exercising their 
freedoms in the colonial zone: 
It was thanks to sheep farming that Ella 
and Charles Elgar owned Fernside. In the 
1840s a few canny entrepreneurs got in 
quick, leasing and then buying cheap acres. 
Interestingly, it is through a collection of 
artefacts belonging to 'common' people that 
connections are made in relation to colonial 
appropriations. John Guard, was sent to Australia 
as a convict and subsequently settled in New 
Zealand in the 1820s, marrying Betty, the first 
white woman to live in New Zealand's South Island. 
The national museum in Wellington inherited a- 
collection of the couple's possessions - including 
John Guard's pistol, sword and whaling implements, 
Betty's Guard's wedding ring and perhaps most, 
importantly for the mythology which surrounds the 
couple, a tortoiseshell comb which is supposed-, to 
have saved Betty's life when she was struck by a 
mere (Maori club) during a tribal attack which 
took place when their boat was shipwrecked off the 
New Zealand coast. As a result of the collection 
(which provides material evidence of. their 
existence), the Guards have appeared at regular 
intervals in New Zealand historiography,, usually 
narrated as courageous pioneers (with'John', Guard- 
portrayed as the archetypal 'kiwi,, blokel), despite', 
the evidence which shows he and his wife were 
involved in 'shady' dealings, most notably_ 
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involving unscrupulous land deals and the exchange 
of sexual favours in which John Guard traded his 
wife (ibid: 122) 16 . Phillips reports: 
To present them as noble pioneers was not 
acceptable... instead it seemed necessary to 
confront visitors with the reality of power 
implied by Pakeha settlement .... We hope to 
show that John Guard's settlement in New 
Zealand emerged from a personal history of 
oppression and a struggle to survive... we 
will use him not to condemn him but to make 
the point that Pakeha settlement inevitably 
involved conflict with Maori (ibid). 
Discourses of commerce and consumption have 
permeated the museum's design and development with 
an emphasis on creating a populist space geared to 
attracting a demographically wide audience. The 
conceptual plan around which the museum was 
developed, proposed to organise the museum in 
order to give the visitor an experience described 
as Imalling'. According to the plan, a tour of 
the museum was designed to function as a 
circulation loop which constantly returned the 
visitor to the atrium which forms the spine of the 
building. It was envisaged in the plan that those 
on a quick tour could 1windowshopl cafe 
facilities and souvenir shops were placed in 
strategic positions 'similar to the way anchor 
shops are placed at opposite ends from each other 
in a mall 117 
16 The very existence of this collection of artifacts may in 
fact explain the prominence of the Guards in local'- : 
historiography - it could be argued that the collection 
, 
(used as 'evidence') has elevated the couple's place in New 
Zealand history. 
17 'The Design of Te Papal, Architecture, New Zealand, Special 
Issue, 1998. 
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The shopping theme has been extended to one of the 
most popular exhibits in the Pakeha section - 
Golden Days. Visitors queue to enter an old- 
fashioned shop where they face an array of 
merchandise displayed in front of a window which 
depicts an 'olden days' Wellington street scene 
beyond. With lights dimmed, a twenty-minute audio 
visual show unfolds. The window becomes a screen 
for the projection of a series of 'magic moments, 
. Clips from films, television news and 
advertising are edited into themed sequences (from 
sporting triumphs to protests - anti-nuclear, land 
rights- and Royal Visits) condensing a familiar, 
visual repertoire projected over a sound track of 
'aural' nostalgia (ranging from the bird call of 
the native Ituil to the national anthem). Visitors 
are offered the opportunity to consume the 
unchallenging banalities of 'Kiwiana' (described 
in the programme as 'the spirit of New Zealand') 
in a space created by the omission of a social 
history section called 'Life in New Zealand'18. 
Te Papa Tongarewa is described as New Zealand's 
most significant piece of contemporary. 
architecture. As a result the building's, material 
infrastructure has provided the means for a cross-, 
section of commercial companies to enhance their 
corporate identities through their connection to 
the museum. 
Plans to exhibit a collection of contraceptives dating' 
from the 1930s, in an exhibit about 'love in New Zealand', 
was shelved when, as Jock Phillips puts it, the Chair of- 
the Museum Board decided 'it would appeal to young people 
who did not knowthe difference between love and sex' 
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In the months following the opening of the 
building, images of the museum were used to 
promote a range of products and services - 
acoustics, electrical, engineering, lighting, 
graphics, interactive technologies, interior 
fittings, landscaping, steel, cladding, precast 
concrete - involved in the building of the museum. 
Thus the museum has become a site for trans- 
national companies keen to be associated with and 
demonstrate their commitment to the 'new' nation 
through their involvement with the museum. 
The development of Te Papa Tongarewa has involved 
a complex process of resistance and accommodation 
in the production of a Ibiculturalist' identity. 
By collapsing the hierarchical boundaries 
traditionally organising museum collections, Te 
Papa can be read as attempt to construct a 
'heterotopial 19 in which, for the museum's 
management at least 'taste and caste have been 
dismantled' in a celebration of the post-modern 
nation 20 It remains to be seen whether. this new 
, version of nation creates an interpretative space 
where the conflicts and tensions of New Zealand's 
bicultural settlement can be interrogated. For 
the purposes of this chapter however, the 
development of Te Papa Tongarewa represents a 
large public investment in a site committed to new 
version of nation which attempts to reconcile a 
range of conflicting pressures. As such, the 
19 Described by Foucault as a place where 'all'the other real- 
sites that can be found within the culture'are 
simultaneously represented, contested and 
invertedl. (Foucault, 1980: 24) 
20 Ian Wedde, museum curator quoted in The Australian 6 June, 
1998. 
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museum functions as a monument to a state which 
appears to have settled accounts with the 
'indigenous' people. 
In the context of New Zealand's re-focused 
economic interest in the Asia-Pacific region; 
together with the growing importance of tourism, as 
the primary service industry, the museum's version 
of nation demonstrates the way in which state has 
been able to adjust to (rather than be transformed 
by) its 'strategic biculturalism' in order to 
strength its branding in the international 
marketplace. 
National Cinema: Negotiating the global/local nexus 
Writing from the semi-periphery of the 'westl, 
_the Australian academic Meaghan Morris has suggested 
that the category of the 'national' can usefully 
be used as a relational term to investigate the 
uneven circuits of cultural production between 
different 'components' of a world system of cinema 
(Morris, 1992a: 470). She argues such a focus hasý'- 
the potential to linternationalisel Cultural 
Studies' approaches which continue to naturali'se 
Anglo-American dominance of film and television 
production. In non-dominant contexts, where the 
geo-politics of cultural production mean.,, - 
'identity' issues are most pressing, reco urse'to 
the level of the 'national' provides1for Morris at, 
least, an important counter-narrative to thel, 'I 
universality assumed by texts emanating from, the 
Icentrel. 
However, in an industry characterised-by,, 
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cross-border networks, defining the components of 
a 'national cinema' is inevitably problematic 
(Elsaesser, 1989). With financial, production and 
distribution networks increasingly organised 
trans-nationally, categorising a film as a product 
of a specific geographical space is a 
classificatory device usually based on a 'cultural 
nationalism' which constructs boundaries around 
groups of texts in order to endow them with an 
imaginary unity or coherence. 
Film Studies debates about national cinema have 
been inflected by wider concerns regarding the 
parameters and methodologies of the discipline 
itself. Tensions exist between text-based 
criticism and materialist/intertextual approaches 
which address broader issues relating to film 
histories and contextual fields of production, 
circulation, criticism and consumption 
(Hayward, 1993; Higson, 1989; OIRegan, 1996). At a 
level of generality it could simply be said that 
all those films made within a particular state 
comprise the 'national cinema'. However, as Stam 
argues, the category can be so broad as to be 
'common sensicall: 
As the products of national industries, 
portraying national situations and 
recycling national intertexts (literature, 
folklore), all films are of course national 
(Shohat: 1994: 285). 
In the case of New Zealand the use of this broad 
definition has been applied recently in a 
monograph which appends a chronological listing of 
one hundred and seventy two 'New Zealand' films 
dating from 1914. The list is accomp anied by a 
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key translating symbols used against numerous 
films on the list which suggests the difficulties 
of applying such a wide-ranging definition to 
construct a national 'oeuvrel. The key 
demonstrates the difficulties involved in 
classifying texts firstly as 'films' and secondly 
within a category defined as 'national'. The 
'key' comprises the following: 
doc= documentary 
TVM= made for television 
loc= foreign film using NZ location 
NRS = foreign film with NZ-related story 
%= film is lost 
#= film only exists in fragments 
(Conrich: 1997,13) 
In other words, attributing national status to a 
film is an arbitrary and highly contested process. 
The Piano provides a specific example of the 
problem of definition. The film was financed by 
the French company CIBY 2000, produced in 
Australia and written and directed by a New 
Zealander (trained in Australia). It starred 
bankable Hollywood actors ( Holly Hunter, Sam 
Neill and Harvey Keitel) but represented the 
colonial landscape of nineteenth century New 
Zealand. When the film was released in New Zealand 
the media was pre-occupied by the debate about 
whether it could be deemed a 'local' product; 
across the Tasman, Tim O'Regan's Australian 
National Cinema located the film within a corpus 
of Australian films (O'Regan: 1996). 
Historically the global cinema industry has been 
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dominated by Hollywood and therefore forms an 
integral, albeit naturalised, part of 'national 
cultural life'. The success of Hollywood, with 
its vertical integration of film production (based 
on the studio system) harnessed to a world-wide 
distribution network, operates on an economy of 
scale guaranteed by the profitability of the huge 
domestic market in the United States 
(Ellis, 1982) . 
While Hollywood is in one sense a 'national' 
cinema (North American), it has been the motor of 
a global industry which has been organised along 
Fordist lines (Collins, 1990: 153). Standardised 
production processes have reproduced 
internationally recognisable genres based on 
Iclassic' narrative forms while equally 
standardised formula for marketing and 
distribution have, to a certain extent, determined 
the way in which products are released and 
consumed globally. (And here it is important to 
note that global distribution strategies - timed 
release in different places linked to advertising 
campaigns and commodity tie-ins such as toys, 
games and confectionary - connects film to broader 
trans-national cultural/leisure industries and 
patterns of consumption). 
Hollywood's dominance of the international film 
industry is in part attributable to its ability to 
produce texts which appear to be universally 
pleasurable. This apparent ability to construct a 
'global popular' has yet to be analysed in terms 
of the meanings made by disparate interpretative 
communities (During, 1997: 820). It would appear 
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that Hollywood's apparent universality of appeal 
stems from its ability to offer pleasures and 
gratifications offered based on the globalised 
taste cultures of 1westernised' forms of 
consumption: 
Much of American film and television is 
about the American dream - the world as we 
would wish it to be -a place in which 
goodness and reason prevail and things work 
out for the best (Collins 1990: 192). 
Despite multicultural' rhetoric and pretensions 
to sex equality, representations of the 'American 
dream' reproduce and rework dominant constructions 
of gender, ethnicity and class. As Richard Dyer 
argues 'in Western representation whites are 
overwhelmingly and disproportionately predominant, 
have the central and elaborated roles and above 
all are placed as the norm, the ordinary, the 
standard' (Dyer, 1997: 3). An appropriate 
methodology for audience research in relation to 
film, beyond psychoanalytic accounts of 
specularity, has yet to emerge, but it is clear 
that such an approach ought to investigate the 
relationship between the representation of 
whiteness in the 'global popular' and trans- 
cultural interpretations. 
Within a configuration dominated by Hollywood, 
there exists a limited market for smaller-scale 
productions organised at a regional level or 
within 'alternative' or artisinal spheres. In some 
national contexts, such as French cinema and 
India's Bollywood, the size of a 'mother-tongued' 
diasporic audience is large enough to guarantee 
profitability for 'regional' productions 
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(Hayward, 1993: 13). 
However, in a small place like New Zealand, with a 
limited tax base and geographically isolated 
communities of audiences, national funding bodies 
are the only possible means of supporting local 
film production. There 'indigenous' productions 
are developed through state assistance which is 
provided in a variety of forms - tax concessions, 
training programmes, and distribution facilities. 
This reliance on public forms of support means 
that despite the recognition of cultural 
diversity, especially since the 'bicultural turn', 
locally produced texts are not only required to 
satisfy a 'mainstream' taste culture, in order 
that New Zealand-ma4e films can compete with 
imports in the local market, but at the same are 
required to meet criteria which are broadly 
'nationalist' in order to attract funding. As 
Roger Horrocks argues: 
As a whole the marketplace can only support 
a limited range of products .... Minorities in New Zealand, ethnic, 'taste' or any 
other kind of grouping, have difficulty 
reaching critical mass or the economic 
take-off point (Horrocks: 1995,86). 
New Zealand's largest national audiences are 
equivalent to niche or regional audiences 
elsewhere and as deregulation has enforced 
'market-led' approaches to funding and 
development, the emphasis on profitability has 
exacerbated the push towards mainstream tastes (in 
other words a replication of Hollywood genres). 
But perhaps more importantly this is a small place 
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with expensively American tastes in film; locally 
produced texts tend to be regarded as strangely 
unfamiliar with New Zealand accents proving 
unacceptable to audiences. 
Morris' account of Australian cinema's 
'postmodernityl can usefully be extended to New 
Zealand cinema. Morris claims film criticism in 
Australia needs to develop 'a theory of fully 
positive unoriginalityl because local productions 
are based on 'scavenging, borrowing, stealing, 
plundering... recoding, rewriting' forms emanating 
from outside national boundaries. While, at one 
level, Morris is merely reiterating the notion 
that there can be no 'authentic' or 'pure' forms 
of culture, national or otherwise, her argument 
provides a context for considering film production 
in 'small' places. She writes 
Film is an industry in a Western mega- 
culture and Australia is simply part of it. 
Ideals of originality, independence and 
authenticity are sentimental anachronisms, 
inappropriate to the combination of 
industrial cinema. Imitation today is true 
realism because the broad base of 
Australian culture from McDonalds to prime 
time television and everything in between 
is comparable to the American 
(Morris, 1988: 247) 
Defining national cinema in economic terms means 
finding a correspondence between national cinema 
and the domestic film industry, particularly in 
terms of ownership of the production and 
distribution infrastructure. There is a sense in 
which the notion of film-making as an 'industry' 
has only emerged in New Zealand during the past 
twenty years. This is largely because of the way 
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in which funding, archiving and training have been 
institutionalised through various channels, 
following the establishment of the New Zealand 
Film Commission in the 1970s to co-ordinate 
production finance and distribution deals 
nationally and internationally. Through this 
process of institutionalisation, film has emerged 
as a practice endowed retrospectively with a 
history and a national identity. 
The New Zealand Film Commission distributes 
lottery funds to finance local film production but 
control of production and distribution is 
generally in the hands of foreign-owned companies. 
This, combined with the growing convergence 
between cinema, television and video, has resulted 
in the development of co-productions which 
increasingly blur the distinctions between texts 
and their different sites of production and 
consumption. For example, Jane Campion's An Angel 
at my Table (1990), was produced as a series for 
New Zealand television and then sold on as a three 
hour-long film for international cinema and video 
release. 
As earlier discussions of Once Were Warriors, The 
Piano and Crush have shown , an approach focused 
on 'content' provides the means to link film texts 
to the construction of national imaginaries. It 
could be argued that the representation of 
recognisably 'local' behavioural codes - gestures, 
words, intonations, attitudes - offers a 'local' 
subject position. Similarly, representations of 
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landscape, gender, class and race relations can 
also be read as nationally specific 21 . 
Many of the difficulties of defining 'national' 
cinema are raised in a documentary written and 
presented by the ex-patriot white New Zealand 
actor Sam Neill, for the Centenary of Cinema (BFI, 
1995) series funded by the British Film Institute. 
Prior to the documentary - Cinema of Unease - 
Neill's most recent film had been his leading role 
as Stewart in The Piano. Undoubtedly his 
reputation as New Zealand's most well-known actor 
(consolidated by The Piano) made him an obvious 
choice for a venture funded by a British 
institution and aimed at an international market. 
Neill's version of New Zealand national cinema 
reached a wide global audience. 
During 1995 the documentary was screened at 
numerous international film festivals - Cannes, 
London, Sydney, Wellington, Melbourne, Edinburgh - 
and was subsequently on general cinema release in 
New Zealand and shown on Britain's Channel 4. 
Cinema of Unease is structured around a trope 
which appears frequently in historical accounts of 
New Zealand's political, economic and cultural 
formation - the narration of nation through 
2'However, in the case of New Zealand, with a small 
production base for both televison and film, it is clear 
that the parameters of national cinema need be drawn at the 
site of consumption as much as the site of production. The 
crucial question (and one beyond the scope of the thesis) in 
relation to 'audience' remains to what extent are modes of 
interpretation geographically and culturally specific? 
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developmental stages from childhood to maturation, 
dependence to independence and international 
recognition. In Cinema of Unease, this 
historicist device is deployed by Neill through a 
chronological and partial selection of 'New 
Zealand' films which are moulded into a narrative 
mirroring the actor's personal journey from 
childhood to internationally-recognised stardom. 
Thus narratival unity for Neill's version of 
'national cinema' is provided by his own 
experiences as a cinema-goer, white New Zealand 
man and actor/practitioner. The solipsism of this 
'bio-docl approach presents an account of national 
cinema which is gender-specific and Pakeha- 
centred. Thus, despite its biographical form, the 
documentary resonates with other dominant accounts 
of national culture in circulation. To this extent 
Cinema of Unease exemplifies the 'myth-making' 
process involved in constructing received versions 
of national culture and raises important issues 
about both the lauthoring' of such accounts - who 
is authorised to speak - and the way in which the 
articulation of particular kinds of memory 
coalesce into internationally-recognisable 
nationalist myths. 
For example, in various accounts of cinema-going 
in New Zealand there are recurring references to 
an orange-coated chocolate sweet, the Jaffa, which 
appears to have symbolic significance in relation 
to the film-based memories of white men. In Cinema 
of Unease Neill, detailing his boyhood love of 
film, recounts his attendance at the local 
cinema's 'Chums Club' (the very name suggests 
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gender exclusion) where adventure films were shown 
every Saturday morning. Speaking to camera on the 
site of the now-demolished cinema, Neill holds a 
small sweet aloft: 
This is a jaffa -a delicious orange and 
chocolate sweet but here at the Rex it was 
the weapon of choice. 
And as he describes how it was used to pelt fellow 
'chums' during the screening a clip from Sam 
Pillsbury's film The Scarecrow (1982) depicts 
jaffas being thrown at a boy sitting in the front 
row of a cinema. 
In the exhibition New Zealand, New Zealand: In 
Praise of Kiwiana (see Chapter 4), the 
significance of a display of Jaffa cartons is 
elaborated in the catalogue in the following way: 
On Saturday afternoons at the 'local' there 
was a social get-together with your 
mates ... Traditional was the rolling of 
Jaffas along the inclined wooden 
floor ... the simmering excitement could 
explode with a barrage of Jaffas fired at 
the screen sufficient to knock back the 
screen (Barnett, 1989: 39). 
Such accounts not only highlight the importance of 
cinema-going as a cultural pursuit but also hint 
at the way social spaces such as the 'Chum's Club' 
privileged certain groups (in this case white 
boys) whilst excluding others. More importantly 
though, is the way the sweet - the Jaffa - 
becomes condensed as a national 'myth'. 
Neill's narration of his adult entry into the 
world of film is also a story of contacts made 
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between groups of white men, primarily those he 
met through the public school system. The 
documentary shows him visiting his old boarding 
school where he suggests 'Englishness' was 
reproduced in the architecture: 
there's a touching pretence about buildings 
like this - they pretend to be somewhere 
else; as determinedly English as possible 
from the other side of the world. 
But crucially such places were also the foundation 
of networks of power which prepared certain kinds 
of young men to live out their 'white destiny'; in 
Neill's case through New Zealand's burgeoning film 
industry. 
In, Cinema of Unease Neill positions himself 
amongst a coterie of white male practitioners who 
are narrated as central to the development of 
national film culture in New Zealand. 
Underpinning the narrative is an echo of the 'Man 
Alone' theme -the lone 'battler' struggling 
against enormous odds, in this case the dominance 
of British culture in the former colony, to 
realise a lifelong love of cinema. Neill portrays 
himself as a victim of cultural imperialism: 'all 
our heroes had foreign accents and all adventures 
happened somewhere else in the world'. For him, 
childhood cinema-going: 
implicitly carried the message that because 
we were somehow absent from the screen that 
our own culture was somehow unworthy and we 
ourselves were less than worthwhile. 
Neill's use of the personal pronouns 'our' and 
'we' in this quotation, and throughout the 
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documentary, reinforces the overweening 
'whiteness' of his analysis as he extrapolates 
from his own experience to speak on behalf of all 
New Zealanders who are portrayed as victims of 
imperialism. 
Neill's story of the struggle for New Zealand 
film-makers (in his account they are almost all 
men) to be recognised internationally can be read 
'against the grain' to reveal 'national cinema' 
(in terms of production, distribution and 
consumption) as a cultural formation which has 
largely excluded those on the 'margins'. 
The Maori film-maker Merata Mita, best known for 
Patu (1983), a controversial film about the 1981 
Springbok Tour of New Zealand, has described the 
local film industry as a 'white and neurotic' 
(Mita, 1992: 47). In her analysis of the industry 
she argues that the central themes of films made 
by white New Zealanders appear to be driven by 
repression and fear: 
the notion of the white person at odds with 
his/her environment, with his/her country 
is deeply. etched in the national psyche 
(ibid). 
For Mita the denial of the nation's colonial past 
lies at the heart of what she describes as a 
'malaise' which is represented in New Zealand 
films as 'matters of the heart, acts of rebellion, 
insanity and misunderstood genius' (ibid). 
Although these themes, which Mita endows with a 
national specificity, are elements of a broader 
'Proppian' schema, and are therefore applicable 
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across all forms of narrative, they are deployed 
by Neill in his account of New Zealand cinema in 
order to endow his selection with a unique 
'structure of feeling'; significantly however he 
fails to address the difficulties encountered by 
Maori people, women and other minority groups to 
make films in New Zealand. 
Exemplifying the point made by Merata Mita, in a 
moment of near-parody and double-narcissism in the 
documentary, a clip from The Piano shows Stewart 
(Sam Neill) gazing at his own reflection in a tiny 
pocket mirror as he prepares to meet his wife-to- 
be, Ada McGrath. Over this clip Neill, the 
documentary's narrator, attempts to reflect on 
himself and his own troubled state when he 
comments: 
The Piano raised a worrying thought for me 
- if a national cinema is a reflection of 
ourselves then ours is a troubled 
reflection indeed. 
Using this clip of Stewart (The Piano's bad 
colonial Other) is as close as the documentary 
comes to linking white settlement and the nation's 
troubled present. By 'psychologising' the nation's 
weak sense of identity in relation to British 
domination, the documentary blurs the connection 
between white privilege and colonial history. 
Instead, the whites of New Zealand (implicitly 
male) are narrated as victims of forces emanating 
from outside the national borders to the extent 
that Neill refers to the Maori and Pakeha as wo 
peoples betrayed, living uneasily side by side in 
paradise'. 
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Cinema of Unease , produced and distributed from 
Britain, testifies to institutional structures 
centred on a Euro-American axis, which dominate 
trans-national circuits of cinematic production 
and distribution. The structure of the film 
industry in New Zealand is too weak and under- 
funded to have produced this documentary, let 
alone financed the international distribution 
which put the text into global circulation. 
This documentary's internationally recognisable 
version of cinema in New Zealand, renders 
invisible the structured inequalities of the film 
industry at the level of both global and local and 
continues the work of disavowing colonial history. 
More importantly, Cinema of Unease provides an 
example of the way in which discourses of 
'whiteness' permeate circuits of cultural 
production naturalising structural inequalities 
and dominant regimes of representation which are 
available to be interpreted at different levels of 
specificity by 'global' audiences. 
Geographies of Broadcasting: Public Service and 
National Sovereignty on the Periphery 
During the latter half of the nineteenth century 
the transformation of the territory of New Zealand 
into a nation state coincided with the development 
of mechanical means of cultural reproduction in 
telegraphy, cinema, photography and radio. The 
process of nation-building in the colony was 
harnessed to a cultural project in which global 
communications networks were used to maintain 
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strong links with the 'Mother Country' and also to 
develop a sense of community between the 
geographically dispersed settlements of the colony 
(Thompson, 1995: 151). 
European colonial powers were able to exploit 
technologies - initially underwater cable systems 
and then later the electromagnetic spectrum - to 
establish early forms of trans-national media and 
communications industries linking colonial 
territories to metropolitan centres. By 1876, 
underwater cables laid between Britain, Australia 
and New Zealand constituted the first global 
system of non-transport communication 
(Thompson, 1995: 154). 
As Schiller argues, such developments provided the 
'ideologically supportive informational 
infrastructure' of global capitalism, 'promoting, 
protecting and extending the modern world system' 
(Schiller, 1989: 21). Throughout the Empire these 
technologies were developed largely by British- 
owned companies working alongside the British 
government, which funded major projects, such as 
submarine cabling, primarily through loans to 
colonial governments for infrastructural 
development. 
The structure of the global telecommunications 
network reflected the geo-politics of nineteenth 
century colonial relations, with developments at 
the national level integrated into a 'world 
communications system' (Robertson, 1992: 70). The 
emergence of international news agencies - 
concerned with the systematic gathering and global 
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dissemination of news and information - resulted 
in a treaty, the Agency Alliance Treaty, 1869, 
which divided the world into domains defined by 
spheres of economic and political influence of the 
major European powers. 
As a result, the British company Reuters covered 
the territories of the Empire, enjoying as 
Thompson puts it 'some degree of political 
patronage ... providing information which was 
valuable for the conduct of trade and diplomacy' 
(Thompson, 1995: 155). 
Similarly in broadcasting, whilst the allocation 
of the electromagnetic spectrum and related 
licensing legislation was controlled by national 
governments, the British company Cable and 
Wireless dominated the colonial hardware market in 
wireless sets (ibid). Thus the globalising 
tendencies of broadcasting and the tensions 
between public and private spheres were already 
inherent in structures established towards the end 
of the nineteenth century. 
This section explores the links between the 
economics of broadcasting and broader issues of 
sovereignty, regulation and national identity 
arguing that the emergence of New Zealand's 
'mixed' broadcasting system - part public 
service/part commercial - resulted in a form of 
state regulation which attempted to 'ring-fence' 
designated areas of local production in a 
broadcasting structure dominated by 'foreign' 
interventions but servicing, in the main, the 
interests of the privileged white majority who 
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have been demographically more appealing to 
advertisers. 
The institutional arrangements of broadcasting in 
New Zealand, mimicking Britain's public service 
model, have always been the most heavily regulated 
cultural sphere in New Zealand. However the public 
service ideal of an independent broadcasting 
system could not be fully realised in the colony 
due to financial constraints - the small 
population base generated insufficient revenue to 
fund the service solely through a licence fee - 
and the difficulty of providing and maintaining a 
universal service to a sparse population scattered 
across mountainous terrain. A massive 
technological and economic outlay was required to 
ensure national transmission; thus from the outset 
broadcasting regulation was dictated as much by 
the needs of advertisers as the state 
(Bell, 1995a: 182) 
In the earliest days of broadcasting, regulation 
was seen as a mechanism for protecting citizens 
from 'media effects', later coalescing around the 
threat of 'Americanisation', although wave-length 
scarcity was the technicist reason used to 
legitimate such controls. During the 1920s 
Britain's Reithian public service model - 'devoted 
to the highest tradition of communitY and nation' 22 
- provided a blueprint for New Zealand's 
broadcasting structure. Public service was seen as 
the means by which a regulatory'stxucture could be 
established to ensure the power of the new medium 
22 Quoted in Curran (1987). 
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was constrained and directed towards the 'national 
interestl(Thompson, 1988: 255). 
Initially the paternalism of New Zealand's public 
service structure reflected fears about the 
potential effects of radio as a powerful form of 
mass communication. The Government used draconian 
legislation to 'protect' the nation's listeners 
through regulatory measures, first introduced in 
1923. Importantly such regulation also involved 
the temporal domestication of national life 
through the structuring of daily rituals based 
around scheduling; this of course is an important 
element in constructing an 'imagined community' of 
listeners (Scannell, 1988). 
The first twenty years of radio in New Zealand saw 
the public service requirement to inform the 
public met by a stream of international news 
provided by Reuters London news agency, whilst 
entertainment programmes relied heavily on BBC- 
produced recordings of orchestral music and drama. 
This reliance on British programming meant that 
the majority white population of New Zealand were 
able to imagine themselves linked to 'Home' 
through the diasporic space of a broadcasting 
system which, while making claims to be 
'national', relied on programming material 
produced in Britain and targeted specifically at 
the Empire (Cardiff, 1987: 139). 
Significantly, the discourses of 'quality' and 
'high culture', which underpinned the debate about 
the superiority of public service in Britain, were 
deployed in the colony to distinguish BBC's 
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imports from US competition. State intervention in 
the trade of cultural goods (which attempted to 
guarantee a stable proportion of locally produced 
programmes in the schedules) was seen as a means 
of protecting citizens primarily from American 
cultural imperialism (Collins, 1990: 210). 
However, as 'information' was increasingly 
identified as central to the formation of ideas 
and identity, regulation was used as the means to 
ensure a congruity between 'polity and culture', 
its primary purpose being to maintain a strong 
sense of national identity in the public sphere - 
in New Zealand's case of course, this was overlaid 
by an imperial identity (ibid: 206). 
Following the introduction of television in the 
fifties (seen as an even greater threat to social 
cohesion), transmission was restricted to the 
evenings only while soap operas and other 
'polluting' forms were banned during school 
holidays (Butterworth, 1989: 147). However, 
qualitative issues were overtaken by concerns for 
national sovereignty which came to dominate 
debates about the media in New Zealand in the 
post-war period. 
Similar economies of scale exist in television 
production as they do for film; as a result the 
cost of purchasing imported programmes from the 
United States or Great Britain, where the size of 
domestic markets ensures production and 
distribution costs are covered before export, has 
always been substantially cheaper than 'home- 
produced' material (ibid: 165). 
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Thus in New Zealand the economics of broadcasting 
has always severely restricted the capacity of the 
state to determine the way broadcasting has 
reflected and shaped the identity of the national 
community. Attempts to control coverage of the 
'national interest' were undermined by limited 
resources and the need to maximise audiences in a 
competitive market. For example, the reporting of 
international events has always been shaped by a 
news agenda heavily reliant on a mix of 'raw' 
visual material brought in from picture agencies 
(with a locally-produced script narrated over the 
pictures) or Ire-packaged' reports from foreign 
correspondents working for major national networks 
in Britain and North America and then sold on to 
smaller regional broadcasters. Similarly, forms of 
entertainment programming have been shaped by the 
finely-honed market-driven genres of major 
international broadcasting organisations, 
producing popular programmes guaranteed to deliver 
audience ratings and generate cross-media 
commercial 'tie-ins'. 
In 1991 television programmes - already proven 
commercially viable with American or British 
audiences - could be purchased by New Zealand 
broadcasters for $5000 per hour while an hour of 
locally-produced documentary cost $100,000. As 
Horrocks puts it: 
Why should Television New Zealand pay 
$200,000 for an hour of local drama when it 
can purchase the most popular television 
programmes in the world for $5000? 
(Horrocks, 1995: 81). 
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As a result, local content has always remained 
relatively stable at around 25% of programming 
(compared with Britain's 80%) but, equally 
significantly, with the exception of nationally 
televised sporting events, such programming has 
rarely attracted more than 10% of the total 
audience. This is primarily because local products 
are seen as 'foreign' by an audience used to 
Anglo-American programmes which have constructed 
production values around 'taste cultures' 
difficult to emulate within limited public funding 
arrangements and using local actors: 
In the cinema and television imported 
material is so dominant that it represents 
the norm, a situation that produces the 
'cultural cringe' .... actors have been 
encouraged to develop a 'BBC' accent since 
this sounded natural or normal in drama. 
In one sense television in New Zealand has 
been culturally a leading agent of 
colonialism - reinforcing the belief that 
British culture is superior (ibid: 93) 
The public service agenda, in terms of locally- 
produced content, has been shaped by a regulatory 
structure based on the reproduction of imagined 
versions of nation. In a. broadcasting environment 
increasingly dependant on advertising (over the 
years the licence fee as a proportion of revenue 
has declined steeply), broadcasters have needed to 
guarantee the delivery of specific demographies of 
audiences to advertisers (the consuming AB's), a 
factor which has overdetermined content delivery. 
Despite a rhetoric which has presented New 
Zealand's public broadcasting sphere as open and 
accessible, 'citizenship' has tended to be 
defined through the discourses of consumerism with 
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the economic ideologies of the state being 
reworked within hegemonic versions of national 
identity. As a result 'nationalist' funding 
formulae have tended to finance a repertoire of 
'normative' local programming which has replicated 
the themes of imported material within a limited 
range of genres - in particular documentary, soap 
opera and drama. As Butterworth argues, the need 
to maximise audience ratings means: 
In New Zealand ... television symbolically 
annihilates whole classes, generations and 
ethnic groups. Existing institutional 
arrangements and power structures are 
replicated and reinforced by 
television ..... (Butterworth, 1989: 156). 
In 1988, the Waitangi Tribunal identified 
broadcasting as a cultural sphere from which Maori 
people had been systematically excluded. In its 
ruling on the interpretation of the Treaty's 
guarantee to protect Maori cultural treasures, the 
Tribunal stated that the structures of 
broadcasting, legislated from an elitist and 
'white' centre, continued to reproduce the social 
relations of domination. 
The Waitangi Tribunal's ruling coincided with the 
deregulation of the broadcasting, along with all 
other areas of state activity, in the late 1980s. 
Deregulation in a sense, resolved the 
contradictions inherent in a system caught between 
public service restrictions and commercial 
imperatives. The internationalising tendencies of 
the broadcast/ telecommunications industry was 
accelerating with technological developments 
particularly in relation to transmission by 
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direct-broadcast satellite. The satellite 
'footprint' of trans-national broadcasters such as 
Cable News Network (CNN) and Murdoch's Sky 
Channels were able to reach domestic audiences 
whilst operating outside the borders of the 
nation; they were therefore not bound by the 
public service regulatory structure. The 
globalising tendencies of broadcasting increased 
with these new forms of delivery and provided the 
legitimation for the deregulation of a 
broadcasting structure already under considerable 
commercial pressure. 
In order to compete with satellite and cable, New 
Zealand's terrestrial radio and television network 
was restructured as two separate state-owned 
enterprises (SOE), wholly funded through 
advertising and sponsorship. Terrestrial 
television channels continued to be owned by the 
state although 'foreign' companies subsequently 
made substantial investments in the sector which 
was legislated to operate as a commercial business 
with the primary aim of returning a profit to the 
state and other shareholders (Kelsey: 1993: 112). 
Deregulation resulted in the removal of local 
content quotas; in particular broadcasters were no 
longer required to schedule news or other 
'informative or 'educative' programmes. In order 
to generate acceptable levels of profit, 
advertising increased from five to seven days a 
week, with the maximum limit per hour increasing 
from the pre-deregulation figure of seven to 
fourteen minutes (Bell, 1995a: 182). 
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In New Zealand's small and highly competitive 
broadcasting market, with limited potential for 
advertising growth, programming has increasingly 
been forced to rely on formulaic 'lowest common 
denominator' genres in order to guarantee the 
delivery of target audiences to advertisers. As 
a result the range of programming has narrowed 
significantly: minority and special interests 
programmes together with arts, religious, public 
access and children's educational programming have 
disappeared from the schedules: As Kelsey puts 
it: 
The overseas influence was already putting 
pressure on local and 'minority' 
programming before deregulation but this 
rapidly worsened ..... the proportional share 
of prime time television for local 'public 
service' programmes fell significantly 
between 1978 and 1992. (Kelsey, 1993: 113) 
'Specialist' areas of programming (which 
previously fell within the public service remit) 
have been replaced by 'local' products which 
replicate 'imported' genres - foreign-formatted 
quiz shows featuring local contestants or locally- 
fronted foreign affairs programmes screening 
packages produced elsewhere, masquerading as 
'national' programmes. 
In order to accommodate the recommendations of the 
Waitangi Tribunal (regarding the 'bicultural 
partnership' for cultural production) within the 
market-driven broadcasting environment , the 1989 
Broadcasting Act established a commission which 
was given an explicit brief to promote 'national' 
culture. New Zealand On Air (NZOA) was empowered 
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to collect a licence fee and use the money 'to 
reflect and develop New Zealand identity and 
culture' with a particular emphasis on 'Maori 
language and culture' (ibid: 183). Policy makers 
adopted a funding model which established a Public 
Service Broadcasting Council to act as an 'Arts 
Council of the air', commissioning independent 
productions which were packaged and 'branded' with 
the NZOA logo for transmission so that, according 
to Bell 'viewing NZOA-funded programmes becomes a 
patriotic act' (Bell, 1995: 195). 
This model purported to separate 'public' 
programming imperatives from the commercial 
aspects of broadcasting; however, much of the 
output funded by NZOA has tended to be confined to 
the peripheral zones of the schedules in a market- 
driven environment dominated by the need to 
deliver 'bundles' of targeted consumer groups to 
advertisers. 'Minority' programmes are competing 
with versions of the nation which are now 
powerfully represented in the new broadcasting 
environment. 
The globalising tendency of broadcasting has been 
accompanied by the emergence of a strong 
'nationalist' discourse embedded in televisual 
content, particularly in forms of 'channel 
branding', corporate programme sponsorship and 
advertising campaigns which market Itrans- 
national' products to 'niche' regional audiences. 
In many ways deregulated television, dominated by 
market forces, and no longer mediated by state 
regulation, has given rise to a global culture of 
consumption which relies on recognisably local 
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iconography for its reproduction. As Butterworth 
argues: 
New Zealanders are sold a happy-family, good- 
society story, a story of sporting prowess 
and rural prosperity, a story of boats and 
freezers and late-model cars, a story of 
racial harmony in what an alien viewer would 
assume, in any case, to be an homogenous 
white society (Butterworth, 1989: 156). 
It is worth examining in detail the way in which 
nationalist narratives are reproduced across the 
'flow' of television programming. Televised sportr 
the most popular form of local programming, 
provides an apposite example, particularly because 
the 'live' events are staged for transmission. (In 
other words television coverage does not simply 
record a game as an event; rather it stages a 
performance around the game). 
New Zealand's peripheral international standing in 
the spheres of politics, economics and culture has 
meant that historically, rugby has been 
overdetermined with signifiers of nation. - 
heterosexual masculinity, physicality, - 
egalitarianism and racial harmony are key 
attributes mythologised in representationsýof the 
national game. In recent times the sport has 
become a site of contestation; the 'whiteness' of 
rugby (in relation to the game's colonial and 
class history and its ties with Pouth Africa),, 
together with the masculinist focus of the game, 
has meant rugby is no longer'seen as a, lneutrall 
vehicle for national mythologies. As Fougere 
argues 'the values and practices embodied in rugby 
have long been at odds with patterns emerging in 
261 
New Zealand culture'(Fougere, 1989: 120). 
Nevertheless televised coverage of rugby 
spectacles continues to reproduce a repertoire of 
themes involving 'magic moments' of 
'togetherness'. Underpinning the coverage is the 
representation of a dominant white 'national' 
lifestyle. 
The segments discussed here date from 1991, a 
crucial year for the game in New Zealand, with the 
All Blacks defending two international trophies - 
the Rugby World Cup and the Bledisloe Cup (a bi- 
national competition between New Zealand and 
Australia). The examples discussed below 
demonstrate the way in which a cross-genre flow of 
televisual material - channel branding, 
sponsorship linfotainment', advertising, news 
commentary and match coverage - can be sutured 
together to provide an overarching narrative of 
'belonging' structured, in this instance, around 
the theme of a nation preparing for 'war'. These 
televisual spectacles (choreographed on camera by 
white male anchors) provide examples of the way in 
which nationalist discourses are reproduced 
through a complex matrix of gendered and 
racialised imagery. Crucially it is the 'live' 
element of the programming which bridges the 
public and private spheres, constructing a 
community of viewers as participants in a national 
'moment'. 
The first example focuses on an hour-long newS7 
magazine special fronted by the white news' 
celebrity/presenter Paul Holmes. The programme 
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segment begins with a Television One channel 
branding graphic entitled 'One World of Sport' 
superimposed on a spinning globe. This graphic 
parodies cartography's 'Peter's projection' (which 
normally represents the country sliding off the 
edge of the world) by f illing the space of the 
Pacific Ocean with an over-sized 'New Zealand'. 
Following the 'Holmes' titles and theme music, 
Paul Holmes (live and in vision) , introduces the 
programme with an invocation uniting viewers in a 
farewell to the team: 
Tonight we are gathered to say good-bye to 
the All Blacks on the eve of their battle 
for the World Cup in the UK. 
Next follows a clip of the Prime Minister Jim 
Bolger addressing the team from what appears to be 
his office: 
All New Zealanders are behind you - they 
know you'll do us proud in the final. 
This is followed by the World Cup 'theme song' 
(replayed numerous times during the programme). A 
massed-choir sings the 'Brotherhood of Man' hit 
united we stand, divided we fall 
and if our backs should ever be against the 
wall, 
we'll be together, 
together you and I 
over a relay of images depicting a Maori haka 
group and various All Black players scoring tries 
and 'bedding down' in scrum formations. The clip 
ends with a chant in Maori from a male choir. 
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The first section of 'Holmes' is devoted to live 
interviews with (all-male, all-white) pundits 
discussing the forthcoming competition. Following 
an advertising break, a series of recorded pieces 
headlined as 'The Mothers' features interviews 
with 'All Black Mums', as Holmes calls them, in 
their homes, discussing the domestic needs of 
their sons. Three of the five women interviewed in 
this section are Maori or Pacific Islanders. 
These two segments, (the punditry followed by 'the 
Mums') reproduce the gendered and racialised 
divisions which characterise the sport; the white 
men, 'live' and speaking from a public space, 
discuss the technicalities of the game while the 
women are relegated to a pre-recorded, behind-the- 
scenes, domestic zone. 
These 'news magazine' segments are interspersed 
with advertising breaks each of which begins with 
a short linfotainment' segment featuring archive 
footage of the All Blacks playing at Twickenham - 
'home of rugby' - edited in time to an 
instrumental version of 'English Country Garden'. 
This sequence, using repackaged grainy imagery of 
newsreel archives, connotes 'heritage' and 
'Englishness', endowing New Zealand rugby with a 
mythologised 'white' history and tradition in the 
international arena. The segment finishes with 
the insignia of the sponsors, Steinlager, branding 
the company's beer as the nation's drink for the 
World Cup. 
The advertising break which follows is dominated 
by the representation of a normative 'whiteness'. 
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Given the symbolic economy of advertising is 
driven by a rhetoric which creates associations 
between lifestyles and socially desirable subject 
positions (seemingly attainable only through the 
consumption of products and services being 
promoted) it follows that taste cultures and 
distinctions reified through the representation of 
such lifestyles (usually involving the maintenance 
of corporeal, domestic and leisure-based regimes) 
will reproduce versions of 'whiteness'. In New 
Zealand, such imagery incorporates dominant (and 
highly regressive) constructions of 'nation'. 
The 'break' begins with an advertisement for New 
Zealand's National Bank, a subsidiary of the 
trans-national banking group Lloyds. The Lloyds 
'black horse' (the global branding insignia of the 
corporation) appears throughout the sequence as an 
integral part of a landscape in which a range of 
luniversalised' (and emphatically 'white') images 
of rural nostalgia (the land, the harvest), inter- 
generational community (the men, the women, the 
children, the old people) condenses a range of 
nationalist themes. A quick succession of brown 
and white 'sepia-tinted' visual clips is edited to 
time with a'segment of Vivaldi's 'Four Seasons' 
(signifying 'nature') which plays uninterrupted on 
one sound-track. The rhythm of image and music 
produces 'heartbeat' timing which, increases the 
intensity and unity of the text, potentially 
eliciting an emotional response from the viewer 
through a powerful (and banal) distillation of 
nostalgic imagery. Over the music a deep male 
voice on the second sound track makes a 
personalised appeal to the viewer, in sonorous 
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tones: 
Your life is in the land 
Generation after generation 
Watching it grow so that those that follow 
can also watch it grow 
Rely upon those who work alongside you, 
come rain or shine 
The visual elements of the advertisement create, 
in quick succession, a montage of aestheticised 
shots which signify fecundity of the land and 
harmony with 'nature', implicitly linking the role 
of the bank with this nationalist 'structure of 
feeling'. The sequence of images unfolds as 
follows :a child (long-haired, blonde) climbs 
onto a large bale of hay, hand raised to her 
shield her eyes, she gazes across a rural 
landscape; a landscape shot featuring the black 
horse galloping through expansive wheat fields; 
the broad back of a black-singleted man (white) 
driving a fencing pile into ploughed earth; a deep 
ploughed furrow; a single autumnal leaf floating 
in water; a medium close shot of the galloping 
black horse; a woman (white) at a farm-house 
window gazing out; children (white) playing in a 
yard; the black horse in close-up; sheep being 
shorn in a yard, a wedding party (white couple) 
showered with confetti (white) on the steps of a 
church (white); men (white) playing cricket on a 
rural green; a pair of elderly hands (white) 
folded in a lap; the black horse; cows in pasture; 
an old man (white) gazing at theýsunset; a young 
woman (white) holding a baby; a young man (white) 
in a check shirt wiping wheat from his hand stands 
beside the woman and child; a plough; the black. 
horse; milk (white) flowing from a churn; wheat 
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flowing (like the milk) in a stream across the 
screen; a bunch of grapes on the vine, the blonde 
child jumps off the hay bale and the final shot 
features the black horse standing on its hind legs 
as a graphic National Bank logo (in Lloyd's 
colours and typography) appears on screen. 
Clearly this 'shot list' cannot adequately convey 
the powerful condensation of imagery and music 
which produces a dense layering within the 'micro- 
format' of the advertisement's narrative. The 
bracketing of (white) in the shot description 
above is intended to indicate the way in which the 
imagery detailed above is freighted with 
'whiteness'. Richard Dyer suggests that a 
'commutation test', where the imaginary 
substitution of black people for white in 
representations, provides the means to interrogate 
the way in which 'whiteness' naturalises 
particular kinds of dominance (Dyer, 1988). In 
this advertisement, such a substitution (of 
'Maori' for 'white') would potentially produce a 
polysemy of meaning with the narrator's 
pronouncement - 'Your life is in the land' - 
opening up a space for a 1(mis)-reading' which 
denaturalises the relationship between 
'whiteness', the land and nature (and the role of 
the financial sector, in this case Lloyds, in 
facilitating this relationship). 
Obviously textual analysis begs many questions not 
only about the way in which texts in general (and 
this 'micro-narrative' in particular), 'carry' 
meaning but also the extent to which such 
'universalised' images of nostalgia are 
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interpreted at a local level. Nevertheless this 
example highlights the way televisual material 
produces shared repertoires -a semiotic 'common 
sense' - through a web of intertextual layering 
which distils and condenses (amongst other things) 
a range of recognisably nationalist tropes. 
More broadly, the representation of ethnicity and 
gender across the flow of material in the Holmes 
segment is generically compartmentalised. For 
example the themed refrain used by Television One 
before and during the World Cup competition (and 
featured here at the beginning of the programme), 
depicts the 'national war cry' (the haka) and 
massed choirs of Maori and Pakeha singing together 
to signify 'one nation'. Similarly the interviews 
with All Black mothers acknowledges the 'racial' 
mix of a team which is dominated by powerful Maori 
and Pacific Island players who, in the context of 
sporting excellence, become eligible for 
televisual citizenship. By contrast, the 
advertising break privileges 'whiteness', as 
advertisers target products and services at the 
'consuming, sector of the audience by representing 
normative versions of bourgeois, heterosexual 
social relations. (Following on from the 
advertisement for the National Bank, a local 
cosmetic company advertises a perfume called 
'White Shoulders' while the next advertisement in 
the segment - for 'Go-boy' dog food reeks of a 
bourgeois 'white' lifestyle, with two pedigree, 
golden-blonde retrievers bounding through the 
leisured space of an unworked rural landscape). 
In the second example to be, discussed - the- 
268 
coverage of the Bledisloe Cup broadcast f rom 
Auckland's Eden Park - the match is produced as a 
'live' cultural event for both the national 
television audience and viewers in Australia. Such 
spectacles are relatively cheap to broadcast and 
provide examples of the way in which electronic 
media have transformed the traditional 
relationship between physical settings and social 
events. 
Satellite delivery enables spatially dispersed 
groups to participate in live performances as a 
community of viewers united by an experience 
created within the electronically-generated space 
of transmission. In this case, the commentary of 
the white male presenter is broadcast 
simultaneously to the crowd at Eden Park (who are 
able to view the broadcast on large screens around 
the stadium) and to the viewers 'at home'. The 
audience's response to the event is mediated by 
cameras which provide a mix of shots (including 
close-ups of the crowd), drawing the viewer closer 
to the 'action' and potentially organising 
responses to the event. 
The hour-long build-up to the match is scripted in 
order to create numerous opportunities for 
advertising breaks and repetitive 'branding' 
clips for Steinlager - 'sponsors of our boys in 
black' - edited to a segment of the Thin Lizzy 
song 'The Boys are Back in Town'., 
The unity of the programme is organised through 
cross-referential segments linking promotional 
discourses (brand 'New Zealand') with, popular 
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culture in a secular celebration of nation which 
condenses motifs and myths - 'our boys' and 'the 
people' - to signify unity in a sporting battle 
reconfigured as 'war'. A chain of repetitive 
refrains - the Steinlager riff and channel 
branding together with clips of local celebrities, 
sports personalities and politicians wishing the 
team well - construct linkages between the team, 
the nation and domestic viewers. 
At one point the Auckland Philharmonic Orchestra 
and a chorus of singers from the Australasian 
version of Lloyd Webber's Les Miserables perform 
'The People's Song'. As the words appear on the 
screen above the stage, the stadium crowd join in 
the chorus: 
Do you hear the people sing 
It is the music of people who long to be 
free 
Singing the song of angry men 
Of people who will not be slaves again 
The camera closes in on the crowd picking out 
faces expressing intense emotion, including a 
close-up shot of New Zealand's international opera 
'star' Kiri Te Kanawa wiping a tear from her eye. 
This 'melting-pot' of high and popular culture 
elements the bringing together of famous and the 
ordinary produces a repertoire of visual and 
aural stimuli encoding a shared'sense of community 
in which mass participation and egalitarianism 
symbolise belonging in the face of 'adversity'. 
The discussion above suggests deregulated 
broadcasting organisations, operating at a sup I ra- 
national level, target particular segments of 
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audience through the reproduction of recognisably 
'local' discourses which operate intertextually 
across different genres. Given the fabric of 
everyday life is increasingly saturated with a 
flow of signs which tend to Idisembed' social 
relations so that, as Appardurai puts it 'the 
imagination is now central to all forms of agency' 
(Apparadurai, 1996: 6), it follows that in fields 
of cultural production 'local' identities are 
increasingly constituted by imaginaries produced 
elsewhere. 
Moreover, in the context of the deregulation of 
the public sphere (with the attendant profit- 
driven necessity of the delivery of 'AB' sections 
of audience to advertisers), the televisual 
landscape of nation, however non-specific, -may be 
racialised in particularly regressive ways. 
Without undertaking audience research it is 
impossible to speculate on the way viewers are 
positioned in relation to such coverage. However, 
the flow of televisual material discussed above 
suggests an overarching spatial identity - 'we the 
people' - invites viewers to participate in a 
spectacle addressed to a national collectivity. 
Crucially the question remains, how-do actual 
groups of domestic viewers identify with a 
national imaginary produced within a medium which 
continues to privilege 'whiteness' in 
representations of lnation"ý 
While the globalised commodification of culture, 
characterised by convergence between formerly 
distinct spheres such example television, cinema, 
publishing and the leisure industries, creates 
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domains of value and taste through the 
valorisation of a generic 'western lifestyle' the 
interventions of these industries are not 
necessarily monolithic or homogenising nor are 
consumption practices necessarily passive or 
predictable. 
Cultural identities are produced through a network 
of apparatuses and daily practices which situate 
individuals within imaginary narratives and as a 
result they are socialised into forms of national 
or ethnic belonging. In national formations the 
'language of the people' is reproduced through the 
media and cultural industries and inculcated 
through the schooling system. 
As we have seen in the discussion of the new 
national museum in New Zealand, the state is able 
to make active interventions in reinterpreting and 
reinscribing the narrations of nation. Such 
explicit interventions, which delineate the 
boundaries of cultural identities through 
particular inclusions and exclusions, provide the 
structural mechanisms for defining 'national 
culture'. These institutional mechanisms produce 
the 'fictive identities' of nation by projecting 
individual existence into the the weft of a 
collective narrative which is continually, 
contested and transformed by struggles for 
hegemony. 
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Chapter 6 
This thesis has examined the historical, economic 
and cultural context for the articulation and 
rearticulation of shifting constructions of 'race' 
and ethnicity which have legitimated the 
structural inequalities and exclusions of a 
colonial state formation installed in New Zealand 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century 
to facilitate favourable conditions for capitalist 
modes of production and extraction. 
Previous chapters have shown that the way in which 
different groupings have been imagined and 
represented as 'raced' collectivities at 
particular historical conjunctures has been 
central to the process of nation-building in New 
Zealand and more latterly to the bicultural 
settlement which has lindigenised' the dominant 
racialised configuration Maori/Pakeha to construct 
a new version of nation based on the rhetoric 'we 
are all settlers'. 
As Chapter 2 analysed, New Zealand's 'crisis of 
identity' during the past twenty years has been 
bound up with a shift of economic focus away from 
the former ties of Empire towards the Pacific Rim. 
The resultant political, cultural and economic 
realignments have seen"racialised'identities in 
New Zealand 'remade' in the face of globalisation 
and deregulation. 
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The thesis has shown how 'whiteness' as a system 
of structured privilege, produced an identity that 
was dehistoricised, invisible and unexamined 
precisely because it came to be aligned with the 
idea of nation. White New Zealanders were 
represented as the New Zealanders and in the 
process their majority presence in the territory 
has been legitimated and naturalised. 
European settlers who emigrated to New Zealand in 
the nineteenth century travelled to a place which 
had been constructed textually through an imperial 
archive which classified, measured and 
hierarchised the Empire, systematically valorising 
European political social and cultural practices 
as the universal of the Icivilising mission', over 
all others. 
The colonial space 
Jerusalem; a place 
than the place the 
National identity 
relationships with 
oriented vision wh 
was represented as the New 
manifestly different and better 
settlers-had left, behind. 
became condensed around settler 
the landscape in a future- 
ich was set against the 
perceived deprivations and alienations of 
industrialised Europe. 
Aligned with the civilising discourses of 
modernity, 'whiteness' came to function as. a 
normative, hegemonic and privileged cultural 
identity in New Zealand (coterminous with dominant 
notions of 'citizenship'), albeit stratified by 
divisions of class and gender. 
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Thus constructions of nation saw 'whiteness' 
harnesssed to the idea of civilisation, democracy, 
progress and individualism in a fashion replicated 
in different ways in other geo-political contexts 
by those nations which came to comprise 'the 
West'. 
The Treaty of Waitangi (1840) provided the legal 
means for the colonisers to legitimate their local 
objectives. As Chapter 3 has detailed, the Treaty 
enabled the colonisers to quickly expedite the 
material objectives of the Icivilising mission', 
namely the acquisition of Maori land which was 
obtained by imposing European notions of value and 
individual property rights on the land. Tribal 
forms of land ownership and management which did 
not 'add value' were rendered illegal; such 
territory was designated as 'waste land' and 
subsequently confiscated. 
For the settler majority, the Treaty, the form of 
which was mistakenly represented in national 
histories as unique to New Zealand, has until 
recently, symbolised national unity and racial 
harmony, shoring up the myth that the. settlers had 
participated in a benevolent, colonisation process. 
Discourses of nation coalesced around the myth - 
'We are one people' -a rallying cry which implied 
the assimilation of Maori had been successfully 
achieved. Such constructions glossed, the legal 
status of the treaty, which was Only recently 
acknowledged, and the colonial,, objectives it had 
been drawn up to achieve., 
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The acquisition of cheap land was the foundation 
for white settler prosperity. The thesis has shown 
that privileges of 'whiteness' accrued to the 
settler majority through an uneven distribution of 
economic, political, social and cultural power 
which saw the social organisation and complex 
cultural practices of the Maori systematically 
denigrated and marginalised as the totalising 
structures of the national formation were put in 
place. Of course, the 'land-grab' was the most 
significant but in other arenas modernity was 
imposed through the technologies of 
'%governmentalityl. For example, the installation 
of English as the official language of nation 
determined the cultural values and standards of 
the colonial education system (defining public 
forms of tastes and value); this in turn impacted 
on the hierarchies structuring the labour market 
and the social formation by effectively 
marginalising those for whom Maori was a first 
language. 
At the same time the ambivalence which has 
historically characterised the relationship 
between the settler majority and the Maori began 
to show itself from the 1890's when 'Maori' 
iconography began to appear in public versions of 
nationhood. Maoriness provided the means to 
represent distinctiveness for a nation which 
lacked the 'cultural capital' of the 'historic 
nations' of the 'West'. 
The extent to which the appropriations of Maori, ý 
land had been naturalised in discourses, of nation, 
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can be gleaned from the way in which associations 
between Maori and the land could at the same time 
provide reference points for the colonial culture 
which sought to represent its uniqueness by 
distancing itself in discourses of nation from its 
dependency on Britain. 
Stamps, currency and souvenirs were embellished 
with Maori scrolls while a repertoire of 
distinctive imagery based on 'traditional' 
Maoriness were used in tourist literature and 
later in commercial iconography. Importantly this 
repertoire was later available for reappropriation 
by Maori asserting contemporary claims to 
indigeneity and sovereignty. 
The thesis has traced the 'traffic' between 
Maoridom and settler culture in order to show that 
Maori were never mere victims of colonialism - 
that the relationship was more dialogic than 
monologic. The renegotiation of the Treaty of 
Waitangi came out of a long, historic struggle 
against the imposition of Eurocentric cultural, 
political and social institutions which, through 
mechanisms of regulation and control, sought at 
first to assimilate the indigenous people as 
'almost-modern' subjects within the liberal 
democratic state. 
Stripped of their land and disadvantaged by the 
capitalist division of labour imposed in the 
colony, Maori have always resisted colonial 
domination and as a result, were subjected to the 
most coercive and repressive technologies of state 
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power - the legal apparatus and civil war during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century. More 
recently, as Chapter 3 has shown, counter- 
hegemonic challenges for Maori sovereignty have 
been incorporated, for the moment at least, 
through the inclusionary mechanisms of the 
'bicultural settlement'. 
Identity claims have been crucial for Maori tribal 
groups making claims for reparations to the 
Waitangi Tribunal. Rulings handed down by the 
Tribunal have re-assessed colonial appropriations 
in terms of the spiritual values Maori are deemed 
to have attached to the land. These contemporary 
reinterpretations of the terms of the treaty have 
insisted that for Maori, land was a source of 
identity that went beyond the limited relationship 
enshrined in European law which recognised Maori 
rights only in relation to 'cultivated' land. 
Access to political and economic power has been 
largely restricted to those who have successfully 
'integrated' and to those groupings who aligned 
themselves most strongly to a cultural identity 
based on constructions of 'tradition', in 
particular, as having specific allegiances to 
tribe. 
This channelling of identity 
limitations on the nature of 
order to be viable, have had 
an identity rubric which has 
Maoriness and in the process 
claimants who have attempted 
in order to politicise Treat: 
has placed severe 
the claims which, in 
to be subsumed within 
essentialised 
excluded those 
to beyond the frame 
1 issues through a 
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broader critique of colonialism and its 
relationship to capitalism. 
Thus while the 'primitivist' idealisations have 
had strategic political value, playing an 
empowering role in the recognition of Maori rights 
and reparations; the 'truth claims' which police 
the boundaries of Maoriness not only affirm 
indigenous spirituality in relation to the land 
and nature, they also marginalise those elements 
deemed 'inauthentic'. 
The emphasis on 'authenticity' is of course as 
'invented' as any other version of identity. Pan- 
tribal Maori identities only emerged in the early 
nineteenth century and provided a collective means 
to counter colonial power. The cultural practices 
attributed to these forms of identification have 
drawn on colonialist representations of a 
primitivism Itextualised' by European 
anthropologists and missionaries during the early 
colonial period. To this extent, the thesis has 
shown that 'Maoriness' is as much an invention of 
modernity as 'whiteness'. 
Thus the recent bicultural settlement in New 
Zealand, based on the recognition of the Treaty of 
Waitangi's legal framing of 'two peoples one 
nation', can be seen to have provided a compromise 
staging-post in the on-going post-colonial 
struggle. 
In the global arena the nation, stateappears to, 
have settled accounts with Maori and this has , 
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improved the country's stability rating in the 
international markets. The reassessment of the 
Treaty of Waitangi signals a break with New 
Zealand's imperial past - sending a positive 
signal to the country's new trading partners on 
the Pacific Rim At the same time, with the 
national economy moving from its colonial 
dependency on agricultural production towards 
deregulated, service-based clusters, new versions 
of nation, based on biculturalism's valorisation 
of tradition and authenticity, have provided a 
means to 'brand' the nation - the 'purity' of 
physical landscape and the indigenous people now 
provide the 'unique selling point' for the place 
in the global tourist market. 
Simultaneously, the racial hierarchies through 
which the hegemonically privileged category 
'white' were produced, have been subjected to a 
'renovation'. The Maori challenge to both the 
legality and the morality of white settlement has 
resulted in attempts to construct 'post-settler' 
narratives which incorporate Maoriness without 
significantly diminishing white entitlements. This 
has seen 'whiteness' effect a partial 
indigenisation by taking on some of the newly- 
valorised attributes of 'Maoriness' in order to 
rework notions of entitlement through spiritual 
claims to the land. This is a move which produces 
a 'pakehal identity uncontaminated by Europe 
whilst perpetuating the, long--ýstanding national 
amnesia which erases connections between the 
material conditions underpinning white, privilege 
and the history of colonialism. Instead, in a 
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move of disaffiliation, where Pakeha become the 
victims of modernity, the disavowal of colonialism 
is linked to a contemporary inversion which 
positions Europe as New Zealand's Other as the 
nation is Ire-branded' for its role in the new 
globalised era of 'corporate multi-culturalism'. 
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